Andy Burnham’s political appeal is easy to understand. At a time when Westminster appears remote, ineffective and disconnected from much of England, his call for devolution speaks directly to a widespread belief that power is too concentrated in London.
Burnham’s argument addresses a genuine problem. Britain is one of the most centralised democracies in the developed world. Decisions affecting communities hundreds of miles from Westminster are routinely made by ministers and civil servants with little understanding of local circumstances. The frustration this creates is entirely justified.
Yet supporters of constitutional reform should be careful not to confuse devolution with democracy.
The question is not whether power should leave Westminster. It should. The question is what happens to that power once it arrives elsewhere.
In “Head North”, Burnham and Steve Rotherham set out a vision of stronger regions, more powerful metro mayors and greater local autonomy. It is an attractive idea because it promises to rebalance the country and revive local decision-making.
The danger is that it may simply replace one concentration of power with another.
Supporters of the current settlement often present metro mayors as a democratic counterweight to Westminster. However, the institutions surrounding those mayors are frequently weak. In many cases, the primary check on mayoral authority comes from Combined Authorities that possess limited democratic legitimacy, attract little public attention and are largely unknown outside political circles.
This should concern people across the political spectrum.
Conservatives who value accountable government should worry about concentrating power in individual political figures. Liberals who value checks and balances should question whether sufficient scrutiny exists. Social democrats who believe in democratic participation should ask whether citizens have meaningful ways to influence decisions between elections.
The issue is not Andy Burnham himself. The issue is the system.
A constitutional settlement should never be designed around the assumption that today’s office-holder is competent and popular. It should be designed on the assumption that tomorrow’s office-holder may not be.
This is why federalism offers a more compelling alternative than the current model of devolution.
Federal systems do more than decentralise power. They divide and balance it. Authority is distributed between different levels of government, each with its own democratic mandate and constitutional protections. The aim is not simply to move power but to prevent its excessive accumulation anywhere.
Britain’s current arrangements often achieve the first objective without achieving the second.
Rather than creating a genuinely federal England, they risk creating powerful regional executives whose authority is only partially constrained by institutions with little public visibility or democratic weight.
A better model already exists within Britain.
In London, the Mayor is scrutinised by the elected London Assembly. While far from perfect, it provides a visible mechanism through which decisions can be challenged, budgets examined and power held to account.
The contrast with many Combined Authorities is striking. Most voters could not name their members, explain how they operate or identify their powers. That is not a criticism of those individuals. It is a criticism of a constitutional structure that lacks democratic visibility and engagement.
If England continues down the path of devolution, scrutiny must evolve alongside executive power.
That means directly elected regional assemblies with meaningful oversight powers and a clear democratic mandate. It means creating institutions that can act as genuine counterweights rather than merely advisory bodies. Most importantly, it means ensuring that regional leaders remain accountable throughout their terms, not just on election day.
Burnham deserves credit for identifying a real weakness in the British state. The debate he has stimulated about regional inequality and constitutional reform is both necessary and overdue.
But constitutional reform should never become a matter of personality. The popularity of a particular politician is not proof that a constitutional arrangement is sound. History repeatedly shows that systems built for trusted individuals are eventually inherited by less trusted ones.
The case for decentralisation remains overwhelming. Britain needs stronger local government, greater regional autonomy and a more balanced distribution of power. But decentralisation alone is not enough.
The real objective should be democratic federalism: a system in which power is dispersed, institutions are balanced and authority is subject to robust scrutiny at every level.
If power is to leave Westminster, it should not simply be handed to new political barons. It should be shared with the people themselves.
* Iain Donaldson is the treasurer of the Rochdale Liberal Democrats.



4 Comments
By Iain Donaldson | Mon 29th June 2026 – 11:08 am…The danger is that it may simply replace one concentration of power with another…
What danger? Westminster/London will remain the major seat of power; devolving more power to those who know ‘local’ issues has long been this party’s policy..
As for, ” It should be designed on the assumption that tomorrow’s office-holder may not be.”
That assumption is the strongest argument FOR devolved power
expats, the issue with concentration of power being that ‘devolution’ to mayors may involve the upward expropriation of powers or budgets from councils to mayors.
Just watched Andy Burnham’s speech.
I hope this is the opening shots in a General Election that may occur in the Autumn.
Here’s a combined response that addresses both comments while reinforcing your federalist argument:
Thanks both. I think you’re actually highlighting different aspects of the same concern.
My argument is not that Westminster would somehow cease to be the dominant centre of power. Britain remains highly centralised, and I agree that decisions should be made closer to the communities they affect. The question is whether devolution is genuinely dispersing power or simply relocating it.
As Matt points out, devolution can sometimes involve powers and budgets moving upwards from local councils to metro mayors rather than directly to local communities. In those circumstances, we are not necessarily decentralising power so much as creating a new layer of executive authority.
That links directly to the point about future office-holders. Constitutional systems should not be designed around the assumption that today’s mayor is competent and popular. They should be designed to withstand the possibility that tomorrow’s mayor is not. The best protection against poor leadership is not simply moving power from one institution to another, but ensuring it is balanced by strong democratic scrutiny and meaningful local representation.
There is also a further problem with England’s current devolution model. The powers enjoyed by metro mayors ultimately exist because Westminster allows them to. A future government with a more centralising outlook could choose to reclaim many of those powers and bring them back to Whitehall. In other words, powers can be devolved, but they can also be repatriated.
That is why I believe the long-term answer is not merely devolution but federalism. A federal settlement would not only decentralise authority but also constitutionally protect it, preventing power from being pulled back to the centre whenever a different government takes office. It would create stronger local autonomy while also ensuring that no individual office-holder, whether in Westminster or a mayoral office, exercises power without effective democratic checks and balances.
The issue, therefore, is not whether power should leave Westminster. It should. The issue is ensuring that once it does, it is genuinely shared, properly scrutinised and protected from being concentrated again, whether at the regional or national level.