For the generation of UK military and civilians that served in Afghanistan over the past 13 years, watching the extensive coverage of the final withdrawal from Helmand province comes with mixed feelings.
As the Foreign Office’s “man in” Helmand during 2010, even then it was obvious to me that the UK media had already made up its mind: the conclusion was we had failed. So, when I read the reports earlier this week that “a third” of Helmand’s schools were still closed due to insecurity, it seemed churlish to wish the same reports would acknowledge that, before the Brits arrived, three-quarters of those schools had been closed.
On Wednesday, in a piece linked to on LibDemVoice, Paddy Ashdown judged the Afghanistan war a “textbook for how to lose”. At this point, fools rush in: Paddy knows more than most about counter-insurgency. Permit me at least to make some observations from my time in Helmand.
Defining success in Afghanistan was always the problem. Was it defeating al-Qaeda? Destroying drugs? Establishing democracy respecting women’s rights? At different times it was all of those things.
And whilst it is easy to condemn politicians’ constantly changing minds, we should accept that public opinion changed almost as often. Paddy paints a picture in which success would be defined by a united Afghanistan, slowly progressing to “some kind of unity and good government”. He doubts that will happen, noting that “we should have made fighting corruption our first priority, instead of becoming the tainted partners of a corrupt government.”
Oh for the luxury of choice! On the one hand, a strong, united government is needed, on the other, one that is uncorrupted. We didn’t like the opium economy as it fed violence and corruption, but trying to stamp it out merely created a larger insurgency.
When we feared we risked becoming “tainted partners of a corrupt government” we criticised President Karzai and his cronies. The reward? A collapse in relations between the Afghan government and NATO, leading to the suspension of important development projects.
I am not arguing that what happened in Afghanistan was beyond criticism. Many mistakes were made. But show me an example of an uncorrupted post-conflict government. Or, if you (quite rightly) question Karzai’s record in power, look again at his actions just after 9/11, which were undoubtedly heroic. Almost no-one questioned supporting Karzai at that time.
Paddy argues that the best chance for a negotiated peace was squandered five years ago. I am less sure: between Karzai’s paranoia, Pakistan’s strategic interest in having the Taliban as a counterweight to India and the West’s fear of radical Islam, the chances were always slight.
We got into Afghanistan with insufficient understanding to achieve the various visions of success that have been bandied about. But even with such understanding, any student of Afghan history will struggle to find examples of uncorrupted, united government delivering progress for its people. Maybe opening schools and markets was as much as could be hoped for.
* Arthur Snell was in the Foreign Office from 1998 - 2014. From 2005 - 2006 he worked in Baghdad focusing on security assistance and counter terrorism projects. This year he campaigned in Cheltenham and Stroud during the general and local election campaigns.
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3 Comments
An interesting article, especially the part about tackling the opium trade creating a larger insurgency. The information about corruption and trying to achieve perfection is also interesting.
One of the things that concerns me at the moment is people looking down at the armed forces. Too many make them out to be hapless sheep being exploited. They deserve our respect, not just sympathy.
Best wishes
A good piece indeed Arthur. I’ve been based in Kabul for the last couple of years and – in the capital city at least – there is a positive mood among the general population that democracy of sorts has indeed arrived, educational levels have improved and there is some hope for the future. It is important to recognise that Afghanistan is extremely diverse, and Helmand and Kabul as as different as chalk and cheese. Each region has its distrinct culture and identity. There is slowly growing sense of national identity built around Kabul, cricket, football, democracy and pride. The situation in the provinces is of course very different. After all, we should not forget that Afghanistan is to a large degree a British construct, as a buffer state created by the British Empire as a Belgian-style neutral entitity, between British India and the Russian Empire. Driven by this imperial imperative, the British insisted – with the Wakhan Corridor added to Afghanistan to keep the two empires apart so that British and Russian soldiers should never be face-to-face. Then the limit of projection of British power cut through tribal boundaries is even today the boundary of Pakistan and Afghanistan. With the Russian Empire able to move vast numbers of troops on its railway system to threaten British India within days, while the British Navy would take weeks to move extra troops from Britain to face them off, Kabul was denied a railway by both empires to ensure a peace of sorts. As early as 1841, British Government geologists were studying the vast copper resources at Aynak next to Kabul, then the Soviets nearly mined them and now China state-owned enterprises look set to actually do it.
A very interesting article and a welcome dose of foreign policy realpolitik. We would all like to see an Afghan government which was secure, peaceful, democratic, where womens’ rights are fully respected and where there was no corruption. In reality foreign policy isn’t always like that. Purists might argue that unless we get everything we shouldn’t get involved – trouble is in practice this could mean getting none. We have to remember that no involvement could mean that gangs or nasties get to rule (e.g. Taliban, ISIS). Sometimes, in foreign policy, you have to choose between imperfect options.