A HOUSE OF LORDS REFORM PROPOSAL

The chief aim of my proposals is to make a transition to a different form of second chamber, on the threefold principle that:

a) Such a transition needs to be a reasonably painless, evolutionary process.

b) Such a transition needs to produce a more effective, ‘slim-line’ revising chamber.

c) Such a transition needs to produce a chamber which contains a more interesting and varied mix of members.

Taking these three principles together, we need to take steps which will, so to speak, throw out the bath-water, but not the baby … and, to stretch the analogy a little, create space for some fresh water, too:

Step One:
Retain current arrangements for Hereditaries and Bishops. Automatically grant a life-peerage to all members of the supreme court ; who become entitled to sit in the Lords (as ‘Law Lords’) upon their retirement from the court.

Step Two:
A Bill placing a limit on the total number of peers there can be (whether sitting in the Lords or not), at any one time. I suggest 1750 people.

Step Three:
The Life Peers to select 25% of their numbers to sit in the Lords (the remaining ‘pool’ of Life Peers could, like the pool of hereditaries, be voted back into the chamber, upon the death of a sitting Life Peer).

Step Four:
100 New Category Peers, selected entirely at random, maybe by a form of national lottery, phased in 20 per year. Replaced one at a time, on the death of one of their number.

Democracy is good, but so also is a link with our history as a nation (which the already much-depleted ‘Lord Spiritual’ help to provide). It would also be good to get a bit more ‘randomism’ in public life. What a delightful thing it would be, and what a boost to public interest in politics, if, say, the local bin-man was suddenly ennobled, under my system. Certainly, the presence of these ‘Jury Peers’ would go a long way to making the ‘feel’ of the second chamber much less elitist.

Some idle musings now on what the approximate ‘shape’ (using slightly out-dated wikipedia figures!) of The Lords would be, following my slimming down of the number of Life Peers ~

Conservative: 83 (35 Life, 48 Hereditary)
Cross: 71 (38 L, 33 H)
Labour: 54 (52 L, 2 H)
Lib Dems: 22 (17 L, 5 H)
UKIP: 2 (1 L, 1 H)

Total: 232 (117 for majority vote, currently Cons plus Lib Dems = 105; which means support also needed from 12 cross-benchers).

Party Percentages: Comparison To Commons:
Conservative: 35.8% Conservative: 46.9%
Cross: 30.6% Labour: 39.7%
Labour: 23.3% Lib Dems: 8.8%
Lib Dems: 9.5% Others: 4.6 %
UKIP: 0.9%

First Intake Of Random (‘Jury’) Peers: 20
Bishops: 25
Law Lords: 22

Total added on: 69

Total Life Peers: 143
Total Hereditary Peers: 91 (1 replacement pending)

Total House: 301

% Life Peers: 47.5 %
% Hereditary: 30.2 %
% First Intake Jury: 6.6 %
% Bishops: 8.3 %
% Law: 7.3 %

Significantly, the current (2010) Coalition Government gets a much better ‘showing’ here ~ but by a process of reduction, rather than addition.

In Sweden, a ‘Council on Legislation’ considers:

1. the manner in which the draft law relates to the fundamental laws (i.e. Sweden’s written and entrenched Constitution) and the legal system in general;

2. the manner in which the different provisions of the draft law relate to one another;

3. the manner in which the draft law relates to the requirements of the rule of law;

4. whether the draft law is so framed that the resulting act of law may be expected to satisfy the stated purposes of the proposed law;

5. what problems are likely to arise in applying the act of law.

I think all of those considerations could be usefully discussed by the Law Lords (and other peers with a legal background).
I think it unlikely that the Law Lords would want to do much voting in the divisions ~ this could be something for a Lords committee to keep an eye on.
I would also like to see a gradual movement towards one written constitution; which could incorporate those five key points.

Upon the completion of a written constitution, I would want any future alterations to that constitution to require the consent of both houses (maybe at a higher threshold than 50% plus 1).

On a final side point, it might be healthy to introduce a check-and-balance to the hereditary monarchy, by requiring the next in line to the throne to secure the approval of both houses, before becoming Head Of State. In the (highly unlikely) event of this approval not being granted, the next person along in line to the throne would go forward in the same way.

Step Two: The Life Peers to select 25% of their numbers to sit in the Lords (the remaining ‘pool’ of Life Peers can, like the pool of hereditaries, be voted back into the chamber, upon the death of a sitting LIfe Peer).

Step Three: 100 New Category Peers, selected entirely at random, maybe by a form of national lottery, phased in 20 per year. Replaced one at a time, on the death of one of their number.

Note: Retain current arrangements for Hereditaries, Law Lords and Bishops.

I believe this would amount to a reasonably painless transition to an effective revising chamber, with a nicely eccentric mix of members! )

I discussed this thread with one of my colleagues this evening who has probably got more experience in getting legislation passed through the private members’ bill process than anyone else alive. His response to Diversity’s comment “worthwhile amendments are always drafted with the Clerks’ advice,” was a very hollow laugh.

And that lies at the root of the disagreement. I’m a big fan of representative democracy, but I’d rather not put my faith in elected politicians, hence my support for other options as part of the solution. Like I said way up, I doubt we’ll agree on this, but the heart of the issue is I think that line.

The hereditary house was certainly partisan, but only one way. Indeed, it had such an institutional bias that it didn’t need to be tightly whipped.

The semi-reformed house is partisan, but it is balanced with no overall control. It is tightly whipped and indeed the members are slightly less likely to rebel than their colleagues in the Commons. That is its strength.

Take away that balance and you have… well, nothing much. You have a bunch of disparate individuals who may like or dislike what the government has just forced through the Commons but who have no real incentive to turn up and vote; who will constantly be told they should respect the wishes of the elected government; who will be constantly told that the finest minds the government has consulted tell them they’re policy is right.

In short, there will be whipping, but it will be the government bullying people into submission.

I love your idea that everything will be fine because the Clerks will be able to tell them what to do. Of course they will, but that’s called bureaucracy. I’d rather put my faith in politicians if its all the same to you.

I agree. What was wrong with the hereditary system was that it was ridiculously partisan. What is right about the present House is that it is much less ridiculously partisan. Selection by lot/sortition will prevent it ever becoming so biased again, without setting up unnecessary conflict of authority between two elected houses.

I spent long hours listening to the old House of Lords at work (on balance it was less soporific than the Commons). The hereditaries were doing nothing that ordinary citzens could not do. Worthwhile amendments are always drafted with the Clerks’ advice.

Firstly, the hereditary system was broken and most of the story of UK constitutional reform of the 20th century was about attempting to fix it in various ways. It was ridiculously partisan.

It is widely recognised that it works much better now. Labour don’t appreciate the fact that it has a nasty habit of changing its precious legislation, but the balanced nature of the House means that it is likely to treat a Conservative government in the same way. It’s one thing I strongly agree with Meg Russell on.

Secondly, yes, at the end of the process peers merely have to engage in binary votes, but they also need to be in a position to draft amendments to legislation. If they don’t do the latter there is none of the former to do!

Juat think carefully about what we expected and received from the old accidental peers under the hereditary system. They participated – a few still do – in the detailed, line-by-line scrutiny that the Lords perform (when given the chance by adequately prepared legislation)and particpated in the simple closed vote decisions at the end of the process. Is there any basis for expecting a random selection of citizens to do worse?
Incidentally, jury decisions are of a yes/no type, like votes in the Houses of Parliament; but the reasoning behind them can be complex. The last time I served on a jury, we found the defendant not guilty. We agreed unaimously that she had committed a robbery, but also that she had been charged with the wrong robbery.
As to how our Peers by lot are persuaded to attend, we solved that with the old lot – give them an attendance allowance. It worked well enough.

The government’s plans for a Citizens’ Summit later this year is not about small, groups handpicked by polling companies. Thus far, they’ve been talking about something not dissimilar to a Canadian-style Citizens’ Assembly.

Again, I ask you, where are the voices (outside of my office) in support of this office? It may be many good things but wildly popular it is not.

And again, as I said above, stop comparing the type of scrutiny you might do in a jury (which is about weighing up evidence and examining detail ultimately coming up with a simple, closed answer) with the sort of detailed, line-by-line scrutiny that the House of Lords performs. The two simply aren’t equivalent.

You simply cannot be allowed to equivocate chalk with cheese. A jury, and a citizens’ jury is a small body with a limited, specific function which winds up as soon as it has completed its talk. They work well when it is clear and unambiguous about what sort of answer they need to come up with (guilty or not guilty, electoral system X or electoral system Y), they work less well when given wildly open-ended decisions to make or when scrutinising detail, which is par for the course in the Lords.

You’re also talking about asking individuals to effectively put their lives on hold for five years to sit in a legislative chamber. It is hard enough asking people to do jury service – how are you going to convince the majority of the public that it is worth doing? Are you going to compel people to do it? Lock them up or fine them if they don’t comply?

I’m sure political hacks of the type that read this website would relish the chance, but they aren’t the sort of people sortition is meant to be attracting is it?

@ James: “the primary purpose of the second chamber is scrutiny and revision, not matching public opinion”

But the research quoted in the article says that matching public opinion is considered a higher priority than elections (and thus more politicians). This would mean that to an extent, it does have “the public” involved.

“How are you going to achieve that by plucking people off the street?”

As Diversity says, the public can be remarkably good at scrutiny if you make it important enough.

” I would have thought the government’s plans for increased use of citizens’ juries would have been more widely welcomed … more cynical about it than elections.”

I think you answered your own questions there. From what I’ve sen of the Govts plans, they’re not going to be random, and they’re going to be small. I’m in favour of proper citizen’s juries, but glorified focus groups do not fill me with confidence.

And anything this Govt does on its own will be met with cynicism at the moment, we both know that, even when they do good we suspect it.

Is the author the same Dr Meg Russell who is a Labour activist in Islington and close to former Labour cllr there (and now Labour MP for Wakefield) Mary Creagh?

Only askin’ …

If sortition was so wildly popular, I would have thought the government’s plans for increased use of citizens’ juries would have been more widely welcomed. From talking to the same “scientifically selected and totally representative set of people” I find they are even more cynical about it than elections.

Nobody in my scientifically selected and totally representative set of people I talk to about political stuff is what I meant. And mostly what I am doing when I talk to these people is remonstrating with them for not voting; they are the disaffected people, who think that an elected upper chamber will simply mean more expense, and that their vote makes Jack all difference anyway.

Last I heard, non-voters were coming close to a majority in this country. Now, if the Lib Dems could find a way to get THEM to vote…

But yes, I am anecdotal, and not backed up by Mori et all. Apologies.

I’m with Mat: sortition is the way to go.

I’m happy with that

I don’t know about the Companies Act – I try to read that as little as is possible Helena Kennedy complained about the large number of late amendments – tabled by the government – made to the CJA 2003.

Well yes they would wouldn’t they? The least attractive part of the existing Lords is how many of its members think the place is fairly close to perfect. In particular a large majority think that appointed peers are the highest form of – well – appointment! That’s because they all think they ought to be there and few of them could expect to be there if there were elections.

Then Hywel rightly said that we should look first and foremost at functions and how parliament works. BUt he then said

“None of that will be changed by just altering the way the Lords is elected. The starting point should be the function of the upper house – which shouldn’t IMO be a mirror image of the lower house.”

No. The starting point should be how Parliament looks at legislation. If I remember correctly (Hywel will correct me!) the 800 clauses of the Companies Act problem was because they were added at the last minute at Report stage.

However it happened, they should have gone back into committee in both Houses.

There are of course many other things that could be improved.

Tony Greaves