America’s Ambassador to the UN, Mike Waltz, recently told American television that the problem with negotiating with Iran is that the Iranians are hopelessly divided.

He was right. Nobody is certain that the Iranian sitting across the negotiating table can make the rest of Iran obey any agreement.

The diplomats and politicians who meet with J.D. Vance, Steve Witkoff, Jared Kushner, et al, are generally pragmatists who want an end to war and sanctions. But back home they are being undermined by revolutionary ideologues prepared to embrace martyrdom.

The pragmatists are led by President Masoud Pezeshkian and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi. 71-year-old Pezeshkian is a heart surgeon who entered politics as the Minister for Health. He has been president of Iran since 2024.

His religious credentials are sound. He supports the theory of the Islamic Revolution. He has to because all candidates for the presidency—and the Majlis—are vetted by the Council of Guardians for their religious credentials.

But at the same time, Pezeshkian’s chief loyalty is to the state rather than to the concept of the revolution. To that end he favours ending Iran’s international isolation; wants to revive the economy and end sanctions; and favours social freedoms.

Pezehskian’s main ally is Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, aged 63, who served as Iran’s ambassador to Japan and deputy foreign minister before becoming foreign minister in 2024. He is a professional negotiator and has led the Iranian delegation in talks with the US. Like Pezeshkian, Araghchi is a pragmatist committed to the idea of Iran as an Islamic state.

The chief opposition to the pragmatic wing is led by 61-year-old Saeed Jalil, leader of the Paydari (Stability) Front which directly holds 90 seats in the 290-seat Majlis (parliament). He can also usually count on about 30 other votes.

Jalil lost part of his right leg in the Iran-Iraq War, and he likes to portray himself as a “living martyr” to the Islamic revolution. Jalil is an austere, rigid, deeply religious ideologue. He led Iranian negotiators in the nuclear talks from 2007 to 2013. Those talks ended in stalemate, mainly because Jalil was more interested in delivering long ideological rants than bargaining. It was his successors who negotiated the 2015 Iran Nuclear Deal (JCPOA) which was jettisoned by Donald Trump.

Jalil has close, but no direct links, with the important Islamic Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) who control not only the police and the military, but also most of the economy. His real power is as a charismatic leader who can mobilise Iran’s religious right.

This group comprises about 10-20 percent of the population. They are roughly equivalent to America’s MAGA movement in that they are a minority but have power because they are united behind a common goal.

A demonstration of Jalil’s power was the recent funeral of Supreme Leader Ali Khameini. Jalil’s Paydari Front bussed in huge crowds from the conservative countryside to Tehran for the public funeral. Foreign media were allowed into the country to witness the tearful crowds waving banners with the word Itamar (revenge) and shouting “Death to America,” “Death to Trum,” “Death to Israel,” “No to negotiations.”

A second hardliner is perennial presidential candidate Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, aged 64. His strength lies in the fact that he has strong ties right across the Iranian political spectrum. During the Iran-Iraq War he rose to become Iran’s youngest divisional commander. He later served as head of the IRGC’s air force, as mayor of Tehran and finally, as Speaker in the Majlis. He remains a senior commander in the IRGC. His experience gives him links in the military, police and politics.

Ghalibaf is an alternative to Jalil on the ideological front. He is deeply committed to the revolution but has been described as more of an “operator than an ideologue.” Jalil tends to argue from a revolutionary perspective. Ghalibaf argues for the revolution in favour of what is achievable. This puts Ghalibaf in the centre of Iranian politics which means that neither the hardliners nor the pragmatists fully trust him.

There have been disputes within the Iranian revolution since its inception. These have been settled by the intervention of the Supreme Leader, first Ayatollah Khomeini and then his successor Ali Khameini. The problem is that the current Supreme Leader, Khameini’s 56-year-old son Mojtaba Khameini, is among the missing.

Mojtaba Khameini is reported to have been badly injured in the bombing that killed his father and most of his family. He is said to be terrified that he will be assassinated if he comes out of hiding. He does regularly issue written orders calling for an end to factionalism, but these are largely ignored.

The mystery deepened this week when the dissident-backed Iran International news agency reported that Pezeshkian was taken to a secret rendezvous with his Supreme Leader. The meeting took place in a darkened car with tinted windows. Pezeshkian could hear the man introduced as Khamenei, but apparently could not see him clearly enough to be certain it was him.

There are several possible explanations. Khamenei may simply be terrified of American or Israeli assassination. He may be so badly injured that he does not want even his president to see him. Or the Council of Guardians may be concealing the fact that its Supreme Leader is too sick to lead—or even dead.

Whatever the explanation, Iran has reached an extraordinary position: its president apparently cannot be certain that the Supreme Leader he is supposed to obey is actually the man issuing the orders.

Also leaderless is the roughly 70 percent of the population who are said to be opposed to the Islamic Revolution. At the moment they are struggling with soaring food prices and a collapsing economy, as well as the constant threat of American bombers.

These are the people whom President Trump relied on rise up and overthrow the mullahs. The problem is that there is no identifiable leader within Iran around whom they can rally. The son of the late Shah, 65-year-old Reza Pahlavi, would like to assume the mantle. The problem is that his name remains inseparable from his father’s autocratic regime, while his decades in exile leave questions about how much support he actually commands inside Iran.

Washington’s problem, therefore, is no longer simply what deals it can strike with Iran. It is deciding which Iran it is striking the deal with — and whether that Iran has the power to deliver

* Tom Arms is foreign editor of Liberal Democrat Voice. He also contributes to “The New World” magazine and lectures on world affairs. He is the author of “America Made in Britain,” two editions of “The Encyclopaedia of the Cold War” and “The Falklands Crisis.”