Quangos – Quasi-autonomous non-governmental organisations – occupy a strange place in the British political landscape. They tend to proliferate because governments can’t resist seeing new commissions for this or advisory panels for that as essential, while rarely deciding that existing bodies have outlived their usefulness. Yet, the term “quango” inhabits the same discursive space as “bureaucracy”. There is an engrained association with waste, inefficiency, red tape and pointless interfering. In many people’s minds, and frequently in political rhetoric, “quango = bad” by definition. (For a discussion of a similar equation regarding bureaucracy, see here on my blog.) So, the story goes, quangos need to be treated with suspicion and reined in whenever possible.
It is now conventional for reforming governments in the UK to assume power aiming to prune the number of quangos. Both Thatcher and Blair made statements to that effect. The evocative phrase ‘bonfire of the quangos’, coined in Mrs Thatcher’s time, has emerged as shorthand for this aspiration. But these are not new concerns. You can find discussions from the 1940s expressing concerns about the proliferation and powers of various non-departmental public bodies.
The Coalition government is no different. One of its first moves was for the Cabinet Office to undertake a cross-departmental review of quangos. The review concluded that of 901 quangos examined, some 192 could be abolished, 118 merged, and 171 needed reform. Forty organisations were still under review in December. The legislation embodying those conclusions – the Public Bodies Reform Bill – is wending its way through Parliament at the moment.
Should we be concerned about this review? In my view the answer is yes. But concern should be about the approach to policy making apparent at the heart of government as much as it is about the desirability or otherwise of quangos. The issues have been exposed in the recent scathing report by the Public Administration Select Committee (PASC). There are at least five reasons for concern.
Clarity, or the lack of it
The Government offered no clear position on the main focus of its review. The tests it proposed for determining whether a quango performed a useful function and should continue were vague and lacked coherence. The Government maintained to the PASC that the key purpose of the review was improving accountability by bringing properly public functions under direct control by Ministers. Saving money was at best a secondary concern. It was fairly simple for the PASC to identify statements, by the Prime Minister and others, that contradict this. It is also contradicted by the review criteria the government included in the Public Bodies Reform Bill, which made reference to the economy, efficiency and effectiveness of a quango’s operation. And that is without explicit consideration of the Coalition Agreement which states quite clearly, under the heading deficit reduction, that “we will reduce the number and cost of quangos”. Yet, the Cabinet Office can offer no estimates of the likely cost implications of the review.
The PASC’s examination of the process led to the conclusion that the review was conducted in a haphazard fashion, in undue haste, without a robust and transparent methodology or sufficient central guidance from the Cabinet Office to ensure an even handed – or even vaguely rational – approach. The results – in terms of the sharply contrasting futures for similar bodies – have little coherence. At times they appear little more than the product of caprice.
Consultation
The Government engaged in almost no structured consultation about the functions or effectiveness of quangos during the review. The Government gave the impression that this was considered largely unnecessary because the decision making was rooted in principle and the application of objective tests. It was, therefore, doubly unfortunate that the principles and tests employed were so badly constructed.
Complacency
Recently Alan Johnson has, rightly, been criticised in the press for not knowing National Insurance rates off the top of his head – seemingly a basic requirement of his role. Yet, the lack of detailed engagement demonstrated by the Cabinet Office Minister, Francis Maude, in his responses to the PASC is equally striking. The vagueness of some answers was worrying. The more specific answers could be contradictory.
Accountability
The Government’s professed aim for this review is to increase accountability. This is problematic for three reasons. First, to equate accountability with Ministerial accountability to Parliament is an extremely impoverished approach. Accountability to stakeholders can take multiple forms. Of course, no Liberal Democrat, grounded in community politics and engagement, would think otherwise. Quangos have Chief Executives and Boards who are visible and engaged in diverse ways with the communities they serve. Second, the idea that quangos are not already highly accountable to ministers is erroneous, although different Departments sponsor and oversee quangos in different ways. Third, there are strong arguments that accountability will be reduced as a result because quangos will become just one part of a larger departmental remit. Their activities will be buried in layers of hierarchy, lower profile and more remote from Ministers.
Concentration of power
Although the Government focused on increasing accountability to Parliament as the driver for this review, the Public Bodies Reform Bill as originally drafted tells a rather different story. It is a familiar story of the Executive seeking to assume power at the expense of the legislature. The Bill is primarily enabling. As originally formulated it was geared around so-called Henry VIII provisions that allow Ministers to use secondary legislation to amend primary legislation. This has caused considerable consternation among those who value due process and scrutiny. Many quangos were set up through primary legislation following sustained debate. Parliament had to be content that they had purpose and value. The proposal that such bodies could be abolished by Ministerial fiat shows a disregard for the democratic process that is at odds with the rhetoric. In order to move things forward the Government has been obliged to water down its proposals so as to allow greater scrutiny of Ministerial action.
The PASC raise many other issues worth closer examination. But that is sufficient to make the point. It couldn’t say so in quite such blunt terms, but we can infer that the PASC considered this a hopeless mess. The quality of thinking behind the review is highly suspect. It exposes a rather high-handed, amateurish and casual approach to policy making. Given these are major changes to the machinery of government that should be a concern to everyone. And it is not what we need if we seek a coherent and effective public sector.
7 Comments
There’s definitely a case for a significant reform of public bodies, rationalisation of functions, mergers to achieve economies of scale, getting rid of the spurious ones and challenging the complacent management ethos of many public bodies.
However two things stick out about the way this has been tackled..
(i) It’s so political – if you look at the composition of the governing boards of quangos that are being axed compared to those quango being reprieved, you will find that those Boards that have chairmen and leading members who are public appointees (vetted under Nolan principles etc) of the last Government and often senior experienced people with Labour affiliations or Labour Peers etc have fared the worst in the quango cull, compared to board compositions with Tories and Lib Dems on them. Surely political affiliation of board and staff members should not be the driving criteria for judging whether a public organisation is performing a usefull public function, doing a good job etc. There’s an element of political payback here that smells, a fair process for public bodies reorganaisation needs to be at least a bit above party political gerrrymandering, just as we don’t under our constitutional arrangements seek to politicise the civil service.
(ii) The Public Bodies Bill – as others have commented this is a sweeping use of Henry VIII clause powers. In fact it’s not so much a Bill as a bundle of ministerial order-making powers to do whatever they want with a list of public bodies set out in the schedules. Now in another era, current Government Ministers (especially the libdem ones) would be shouting ‘abuse of power’ and ‘executive takeover’ from the rooftops if anything like this came before Parliament – as legislation which centralises power in Ministers hands to such an extent goes, it is quite is unprecedented, frightening almost. Think about the constitutional stink we made about the Regulatory Reform Act for example…but the public bodies legislation this is a whole different order of executive powermaking without all the checks and balances of Parliamentary scrutiny etc.
For constitutional lawyers, a line has been crossed here. A few of our Peers in the Lords are speaking out about this, but they are also under pressure to tow the Party line..
A few of our Peers in the Lords are speaking out about this, but they are also under pressure to tow the Party line..
I wonder where we are being told to tow it to!
Actually the Party line in the Lords is very much that we think this is a bad Bill, we want to see major changes to its “architecture” to seriously reduce the Henry VIII aspect of it, and we are taking part in the constructive scrutiny in Committee stage of all the bodies lists (some 100s). There are also important discussions taking place with Ministers.
Next in line – the Forest of Dean and Regional Development Agencies, then (as bit later) National Park Authorities.
Tony Greaves
Tony, well done – I’m glad to see that you’re championing agencies working on rural development and issues – it is not as if there are many industry bodies other than NFU that can do work on improving rural infrastructures etc – and big society networks somewhat challenged by long distances between population centres etc
However, I am assuming that the final bill, with a few tame amendments, will all be processed through both houses by Government whips as it’s a pretty key project (aka dismantling the quango state) for the Cabinet Office, and delivering the CSR settlement for departments etc
Thanks for the comments so far.
@James Sandbach – I agree – I think I soft-pedalled a bit on quite how constitutionally problematic the Bill is.
@tonygreaves – I can only hope for success in the moves to make this Bill less opaque and the requirements on the Executive to account for their actions more effective.
@JamesS – But one of the points made by the PASC, in the light of the comments by the Cabinet Office, is precisely that the government is unable to provide any estimate of the money this will save. Given the way in which it has been run it is not outside the realms of possibility that it saves nothing. In fact, the process of change management/ implementation came in for just as much criticism by the PASC as the policy. The hands off approach to transitioning or winding down functions that seems to be being taken by the Cabinet Office is both of a piece with its policy making under the current regime and potentially disastrous. This could well end up costing more in the short term at least.
It is also clear that in at least some cases where functions are being moving the ‘receiving’ organisations are creating new divisions or taking on more staff to cope etc. While the number of quangos may go down, the impact on employment in quangos (and the impact on efficiency of operation) is likely to be much more modest.
Totally agree with this article. The level of powers this bill would give Ministers is crazy. With regard to RDAs in particular I understood a while ago that it would be legally dubious to abolish them with the powers in the public bodies bill so the abolition is being written into a separate bill – don’t know if that’s changed?
“There is an engrained association with waste, inefficiency, red tape and pointless interfering.”
Most importantly, they are not a function of ‘representative’ democracy, as they are not accountable.
@Jedibeeftrix – I don’t think I agree with you there. The point I was making in the post was that the Govt has a very simplistic notion of accountability – it only exists if an activity is under the direct hierarchical control of the Ministers. It is true that quangos are not accountable in that way. But that does not mean they are by definition not accountable. Some clearly are because they are relatively tightly managed by their Ministry. Some are less so, often because the Ministry takes a very hands off approach to those quangos operating in its policy area.
Equally, there are other mechanisms of accountability and the argument is that these are likely to be more effective when the activity is delivered through a quango than they would be if it is delivered directly by the ‘faceless bureaucrats’ of a Whitehall Ministry. The PASC recommendation was actually that there are too many different types of quango, some accountable some less so, and the Govt should turn them all into Executive Agencies. That would deliver a more direct link between the Minister and the Chief Executive of the quango than anything the Govt appears to be proposing.