Fair votes are essential, but they are only the first pillar of constitutional renewal. The second pillar is federalism: the redistribution of power away from Westminster and towards the nations and regions where people actually experience the consequences of government decisions.
The United Kingdom is one of the most centralised democracies in the developed world. Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland, and London possess varying degrees of devolution, yet most of England remains governed through Westminster departments, Whitehall ministries, arm’s-length agencies, and overlapping administrative bodies. Decisions affecting transport, housing, infrastructure, skills, economic development, and public services are often taken hundreds of miles away from the communities they affect.
The result is confusion, duplication, and weak accountability. When services fail, it is frequently unclear whether responsibility lies with ministers, local authorities, regulators, agencies, or quasi-independent bodies. Democracy becomes less meaningful when citizens cannot identify who is responsible.
Federalism addresses this by clearly defining where power sits.
Westminster would become a genuine federal parliament responsible for defence, foreign affairs, national security, macroeconomic stability, currency, and constitutional matters. Rather than simultaneously acting as both a UK parliament and, in practice, England’s legislature, it would focus on genuinely federal responsibilities.
Below it would sit state-level governments: Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland, London, and a series of English regional states.
These English states should be based on existing judicial circuit geography. This is not an arbitrary choice. Judicial circuits already reflect long-established administrative realities including population distribution, economic relationships, transport networks, public service structures, and institutional capacity. They provide coherent territorial units large enough to exercise meaningful powers while avoiding the artificial boundaries that often undermine regional governance proposals.
These state governments would oversee health, education, transport, housing, infrastructure, policing structures, and regional economic development. Power would be exercised at the level where decisions are experienced.
The practical advantages are obvious. Cornwall’s economic challenges differ from those of the North East. Greater Manchester faces different housing and transport pressures from the South West. Federalism allows policy to reflect local realities rather than national averages.
This structure would also clarify accountability through three distinct tiers: federal government, state government, and local government. Local authorities would be strengthened and simplified, focusing on service delivery and community-level decision-making, while many overlapping quangos and agencies would be absorbed into either federal or state structures.
Importantly, this does not require a larger state. Federalism is a redistribution of authority, not an expansion of government. Westminster would become smaller and more focused. Many existing MPs could transition into state legislatures. Rationalising overlapping institutions may even reduce the overall size and complexity of government.
A federal constitution also requires institutional balance. The House of Commons would remain the chamber representing citizens on a population basis. Alongside it, an elected Senate would replace the House of Lords and represent the nations and English regions as territorial units of the federation. The Commons would provide democratic legitimacy through population; the Senate would provide territorial legitimacy through regional representation.
This approach offers something to every political tradition. Labour supporters gain stronger regional economic power and more effective local investment. Conservatives gain clearer accountability and less over-centralised government. Greens gain greater capacity for place-based environmental and infrastructure policy. Reform UK supporters gain genuine decentralisation of authority away from Westminster.
Most importantly, government becomes closer to the people it affects. Responsibility becomes clearer, accountability stronger, and democracy more real.
Federalism is not a proposal for fragmentation. It is a proposal for coherence: a modern constitutional settlement that aligns power with place and makes democratic government easier to understand, influence, and hold to account.
* Iain Donaldson is the treasurer of the Rochdale Liberal Democrats.
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17 Comments
“ Westminster would become a genuine federal parliament responsible for defence, foreign affairs, national security, macroeconomic stability, currency, and constitutional matters. Rather than simultaneously acting as both a UK parliament and, in practice, England’s legislature, it would focus on genuinely federal responsibilities.
Below it would sit state-level governments: Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland, London, and a series of English regional states.”
The problem with this model is the question of how English law is made and updated. If there is no English legislature, are you proposing that each of the English Regional States will be able to make its own criminal and civil laws? If not, how do you propose that English criminal law, for example, would be updated?
The Greater Manchester Mayor has devolved powers of the NHS for example than the Greater London Authority and it’s Mayor have.
@Kira
Current Lib Dem policy calls for the regions of England to have similar powers to Scotland, except for a few all-England areas of law which would be decided on by an English Chamber drawn from the members of the regional assemblies.
“calls for the regions of England to have similar powers to Scotland, except for a few all-England areas of law which would be decided on by an English Chamber drawn from the members of the regional assemblies.”
But in that case not all members of the federal UK have the same powers. Also we have an unnecessarily complex federation. The straightforward solution in 4 members England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.
“Cornwall’s economic challenges differ from those of the North East. ” If the English regions were based on the Judicial circuits then Cornwall would be part of the South west. Cornwall, Devon, Dorset, Somerset, Bristol, Wiltshire, Hampshire and The Isle of Wight. Ok a small improvement but do these areas really have that much in common?
@Daniel Walker
Thank you for that information. I did not know that our position was that laws for the whole of England should be made by an indirectly elected body. Personally, I think legislative bodies should always be directly elected and I don’t see why England should be expected to accept anything less
@ Daniel Walker Has the party costed the amount for changing to the arrangement you describe, Daniel, and what amount does it come to ?
For my part I would far prefer the money to be devoted to social care as per implementing the Dilnot Report.
@Kira
I was at the debate where that policy was decided. There were two other options: one was the regions of England having the same powers as Scotland and there was no whole-of-England body at all (except possibly for ceremonial purposes) and the other England being co-equal with Wales, Scotland, and NI as a single unit, were both reckoned unworkable (the first because it would seem like abolishing England¹, the second because England is so much more populous² it would not really work (you would either have the federal parliament being dominated by England or you would have a situation where Scottish, Welsh, and NI votes were more valuable that English ones, neither being a good idea)
The assumption was that the whole-of-England chamber would not have many reserved powers, and so making it in effect the regions of England acting en banc would be OK. You could directly elect members to it, but the amount of powers reserved to it would be quite small in this scenario.
1. although I note that Yorkshire was “abolished” in the same was in the 1974 local government reorganisation and definitely still exists 🙂
2. Conversely Yorkshire and Scotland have quite similar populations and economic output (AIUI), for example.
@David Raw
I am afraid I don’t know that; however I am always wary of arguments that say we should have the cheapest possible democracy. (Which isn’t to say that sorting out social care isn’t also important, of course)
@Andrew Tampion “But in that case not all members of the federal UK have the same powers.”
Yes, although the reserved whole-of-England powers would be quite narrow.
“The straightforward solution in 4 members England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.”
England is too much larger than the other three for that to work in any satisfactory way, as I mentioned to Kira.
@ Daniel Walker, “we should have the cheapest possible democracy”.
I didn’t say that, Daniel, though what I imply is that the party needs to prove to and make clear to the electorate the value and choices that it makes…….. which unfortunately it sometimes seems to have forgotten. It’s something called accountability.
“England is too much larger than the other three for that to work in any satisfactory way, as I mentioned to Kira.”
I don’t agree. If all matters other than the ones you list for the Federal Body were handed to the NI, wales Scotland and England then why does population imbalance matter? Consider the USA. California has a population of 40 million and Wyoming about 600,00. That’s 66 time more populous. Would you argue that California should be broken up into smaller units? The population imbalance would remain whether you have one region for England or 8 or 9. Indeed if seats in the reformed House of Lords were allocated equal by region then breaking England up would make things worse not better. If the new HoL’s had 25 members from England, Wales, Scotland and NI then that would be fair. You could consider including the IoM and the Channel Islands together with the other Overseas Dependencies with smaller numbers of representatives. If you broke england into 8 regions and gave them equal representation then England’s representation would be multiplied proportionately.
My other objection to the regional England plan is that these areas are primarily administrative and do not necessarily represent cultural areas.
@David Raw “I didn’t say that, Daniel, though what I imply is that the party needs to prove to and make clear to the electorate the value and choices that it makes…….. which unfortunately it sometimes seems to have forgotten. It’s something called accountability.”
My apologies, David. I am afraid I am still somewhat bitter about the appalling 2011 No to AV campaign, which basically campaigned against AV on the grounds of cost, as though a better (albeit not quite the one I would want) electoral system was just wasted money.
@Andrew Tampion “California has a population of 40 million and Wyoming about 600,00. That’s 66 time more populous. ”
Yes, true. And, a Wyoming voter has more power to pick the President, and more power in the Senate as a result. I am not sure that’s the argument in favour you think it it.
Indeed if seats in the reformed House of Lords were allocated equal by region then breaking England up would make things worse not better.
That’s only if you assume that the English representatives would vote together, all the time, which seems highly unlikely.
Keeping England as a single unit would also fail to encourage the decentralisation that Iain mentions in his article.
@Iain Donaldson
There is clearly a strong diversity of opinion on this topic.
“These state governments would oversee health, education, transport, housing, infrastructure, policing structures, and regional economic development. Power would be exercised at the level where decisions are experienced.”
Although in theory state governments bring power closer to the people they serve, in practice we would experience a “postcode lottery” where some regions delivered and others did not. I myself would be against this.
The term “devolving power”, as in the title of this piece, is often used when what is really meant is the devolution of responsibility.
Many in Westminster will like the latter but not so much the former. At present all MPs in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland can neatly side step any complaints from constituents about the NHS and education by saying, in effect, that it’s not their problem and should contact their MSP, MS, or MLA.
The ability of the devolved MPs to address the issues raised will very much depend on the overall deal reached with the Westminster government. Scotland has a better deal than Wales which is why the Welsh NHS works less well than in either England or Scotland. Northern Ireland now has a much better deal that it used to have in the post war period. This bad deal led to the civil strife there, from the lates 60s onwards, that all of us who are old enough to have lived through it will be will be familiar.
The details of these deals is where the real devolution of power occurs. Devolution of responsibility with an insufficient devolution of power is a recipe for trouble if the economics aren’t right.
“ At present all MPs in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland can neatly side step any complaints from constituents about the NHS and education by saying, in effect, that it’s not their problem and should contact their MSP, MS, or MLA.”
This is correct. MPs from Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland help decide laws and policies for England – they have no say over those matters in their own countries.
“Yes, true. And, a Wyoming voter has more power to pick the President, and more power in the Senate as a result. I am not sure that’s the argument in favour you think it it.”
Except that California has 1/5th of the votes in the Electoral College whereas Wyoming only has 1/90th. Which is why most serious candidate ignore Wyoming and Rhode Island and many other small states.
“That’s only if you assume that the English representatives would vote together, all the time, which seems highly unlikely.”
I don’t need to assume that. If England was divided into 7 regions with the other constituent countries having 1 region each then England would have 70% of the votes. Even if they only occasionally voted together that would be a lot. Also only 6 English regions would have to vote together,. Bear in mind that, depending on the issue one of the other constituent countries might vote the same way in which case only 5 English regions need vote.
“Keeping England as a single unit would also fail to encourage the decentralisation that Iain mentions in his article.”
Federalisation is only one form of decentralisation. I would argue that in the
Thank you to everyone who has contributed to this discussion. What strikes me is that despite disagreements about the precise constitutional model, there is actually considerable agreement on the underlying diagnosis.
Several commenters, including Peter Martin, Daniel Walker, Simon and Kira Collins, have highlighted different aspects of the same problem: power in the UK is often exercised at a distance from the people affected by it, responsibility is fragmented, and accountability can be unclear. Whether we are discussing health services, transport, economic development, or education, citizens frequently struggle to identify who is responsible for decisions and outcomes.
Peter is particularly right to emphasise that devolution must involve genuine power, not merely responsibility. A federal system only works if powers, resources and accountability are aligned (an issue covered in my third article in this series to be published tomorrow). Likewise, Simon’s observation about the uneven distribution of powers between Greater Manchester and London illustrates how inconsistent our current arrangements have become.
I also agree with Kira that democratic legitimacy matters. Any constitutional settlement must ensure that those who make laws are properly accountable to the people affected by them. Similarly, David Raw is right that constitutional reform should be able to demonstrate clear public value rather than existing as an exercise in institutional redesign for its own sake.
Where there appears to be broad agreement is that the status quo is unsatisfactory. The debate is therefore less about whether power should be redistributed and accountability improved, and more about the best mechanism for achieving those goals. That is a healthy and constructive discussion to have.
Thank you to everyone who has engaged with the article. While there are legitimate questions about the details, I remain convinced that a federal structure based on nations and English regions is the most effective way to decentralise power.
Andrew argues for a federation of England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. The difficulty is that this would still leave England as a highly centralised political unit of nearly 60 million people. Power would move from Westminster, but not necessarily closer to the communities affected by decisions. The purpose of English regional states is not simply constitutional balance; it is to ensure that decisions affecting places such as Cornwall, the North East or Greater Manchester are made closer to those areas.
I also do not accept that regional government would inevitably create a harmful “postcode lottery”. Different regions face different challenges and should have the freedom to pursue different solutions. The key question is whether citizens can clearly identify who is responsible and hold them accountable for the results.
Finally, federalism should not be seen as creating a larger state. The proposal is about redistributing authority within existing structures, clarifying responsibilities, and reducing the confusion that comes from overlapping layers of governance. The aim is not more government, but government that is easier to understand, influence and hold to account.