Lib Dem Voice has been conducting a survey of party members registered on our members’ forum asking them for their views of the coalition, Labour leadership and the party’s general election result. Over 400 have responded, and here’s part five of what you’ve told us …
LDV asked: The coalition government is proposing that in order to legislate for fixed-term parliaments it should take a vote of 55%+1 of MPs to dissolve Parliament. (NB: this does not affect a vote of no confidence in the government which can still be carried by a simple majority of 50%+1). What is your view:
Here’s what you said:
34% – I agree with fixed-term parliaments, but think the 55%+1 threshold is too low
61% – I agree with fixed-term parliaments, and think the 55%+1 threshold is about right
5% – I disagree with fixed-term parliaments
(Excluding Don’t Know / No opinion = 6%)
So 95% of Lib Dem members back the principle of a fixed-term Parliament with a threshold higher than 50%+1 needed to dissolve Parliament – with 55%+1 backed by almost twice as many as support a higher threshold. Just 5% of party members oppose fixed-term parliaments.
There was some dissent, though, to the notion that the fixed-terms would of five years’ duration rather than four – this story in The Guardian indicates one of the unintended consequences of holding a general election in May 2015: it will be the same day as elections to the Scottish parliament and Welsh assembly.
A couple of members said they favoured fixed-term parliaments, but wanted a 50%+1 threshold to be sufficient – an argument I don’t quite understand, as that would mean any government with a simple majority could dissolve Parliament at any point of their choosing. Which isn’t my understanding of what a fixed-term parliament should be.
Here is a selection of your comments:
Should be two thirds. What’s the point of fixed term parliaments with 55%? Then a relatively small, “normal” majority could just get around the fixed term like we have now. I’d prefer a four year term to the proposed five It’s very hard to say, I can see the point of this, it doesn’t look good though and maybe the issue is how Parliament is dissolved. A properly elected President should have that power. I think this is a good idea, and don’t understand all the fuss from Labour about the 55%. Their opposition to it is entirely hypocritical given that they introduced 66% in Scotland! There also needs to be a time-out clause that dissolves parliament if an alternative government cannot be formed, as per the Scottish Parliament. The 55% is damaging because it looks tailor-made for the coalition to dissolve Parliament itself. Also, in principle the threshold should be higher to prevent partisan dissolutions. The two thirds threshold in Scotland and Wales is right. This bill should be amended immediately.
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33 Comments
David Heath didn’t even try to explain the specific 55% threshold during his Ministerial contribution to the adjournment debate on this issue. We still haven’t had this precise number justified by anyone. I suspect the figure will get amended when it comes to drafting the legislation.
I’d much rather have 66% as the figure required. Dissolving parliament is a serious thing and should therefore require a sufficiently serious amount of the votes.
As a safety feature, as already mentioned in the article, for dealing with the result of a no confidence vote there should be a fixed term between losing a no-confidence vote and having to form a new government, say 1 month. (20 working days), and quite possibly a structure or procedure that must be followed to try and help establish a new government.
If such mechanisms already exist and work in Scotland I’ve nothing against re-using them.
As if this issue isn’t confusing enough (and until we see the nth level of detail on it will continue to be confusing), I am not even more confused by the phrasing “55%+1”. Last I checked it was 55% full stop. With 50%+1 there is a reason for the +1 – it’s to ensure that there is an actual majority – that more MPs want X (whatever X is) than MPs who do not want X. With 55% there already is a majority. Why would you need a +1?
My problem with this proposal is I don’t really understands what happens if a Government loses a vote of no confidence but there is not the 55% vote needed to dissolve Parliament. Doesnt that mean we could end up with a situation where no budget could be passed but we could not have a new election either ? I understand that it is unlikely to happen in practice, but I tend to work on the principle that the worst case scenario that will never happen in practice, has a nasty habit of happening anyway.,
To be fair, you should have had a third question: “I agree with fixed-term parliaments, and think the 55%+1 threshold is too high”. At the moment our opponents will be able to say, “This poll was a push poll, putting forward the coalition’s opinion that 55%+1 is the perfect answer”
Could someone who is in favour of fixed terms please explain the benefit of them other than removing the political advantage of the sitting government from calling an election at a time to suit themselves?
Surely that power could be removed without a fixed term restricting the chances of the backbenches forcing an election.
Other than removing that power from the PM I can only see downsides to this policy. Why the obsession?
The 55%+1 rule, while taking away the power of Prime Ministers to decide the date of elections at their convenience is a good thing, surely it takes power away from parliament too? Now that isn’t so much of a problem if your executive is elected directly and has a mandate independent of the legislature. But of course, that is not the case for parliamentary democracies. I still believe that this policy is ill-conceived and principally motivated by a desire to protect the coalition, rather than improving our democracy.
@ Harry Hayfield
But Harry I don’t understand the definition of ‘fixed-term parliaments’ if the governing party/parties have the votes to dissolve parliament at will.
Personally I think 55% is too low, but I grasp its logic: to make it impossible for the coalition government to trigger a general election if they deem it advantageous.
If you agree with the principle of fixed-term parliaments you have to have some form of lock-in mechnaism, otherwise there’s nothing to stop governments cutting and running as they can now.
The alternative to a super-majority rule is to take away the incentive the government has to call an early election. Have a rule that if there is an early dissolution the new parliament will only serve for what remains of the five year term of its predecessor. To put it another way, there is an “ordinary election” every five years come what may, and the occurrence of an “early election” doesn’t affect the date of the next ordinary election.
They have this rule in Sweden and early dissolutions are extremely rare there.
Under the present system prime ministers wait until the final year of a parliament, then call an election at an opportune moment when they are high in the polls, knowing that they will win a whole new five year term. This is why no parliament ever lasts its full term.
If there is to be a super-majority requirement then there should also be a Constructive Vote of No Confidence rule, as used in Germany. This means that a vote of no confidence is invalid unless it names a new candidate to become prime minister. It prevents a deadlock in which no government can be formed.
I think this is preferable to a rule that parliament is dissolved if no government can be formed within 28 days. This has various problems:
(1) It is open to abuse. If the prime minister wants an early election, but can’t persuade a super-majority to dissolve parliament, then all he has to do is whip his MPs to create a deadlock situation for 28 days.
(2) There is no guarantee that a fresh election would resolve the deadlock.
(3) It is unwise for the country to have no legitimate government for any period of time, even for 28 days plus the time it takes to organise an election.
“A couple of members said they favoured fixed-term parliaments, but wanted a 50%+1 threshold to be sufficient – an argument I don’t quite understand, as that would mean any government with a simple majority could dissolve Parliament at any point of their choosing. Which isn’t my understanding of what a fixed-term parliament should be.”
Very fair comment. However, more often than not, governments do command a 55% majority, on a one-party basis. So, more often than not, the 55% threshold means that the government could dissolve Parliament at any point of their choosing. Which isn’t MY understanding of what a fixed-term parliament should be.
JC, one argument in favour is that it takes a lot of the power away from the executive as a body and therefore gives the legislature more say. ie. a government can’t threaten its backbenchers (or other parties) by calling an election when they feel like it.
I know that sounds like the ‘political advantage’ you mentioned but it goes a lot deeper than that, in the States one of the reasons that Congress and the Senate are so confident rebelling is that they have their own beat to dance to and no government can call an election after a tough vote, or a vote of no confidence. This is why those bodies have low popularity generally (‘Congress is terrible, it just blocks everything up’) but the members themselves are popular in their districts and States (‘I like Senator Whoever, they stopped that terrible ____ law that would have killed our town’).
I think 55% is much too low to really create a ‘safe’ legislature and what we really need is a directly elected executive to really free up our members but I guess that’s one of the argument for fixed terms.
*members of Parliament, rather than Lib Dem members… I don’t think anyone can accuse them of being too in hoc to the leadership! 🙂
One more thing to add on this: in practical terms, the political situation of a dissolution vote being called will be the primary factor in what the outcome of the vote is. If the government legislates for fixed terms, that would make it politically difficult for any dissolution vote to be called for many parliaments, and particularly whipped. Or if something particularly outrageous/scandalous happened that affected all of politics, it would be politically difficult for MPs to vote to deny the public an election. So, in that sense, the debate about what the threshold should be may be of little practical consequence. Then again, it is still important to get good law on the statute books.
Martin, I still don’t see why this is served by removing the power of a vote of confidence from the back benches. Stopping the power of the executive to call elections does not imply removing it from the ordinary members, which is what fixing terms does.
@JC
Backbenchers can still call for a vote of confidence. If failed, the government falls. What are you bleathering about?
@Paul McKeown
“Backbenchers can still call for a vote of confidence. If failed, the government falls.”
Not necessarily, and this is why people are so alarmed by it! If an alternative government could not be formed, and Tory MPs refused to back a dissolution vote, then the government would be FORCED to continue, albeit without Lib Dem members.
This is possibly the most obviously stupid scheme I have ever seen proposed by any government anywhere. A bunch of primary school children would do a better job of amending our constitution than this.
No matter what spin is put on it, 55% (never mind 66%) will always sound instinctively undemocratic to people, and that’s why this issue is going to be such a thorn in your sides.
What’s worse is that I simply don’t believe the reasons given for this change. Cameron has always been firmly opposed to fixed Parliaments, right up to the election, so when he says that he only wants this 55% rule because he wants to bring in fixed Parliaments, why should anybody believe him?
The whole thing is a very poorly executed con. How did Cameron think he could get away with it, when 55% is oh-so-conveniently just beyond the 53% of MPs who are not Tories? This is about one thing and one thing only – protecting a minority Cameron government in the event of a coalition split. I think one of the Lib Dem negotiators said as much the night the agreement was finalised. Having failed to get a majority at the ballot box, Cameron is simply fiddling the constitution so that “45 is the new 50” when we’re talking about a Commons majority. And you guys are letting him get away with it.
People are looking at this whole “fixed” Parliament thing in entirely the wrong way. Non-fixed Parliaments are not in themselves a bad thing. In fact, early elections are often desirable for the proverbial good of the country – this was certainly the case in October 1974, and (arguably) in 1966 too. Which leaves 1951 as the only genuine post-war example of a government calling an election after significantly less than four years in the hope of electoral gain.
So what exactly is the “problem” that needs solving? If (as was often said in recent years) the problem is that unpopular governments and “unelected” PMs can cling on to power for five years, then these proposals will EXACERBATE the problem. I have seen no polls on this, but I’d bet good money that most people would prefer terms of four rather than five years.
History suggests that a four-year “fixed” term would probably not even need enforcing, but if enforcement were required then you could simply say that Parliament could not be dissolved unless the government lost a confidence vote. I doubt whether any government would incur the wrath of the public by deliberately bringing itself down for electoral gain.
One thing’s for sure – this is all far too important constitutionally to have been decided in five minutes as a tiny part of the Tory-Lib Dem coalition negotiations. There should be a proper, unprejudiced national debate, with all options considered, and probably a referendum at the end of it.
A final word – those who are calling Labour “hypocrites” because they came up with the 66% rule in Scotland really should learn the difference between the House of Commons and the Scottish Parliament. One is the primary legislative body for a sovereign nation; the other is not. What is right for one may not be right for the other.
Stuart
“Not necessarily, and this is why people are so alarmed by it! If an alternative government could not be formed, and Tory MPs refused to back a dissolution vote, then the government would be FORCED to continue, albeit without Lib Dem members.”
Apparently this concern is going to be addressed.
The BBC last week quoted David Heath as follows:
“He said the government would still have to resign if it lost a confidence vote on a simple majority. Then another party or coalition of parties might try to form a government, or if no government could be formed “within a particular time” parliament would be dissolved.”
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/8705692.stm
“Cameron has always been firmly opposed to fixed Parliaments, right up to the election …”
That’s not actually true. If you do a Google search you’ll find a speech last year in which he acknowledged there were strong arguments in favour of them.
Anthony: Perhaps Cameron likes the idea of fixed Parliaments under Tory governments but not Labour ones! He spent three years berating Brown for not calling an early election, and just five weeks ago he made a speech in which he proposed forcing “unelected” PMs to call an election within six months, regardless of Parliament’s opinion. I guess nobody believes in a truly fixed Parliament; we’re all just talking about different types of pseudo-fixed here.
@Stuart
Speak for yourself. Liberal Democrats believe in fixed parliaments.
@JC the problem is that if the lobby fodder can dissolve the parliament, their leadership can ‘make’ them do it and still have control over the timing of the election. While they can do that the party leadership has too much power.
If it were 55% of the MPs belong to one party as it is in most Parliaments (and likely future ones) we couldn’t call this a fixed term system anyway, because if the governing party has 55%+1 and that party’s leadership could whip their guys into calling an election.
So as has been said above, this isn’t really a fixed term parliament… I’d argue a proper fixed term parliament doesn’t work in this country while we have the craziness of trying to form a government from the legislature, but discussing a direct vote for PM is perhaps a subject for another thread!
@Stuart
I wouldn’t be so sure. The German constitution has exactly this provision: in theory there can only be an early election if the government loses a confidence vote. In practice, when the Chancellor wants an election he simply orders his own MPs to vote against a motion of confidence. This trick has been used twice so far, in 1983 and 2005.
So the fixed term of the Bundestag is somewhat meaningless. Similarly I think politicians would abuse a rule that parliament is dissolved if no government can be formed within a set period.
@Modicum
That’s not really what happened in Germany. In 1983 the early election was engineered because there had been a parliamentary coup a few months earlier, replacing a social democrat-led government with a christian democrat-led one, and there was a widespread feeling that the electorate should get a chance to give its verdict. In 2005, a government with an extremely small majority, struggling to hold onto the support of its own members, effectively gave up the ghost. The fact that the Chancellor’s party was miles behind the opposition in the polls at the time (and had just lost a regional election) shows that it wasn’t a case of the government cynically abusing the constitution for its own advantage. In fact, the fixed term rule works very well in Germany, where all parties accept that other than in exceptional circumstances, the election will fall at four-yearly intervals.
However — it’s still not as good as the Swedish system!
Martin,
You’re right it would be possible for the government to do that. I think it would be too politically damaging for them but it would be possible. What I am asking is, if the executive being able to call an election is taken out of the list of possibilities, what is the democratic advantage in fixing term length?
@Malcom Todd
Point taken. Two early elections since the 1980s is not actually a bad record.
But whatever the justification I do think a government deliberately losing a vote of confidence is not quite in the spirit of the rules. If the system has worked reasonably well in Germany I expect it’s not because the Basic Law is rigorously enforced but because it has led to a political convention against calling frivolous early elections. Perhaps a similar convention will emerge in the UK.
I also would quibble with describing Kohl’s election as a “parliamentary coup”. In a parliamentary democracy I think a midterm change of government is perfectly legitimate. But I know many people disagree with that view.
@JC
I’m aware of two common arguments for fixed terms. The first is that it produces “stability”; I’m not convinced by that because I think sometimes having an election is necessary for stable government.
The other is that fixed terms create a “level playing field” between the majority and the opposition. Currently the majority can call an election at the most convenient time to keep it in office. This makes the government harder to remove and seems to give it an unfair advantage. Arguably an election on a fixed date is more likely to reflect the settled view of the people than a snap election called when there is a fleeting spike in the opinion polls.
Modicum: “Perhaps a similar convention will emerge in the UK.”
I think this hits the nail on the head. Most sensible people accept that it is often desirable (or even necessary) to hold an election before a term is up. Such an outcome needs to be fairly straightforward to bring about otherwise there could be chaos. In my opinion there has to be a strong element of trust involved; it needs to be ingrained in our political culture that we have “default” (I prefer this word to “fixed”) Parliaments which are only cut short in specific and well understood circumstances, and woe betide any government which attempts to subvert the system by attempting to call an election of convenience.
I think this is a more sensible approach than attempting to frame a set of rules which make it impossible for a government to call an election at will while retaining the ability to dissolve Parliament when it is clearly in the national interest to do so.
Any form of “fixed” or “default” Parliament would be palatable to more people if the default term were four years rather than five. Five years seems an awfully long time to be stuck with a government that basically isn’t wanted (as happened from 1993 onwards, and again from c. 2007).
The problem with a 4 year cycle was that it would always coincide with the same local election round. A better solution might be to fix the election date in October thereby avoiding any council election clash.
Re the 55% principle, my view is that the electorate have chosen the Parliament for a fixed term of 5 years. It is then up to the MPs to make that work and not go against the voters wishes by forcing an early election.
Hence, in our current example, noone voted for the Lib Dem/Tory coalition – it was formed by those two parties afterwards in the light of the results. Therefore defeat for the coalition government in a confidence vote should not force an early election – the MPs should then have to try and form an alternative government.
If they are unable to do so, then a higher percentage (agreed 55% may be too low as there is no restraint on a party with a majority of over 60) should be able to force an early election. This is effectively the Scottish Parliament position as I understand it and I struggle to see why the Westminster position should be different in principle.
“If they are unable to do so, then a higher percentage… should be able to force an early election.”
In such a system, it would be perfectly possible for the government to lose a confidence vote (say by 53-47), the other parties to fail to agree on an alternative government, Parliament to fail to dissolve itself (again by 53-47), and we’d be stuck with the resulting chaos for five long years. A higher threshold such as the one you suggest would make the above situation far MORE likely to occur.
Surely there has to be a better way. If the politicians cannot think of one, then I suggest they run a competition in the nation’s primary schools.
If no alternative majority government could be formed, then a minority government would take place as currently in Scotland. This does not seem to have given rise to any “resulting chaos”.
A minority government unable to pass legislation would be as chaotic as it’s possible to get. Were that not so, the Lib Dems would be sitting on the opposition benches alongside Labour. I am perplexed that anybody should be keen to preserve for five years a Parliament from which no strong government could be formed.
Of course, if such a situation ever arose, Parliament would undoubtedly say: “This chaos is good for nobody. Let’s just repeal the fixed Parliament legislation and have an election.” The whole thing seems more pointless the more one thinks about it.