There is much that pro Europeans can support in this. I believe that the inserts in para v,vi and vii  are correct. Above all, the statement against our dependence on the United States is more forthright (and right) than my colleagues and I finally settled upon, in order to encourage some realism from our defence team. Having seen the company they seem prepared to keep in the columns of The Independent the other day, I rather wonder whether such deference is deserved.  

However, I do not agree that we would be better spending money on conventional forces. What history since the mid eighties has demonstrated, I would submit, is the efficacy of nuclear deterrence, and the inefficacy of conventional war making. With the possible exception of our assault on Serbia over Kosovo (the last Act of which, of course, has yet to be played out) it is difficult to point to a single instance where the possession of a greater conventional capability would have served the national interest. Intelligence, both electronic and human, yes, paramilitary police style capability yes, humanitarian and emergency aid capability yes, but not more tanks, aircraft carriers, strike fighters or whatever which cost the real money. Indeed it has been the illusions such capabilities have fostered that have contributed greatly to the crass policy errors that have been made in the Middle East. 

Moreover, in a European (or, indeed, a NATO) context, as a nuclear power, we can legitimately expect our non nuclear partners to carry a greater conventional burden. (Their failure to do so underlines a deep crisis in NATO as we are seeing in Afghanistan). It is encouraging our allies, such as the Germans, the Italians and the Spanish to be more serious about defence which is the real task, not imagining we can encourage by some unilateralist adventure Iran or other potential nuclear states to abandon their plans.

But the real problem seems to be the final resolution to keep Trident until it collapses. Does this really send the message that we wish to emancipate ourselves from US tutelage? Rather the contrary, I would have thought. We would retain an American system beyond its optimal life and become increasingly dependent, in the last resort, upon an American nuclear umbrella. It is nonsense is it not, or am I missing something?

Perhaps I am. Is the real intention to allow this nonsense to go forward and precipitate an early move to unilateralism? In the same way, some would say, that I and my colleagues are complaining now about the fact that our deterrence is not truly independent, in the hope of eventually persuading the British people that we should co-operate with the French? But there is a difference. I would be perfectly content with a truly independent minimum British deterrent. And I am quite open about my hopes of working with the French to create the cornerstone of a proper European defence identity. Why are those who believe, honourably, that we should not have nuclear weapons at all so bashful? 

If it is because the case for unilateralism is, alas, weaker now than it has ever been, then surely let us concentrate upon the main issue, which is our relationship with America and what it means for “our position in Europe and beyond”.  I say this in sorrow because I know that many of those in the Liberal Democrat Peace and Security Group have a far longer record of fighting for the European cause in this country than I.  

I believe very much in European soft power. The contrast over New Year of the news from Sofia and Bucharest and the news from Baghdad and Nauzad was eloquent. But we must also be strong if we are ever to achieve a truly independent minimum British deterrent. And I am quite open about my hopes of working with the French to create the cornerstone of a proper European defence identity. Why are those who believe, honourably, that we should not have nuclear weapons at all so bashful? 

If it is because the case for unilateralism is, alas, weaker now than it has ever been, then surely let us concentrate upon the main issue, which is our relationship with America and what it means for “our position in Europe and beyond”.  I say this in sorrow because I know that many of those in the Liberal Democrat Peace and Security Group have a far longer record of fighting for the European cause in this country than I.  

I believe very much in European soft power. The contrast over New Year of the news from Sofia and Bucharest and the news from Baghdad and Nauzad was eloquent. But we must also be strong if we are ever to achieve a truly independent voice in world affairs to project that model of international democracy and the rule of law which is unique to our continent.