The failure of the Gaza peace process reflects a recurring problem in the international approach to Palestine: powerful actors repeatedly claim the authority to shape Palestinians’ future, make sweeping yet undeliverable promises… and when those promises fail to materialise, Palestinians face the consequences.

In January, President Trump’s son-in law Jared Kushner unveiled an ambitious plan for a “New Gaza” filled with gleaming high-rise towers, a revitalised coastline and tourist-packed beaches. Six months later, no meaningful reconstruction has taken place, and hundreds of thousands of Palestinians continue to live in cramped, unsanitary tents that have become breeding grounds for disease and rodent infestations.

Earlier this month, it was quietly announced that the scope of reconstruction plans has been dramatically reduced to a small pilot project in southern Gaza. The contrast between the scale of the original promises and what has actually been delivered could hardly be greater, despite the centrality of this project to the ceasefire deal.

There has been little acknowledgement of this from Trump and his cronies, who despite being quick to present themselves as the architects of Gaza’s reconstruction have shown little interest in overseeing its implementation.

This lack of accountability is hardly surprising given the composition of the ‘Board of Peace’ (BoP) tasked with overseeing Gaza’s future. The board includes external figures with powerful business interests, some with known pro-Israel sympathies, but excludes Palestinians.

The US-backed BoP rightly criticises Hamas when it fails to abide by the agreement, but then fails completely to use its considerable influence to prevent Israeli violations. Israel continues to kill civilians on an almost daily basis. It continues to obstruct the entry of aid, reconstruction materials and even the Palestinian technocrats assigned to administer Gaza. And despite agreeing to gradually withdraw from the territory, the Israeli army has steadily entrenched its presence, with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announcing in May that he had ordered the army to seize 70% of the strip.

Rather that addressing any of Israel’s repeated attempts to sabotage the ceasefire, those tasked with overseeing Gaza have focused primarily on one issue: Hamas’ refusal to disarm. The extent of this asymmetry became clear in May, when the high representative for Gaza appointed by the BoP, Nickolay Mladenov, blamed Hamas for the stalled peace process with no direct mention of Israeli violations – prompting warnings that the board’s lack of even-handedness in implementing the truce risks a return to full-scale war.

Hamas bears responsibility for grave crimes, and Palestinians deserve a political future free from authoritarian rule. But a peace process cannot succeed if it demands fundamental concessions from one side while failing to confront the actions of the other. Israel has overwhelming military power and control over the conditions on the ground. The ceasefire was predicated on both sides ceasing firing, not only one of them.

Meanwhile, it is Palestinians who are left to bear the consequences as promised reconstruction fails to materialise, humanitarian conditions remain dire, and the ‘ceasefire’ becomes increasingly tenuous. Those who made the decisions face few consequences; those who had little say in them must live with the results.

This dynamic is not new. Alex Cole-Hamilton’s excellent recent article on Britain’s role in Palestine’s history highlighted a similar pattern during the British occupation of Palestine from 1917-1948. When Britain became the Mandatory Power, it claimed responsibility for governing the territory and preparing it for a future political settlement. This followed the 1917 Balfour Declaration in which Britain committed to supporting the establishment of a Jewish national home while also promising that this would not prejudice the rights of Palestine’s existing population.

Yet Britain failed to protect those rights or create the political conditions necessary for a peaceful transition. The Palestinian majority was denied meaningful political representation, while Britain’s policies deepened tensions between the communities it was supposed to govern. Instead of building the foundations for self-determination, Britain maintained control through repression before withdrawing abruptly in 1948 without resolving the fundamental questions for which it had assumed responsibility. This was followed by regional war and the Nakba – the forced expulsion of around 750,000 Palestinians from their homes.

Alex’s argument was not that Britain was solely responsible for every event that followed, but rather that as a colonial power Britain assumed responsibilities which it failed to fulfil. The consequences have been severe and long-lasting, and they demand our recognition.

It is therefore disappointing that some of the responses, including Gavin Stollar’s blame-shifting article, have sought to shift the focus by pointing to the rejection of partition proposals by Arab leaders in 1937 and 1947. It is hardly surprising that a population which formed the majority of the country objected to plans that would divide its homeland and transfer large parts of it to a new state. That does not erase the responsibilities of the Mandatory Power, nor does it justify the violent displacement and dispossession of 750,000 people.

That same tendency, to place disproportionate responsibility on Palestinians for outcomes shaped by more powerful actors, is clearly visible in the rhetoric around the Gaza peace process today.

If a free and independent Palestine is ever to materialise, Palestinians must be able to shape it themselves. That requires an end to the pattern in which others make decisions on their behalf, fail to uphold their own responsibilities, and then shift blame onto Palestinians when those decisions fail.

* Jonathan Brown is a member of the Chichester Liberal Democrats, is Vice Chair of the Liberal Democrat Friends of Palestine and Chairs the Liberal Democrats for Free Syria.