The future of war has arrived: It’s the Navy

The character of warfare is undergoing a profound transformation. While the fundamental nature of war – competition, coercion and violence remains unchanged, the methods by which states pursue strategic advantage have evolved dramatically. Conventional military forces remain essential, but the decisive battles of the twenty-first century are increasingly fought beyond traditional frontlines. The new centre of gravity lies in the resilience of a nation’s Critical National Infrastructure (CNI). Energy grids, telecommunications networks, transport systems, financial institutions, water supplies and digital connectivity have become both strategic assets and prime targets. The future of conflict is increasingly focused on disrupting, degrading and manipulating the infrastructure that underpins modern societies.

Recent conflicts in the Middle East and Ukraine have demonstrated this shift. Military success is no longer measured solely by territorial gains but by the ability to paralyse an adversary’s essential services. Attacks on energy facilities, communications networks and logistics hubs aim not only to destroy physical assets but to undermine political legitimacy, economic stability and public confidence. Modern warfare has become multidimensional, combining kinetic strikes with cyber operations, electronic warfare and information campaigns to generate strategic effects far greater than the weapons themselves might suggest. Infrastructure has become both the battlefield and the weapon.

The war in Ukraine has reinforced this reality with exceptional clarity. Russia’s sustained campaign against Ukraine’s electricity generation, transmission networks and energy distribution systems has demonstrated the strategic value of targeting CNI. Missile and drone attacks have sought to deny electricity, heating and communications to civilian populations while constraining Ukraine’s military capability. These were not simply tactical operations but part of a broader strategy of societal attrition intended to erode resilience, impose economic costs and weaken national morale. Ukraine has also demonstrated the offensive potential of this approach, conducting strikes against Russian economic targets, including major retail infrastructure, bringing the effects of war directly to the civilian population and illustrating how infrastructure attacks can generate strategic pressure without territorial conquest.

For the United Kingdom, these developments demand serious reflection. Britain possesses one of the world’s most interconnected economies, supported by sophisticated digital networks and globally integrated supply chains. While these strengths generate prosperity, they also create strategic vulnerabilities. Russian intelligence services and state-sponsored cyber actors have repeatedly been linked to espionage, cyber intrusions and hostile activities directed against the UK and its allies. Such operations form part of a broader strategy of hybrid warfare, combining cyber-attacks, disinformation, economic coercion and intelligence activity to exploit vulnerabilities without crossing the threshold of conventional war. The objective is not immediate destruction but the gradual erosion of resilience and strategic advantage.

Geography no longer guarantees Britain’s security. An adversary need not deploy forces across the English Channel when malicious cyber activity, disinformation campaigns or attacks on undersea communications cables can create significant national disruption. Britain’s offshore energy infrastructure, submarine telecommunications networks, financial systems and maritime trade routes are all critical national assets whose protection is now inseparable from national defence. Safeguarding CNI should therefore be viewed not as a peripheral homeland security issue but as a core military responsibility.

Within this context, the Royal Navy assumes renewed strategic importance. Maritime power has always underpinned Britain’s prosperity, but its role now extends well beyond traditional sea control. The Navy has become a key enabler of joint operations across the maritime, land, air, cyber and space domains while protecting the infrastructure on which national resilience depends. Undersea communications cables, offshore wind farms, energy pipelines and global shipping routes collectively form an extensive maritime battlespace that demands continuous surveillance, credible deterrence and effective defence.

Meeting this challenge requires sustained investment and modernisation. Additional surface combatants and submarines remain essential, but equal emphasis must be placed on autonomous systems, artificial intelligence, cyber resilience, seabed surveillance, anti-submarine warfare and integrated command-and-control systems capable of responding rapidly to hybrid threats. Maritime security increasingly depends on the ability to detect, attribute and counter hostile activity beneath the surface as much as above it.

This investment must be understood as a genuinely imperative, The Royal Navy, British Army and Royal Air Force must continue developing an integrated force capable of protecting national infrastructure across every operational domain. Shared intelligence, resilient communications and interoperable technologies will define future military effectiveness. Defending CNI also requires close coordination between the armed forces, government departments, intelligence agencies, industry and international allies, recognising that national resilience has itself become a strategic capability. The Navy’s offensive capability today is also vital for hard diplomacy, deploying offensive strike groups when needed, and the ability to secure supply chains at short notice. 

The future battlefield is no longer confined to trenches or fleets. It encompasses power stations, fibre-optic cables, ports, satellites, financial systems and digital networks upon which modern societies depend. Nations capable of defending these interconnected systems will possess a decisive strategic advantage, while those that cannot risk paralysis before conventional combat even begins. The future of war is already here. Success in the coming decades will depend not simply on the size of armed forces but on the ability to protect – and, when necessary, contest – the critical national infrastructure that underpins military power, economic prosperity and national sovereignty. Investing in the navy therefore must be a priority. 

 

* Edward Marsh is a veteran and has worked in defence and national security for 20 years, a member of the business network and is on the Party’s approved parliamentary candidate list.

Read more by or more about .
This entry was posted in Op-eds.
Advert

9 Comments

  • “The Navy’s offensive capability today is also vital for hard diplomacy”

    Nice euphemism. Certainly puts a new spin on recent Lib Dem calls for “diplomatic solutions” in the Middle East.

  • This article started well but the conclusion is wrong. Ukraine has successfully forced the surviving elements of the once mighty Russian Black Sea Fleet to retreat to the eastern periphery of the Black Sea…and not by using naval power. Relatively cheap drones have shown how vulnerable navy vessels can be on open water. We do not need more and better navy ships…the future is drones that can be launched from mainland UK against any targets that may threaten us.

  • James Hargrave 6th Aug '26 - 6:51pm

    A timely piece given current events. Chronic underinvestment in our energy resilience (especially gas) has left us very exposed, and assuming that isn’t solved any time soon then we’d better invest in protection of supply.

  • Edward marsh 6th Aug '26 - 7:01pm

    Thanks for the comment Jana. I’m not sure it’s “wrong” per say as the navy has a wide reach of maritime security responsibilities, many I outlined, the fleet is just one element. They also have obligation to protect parts of subsea CNI as laid out in SDSR25. So the navy has vast responsibility for major CNI elements, this, I believe requires enhanced investment.

  • Steve Trevethan 7th Aug '26 - 8:54am

    Might the “Future of War “and its present state also be affected by decisions relating to deciding who are the actual enemies?

    Might the Russia-Ukrains war be, in deeper realit, a war between America and Russia, using Ukraine and Europe as proxies?

    Might the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the America + Israel- Iran conflict be connected by having a principle purpose of controlling world oil power and wealth?

    Might both conflicts be part of a submerged policy of the U. S. A. to achieve world domination by controlling oil distribution as hypothesised in the attached article?

    https://michael-hudson.com/2026/07/americas-war-on-an-independent-world/

  • @Jana – there is a huge difference between the relatively confined space of the Black Sea (and the Azov Sea in particular) and the North Atlantic where the area and distances are much greater and the sea states can be much more severe.

    The North Atlantic can’t currently be secured by “cheap” drones launched from the UK mainland.

  • Rif Winfield 7th Aug '26 - 9:47am

    Whatever the multiple roles which the Navy must undertake (and here I fully agree with you, Edward), what is essential is the quantity of vessels. However effective individual ships might be, it is – as always – the number of hulls which can be deployed in whatever space is needed to protect CNI. Even drones need mobile carrier vessels on which to base, maintain and launch drones. Remember too that the UK is an island nation, with 70 million inhabitants and producing food for around 40 millions. Agricultural land being a limiting factor, the rest of our food supply is based on imports, so food security is as important as energy and military security. The vast majority of our food imports come by ship (vice a small proportion by air), so ensuring the security of our seaways remains a critical requirement. Drones can undertake anti-submarine, anti-surface ship and anti-mine roles, but it required a minimum number of drone carriers to undertake these roles.

  • Peter Chambers 7th Aug '26 - 4:10pm

    I would like to agree that the “It” is the Royal Navy. But I cannot. The necessary “It” is Social Democracy.

    The National Preparedness Commission said in their paper Finlands Comprehensive Security Model

    “Superficially, it looks like the UK is moving in a Finnish direction. But progress has been slow, and the deep foundations of Finland’s system – cohesion, equality, public trust, and shared identity – are still treated as siloed public policy issues in the UK.”

    “…the UK approach appears more of a top-down communication strategy, while the Finns prioritise a bottom-up approach to participatory citizenship, which is the foundational strength of the Comprehensive Security model.”

  • Rich Dilshad 10th Aug '26 - 2:34pm

    Interesting piece Edward, and I particularly agree on the growing vulnerability of CNI. The recent damage to EstLink 2 and other Baltic subsea infrastructure demonstrates how exposed these assets can be.

    From an energy/infrastructure perspective, resilience and recovery are as important as defence. We simply can’t physically protect thousands of kilometres of cables and pipelines, so rapid detection and access to repair vessels, specialist crews and spares become critical. And the vulnerability doesn’t end offshore – landfalls, substations and converter stations can be equally significant single points of failure.

    This therefore feels broader than purely a naval challenge, requiring close cooperation between defence, government and CNI owners/operators.

Post a Comment

Lib Dem Voice welcomes comments from everyone but we ask you to be polite, to be on topic and to be who you say you are. You can read our comments policy in full here. Please respect it and all readers of the site.

To have your photo next to your comment please signup your email address with Gravatar.

Your email is never published. Required fields are marked *

*
*
Please complete the name of this site, Liberal Democrat ...?

Advert

Recent Comments

  • Jack
    Ed, the word you are after is 'racist'. 'Mean' is utterly inadequate. Do better. Now....
  • David Le Grice
    @Ynys Mon Man Try telling that to all the hard working candidates and activists in the many target wards where the Greens beat us with a paper candidate!...
  • Ynys Mon Man
    The Lib Dems are highly visible in roughly a third of Lincoln and perhaps 50% of York (both Labour-held at Westminster). Why is this? Because a small core of ac...
  • John McHugo
    @Simon McGrath - "It started with 6 Arab countries invading Israel intent on killing its Jewish population". That is just simply untrue and an outrageous st...
  • David Allen
    Here (including below-the-line comments) are some answers to the "invisibility" question: https://www.libdemvoice.org/roz-savage-mp-writes-liberalism-is-havi...