8 Comments

• @JamesFirth 27th Oct '10 - 1:44pm

  Actually this does nothing to appease my concerns. I’ve been closely following the progress on the IMP and other related issues for many years, am involved with the Open Rights Group and a participant on various forums and groups, including Fipr.

  As I understand it, this is just re-affirmation that IMP will not be a single, consolidated centralised database dreamt up under Labour’s watch.

  Yes, I have a loose affiliation with The Telegraph but I really feel their reporting was spot on. Tom Whitehead is senior staff and unlikely to have left threads unchecked.

  In fact he writes:

  “Any suggestion of a central “super database” has been ruled out but the plans are expected to involve service providers storing all users details for a set period of time. ”

  My own limited sources indicate this will take the form of expanding the programme already in place in major ISPs. The worry is this expansion will take the surveillance firmly over the line of acceptability, putting reprogrammable equipment under the indirect control of security services, through required regular software updates, although the storage of the data gathered will still be the responsibility of the ISP.

  Either way, there was a clear promise in S10 of the coalition agreement:

  “Ending of storage of internet and email records without good reason”

  This promise was echoed in BOTH parties’ manifestos.

  I’m afraid Mark we’re playing a game of semantics with various Home Office sources. If as I suspect the current plans involve retention by ISPs with data to be stored by ISPs it is actually no better than a central database.

  Instead of handing over a rich private database to be under state control, possibly open to abuse by the state, instead we’re entrusting the rich private database to a private company. Just look at how ISPs only recently failed to send counsel to court hearings where private details were being requested in a copyright infringement case, and then how highly sensitive details were emailed by BTs legal team unencrypted.

  I’m no more comfortable having BT being the custodian of the details of my inner life than I am the state.

  I’ve written about the ACS:Law situation on my blog and in The Guardian. I’ve also slammed the IMP on my blog here:
  Scrap the Interception Modernisation Programme? Of course, Minister, but first you really should read this…

• Phil 27th Oct '10 - 2:25pm

  Mark, you’re absolutely right. New Labour wanted a centralised database. The new centre-right government doesn’t want it centralised, they want it distributed. But it’s still a store of every message you send and every website you visit. It’s still a ‘modernisation’ of interception in that it’s a *huge expansion* of it.

  Worst of all, New Labour were only talking about using it for serious crime and terrorism prevention. Yet the Home Office is now talking about it being available for all sorts of law enforcement, even the prevention of disorder, presumably. http://www.theregister.co.uk/2010/10/26/interception_modernisation_home_office_price/

  Happy with that, Mark? Should Lib Dems be happy that IMP is ‘not coming back’ under the coalition’s “alternative” plans?

• nige 27th Oct '10 - 4:24pm

  Oh well, much for reversing the infringements of civil liberties by Labour, so what’s the next promise the Coalition are going to renege on? ID cards perhaps? well maybe not. how about just making it compulsory to carry a biometric passport instead? after all it not an ID card is it.

• Zoe O'Connell 27th Oct '10 - 5:00pm

  @JamesFurth – could you elaborate on “My own limited sources indicate this will take the form of expanding the programme already in place in major ISPs“? Which particular programme are you referring to? “…if as I suspect the current plans involve retention by ISPs with data to be stored by ISPs…” is just restating exactly the form IMP took before it was shelved in 2009.

  Just look at how ISPs only recently failed to send counsel to court hearings where private details were being requested in a copyright infringement case

  I’m surprised that you think it would be appropriate for ISPs to send counsel to such a court hearing. ISPs are bystanders to a dispute between the end users and the copyright holder, what useful input would a barrister be able to provide by being present in the room?

  And from Phil:

  Yet the Home Office is now talking about it being available for all sorts of law enforcement, even the prevention of disorder, presumably

  Nowhere have I seen this stated by the Home Office.

• @JamesFirth 27th Oct '10 - 9:06pm

  Hi Zoe,

  I’m not sure what you think I might be able to divulge above what I posted but I’m happy to discuss further. Find me on twitter (although you got a typo in my surname) or email me james -at- slightlyrightofcentre.com

  And yes I do expect BT to send counsel to hearings when their customer’s privacy is a stake. The UK has an adversarial legal system, which means that if the view of one party is not contested, the other party – in most cases – wins by default.

  In order to protect against spurious cases it’s VITAL that the ISPs send counsel to all hearings, otherwise the applicant will most likely win by default.

  Note that two of the major ISPs – Talk Talk and Virgin Media – did just this when Davenport Lyons first started to pursue copyright infringers. The upshot is that their successor, ACS:Law, chose to avoid these two ISPs because they felt their claims would fail. It’s all revealed in the leaked logs. I’ve got a series of thoroughly researched digital rights articles up on my blog on the subject. Feel free to read.

  Best,
  James

• Mark Pack 27th Oct '10 - 11:28pm

  James (and others): one point I’d add to Zoe’s points is that a decentralised system of accessing traffic patterns (which looks to be where the Home Office is now headed) is very different from a centralised database that contains the contents of messages. Two reasons for that: (a) decentralised vs centralised – a centralised system is more open to abuse through means such as hacking or wayward staff because it’s but the one system to crack or to use in ways you shouldn’t. Spreading data between different systems is an important safeguard against abuse; (b) traffic patterns vs contents of messages – it’s like the different between your postman knowing what post is delivered to you each day and looking inside each envelope or package. In other words – a very big difference.

  However, more importantly than all of that, the question of what happens next is very much being debated inside government. For the reasons Zoe gives (and I’ve added to), the ‘worst case’ scenario is not anything like the IMP. But by campaigning against the supposed threat of a return of the IMP campaigners are missing the target and risk backing themselves into irrelevance. The campaigning would be much better directed over the range of questions which are really up for debate.

• David S 28th Oct '10 - 9:31am

  Mark, Zoe, James, All,

  I think Mark’s right in that this isn’t a “wost case scenario.” However James acknowledges this in his defence of the Telegraph reporting, which I too find reasonably balanced on this occasion. I too am not comfortable with retention whoever holds the keys. Especially if the IMP includes, as has been rumoured, an element of direct secure data exchange between the ISP data store and law enforcement, under the pretence of improving “data security”

  I don’t think anyone knows enough about the actual plans yet, we need to know what storage is planned – if any. Noting the pledges quite rightly highlighted in the Lib Dem manifesto and the coalition agreement.

  Granted, scare stories are not helpful. But nor do I feel are headlines like “no, it’s not coming back.” On this I agree with James above – we’re playing semantics on significant liberty issues.

  This is a highly complex area, not just in the practicalities of implementation but on the legal definitions on what is allowed to be gathered, and the access rules – senior police officer, court warrant or sign-off from a secretary of state? Just one issue I’ve seen various views on is what constitutes traffic information when data is embedded in other protocols. I doubt the law as exists today really foresaw Facebook.

  I hope you will all continue to investigate further and keep the members and supporters updated on the government’s progress.

• Niklas Smith 28th Oct '10 - 12:47pm

  Julian Huppert MP asked a question to David Cameron on this subject at PMQs yesterday, but Cameron’s answer was not very informative:

  Julian Huppert (Cambridge, Liberal Democrat): Can the Prime Minister reassure the House that the Government have no plans to revive Labour’s intercept modernisation programme, whether in name or in function, and that he remains fully committed to the pledge in the coalition agreement to reverse the substantial erosion of civil liberties and to roll back state intrusion?

  David Cameron (Prime Minister): I would argue that we have made good progress on rolling back state intrusion in terms of getting rid of ID cards and in terms of the right to enter a person’s home. We are not considering a central Government database to store all communications information, and we shall be working with the Information Commissioner’s Office on anything we do in that area.

  It is of course gratifying that a central government database is not under consideration, but that was not what IMP was anyway. And the Information Commissioner has always struck me as fairly toothless.