If the UK economy were permanently £180 billion larger every year, and that translated into around £54 billion of extra tax receipts annually, the real‑world impact would not be abstract. It would be measured in hospitals built, nurses hired, waiting lists cut, teachers recruited and classrooms made smaller. This is where the story moves from macroeconomics to people’s lives and to the choices a government can make with new, sustainable revenue.
The NHS: more staff, shorter waits
Take the NHS first. Recent estimates suggest that one additional NHS doctor costs the public sector roughly £100,000 per year when salaries, training and overheads are included, while a nurse costs around £40,000 to £50,000. If even a quarter of the extra £54 billion a year – about £13.5 billion – were directed into health and care, it would support a transformation on the ground.
That level of funding could pay for roughly 135,000 extra doctors or around 270,000 extra nurses, or a mixed workforce of, for example, 60,000 doctors and 110,000 nurses. In practice, a phased approach would be more realistic and more powerful. A government could plan to recruit 5,000 new doctors and 20,000 new nurses each year for a decade, backed up by thousands more radiographers, physiotherapists and paramedics, as well as sustained capital investment in scanners, theatres and digital systems.
The NHS currently has well over seven million people waiting for elective treatment at any one time. If extra staff and capacity reduced the average waiting time by even a third, that would mean millions of people seen sooner, with operations scheduled faster and fewer people stuck in pain or fear for months on end. It would also reduce pressure on accident and emergency departments and on GPs, who are often left dealing with the consequences of delayed care.
Schools: smaller classes, more teachers
Education is the second pillar. Analysis by independent research bodies suggests that hiring one full‑time teacher costs roughly £40,000 to £50,000 a year, including salary, pension contributions and on‑costs. If another £10 to £12 billion a year of the extra tax revenue were invested in schools and colleges, that could fund 20,000 to 25,000 new teachers each year or a quarter of a million additional teaching posts over ten years.
Those teachers could be used to cut class sizes and expand specialist provision. In many parts of England, the average primary class is close to 30 pupils. A targeted policy could aim to reduce typical class sizes to the low or mid twenties, giving children more individual time with their teacher and making it easier to identify problems early. In secondary schools, the same funding could provide more subject specialists in science, languages and technology, smaller groups for core subjects such as maths and English, and better pastoral and mental health support.
Lower class sizes and a richer curriculum are not just a “nice to have”. They are associated with higher attainment, especially for children from disadvantaged backgrounds. Over time, that means better exam results, more young people staying on in education or training, and a more skilled workforce feeding back into the strength of the economy. The benefits compound across decades.
Social care and mental health
Beyond hospitals and classrooms, extra revenue could address the long‑running crisis in social care and mental health. The UK faces a social care workforce gap running into the tens of thousands, and many older people wait months for home help, respite care or a place in a suitable setting. Families are often left to plug the gaps, with huge emotional and financial costs.
If even £3 to £4 billion a year of the additional tax take were devoted to adult social care, it could support the creation of tens of thousands of new care worker posts over a decade, along with better pay and training to reduce churn. Waiting times for assessments and care packages could be cut significantly, freeing up hospital beds and giving people the dignity of timely support. Expansion of community mental health teams and early‑intervention services would reduce crises, ease pressure on emergency services and improve quality of life for thousands of people every year.
Defence, transport and green energy
The remaining headroom could help modernise Britain’s infrastructure and security. An extra £5 to £10 billion a year for defence would allow the country to maintain credible armed forces, invest in new frigates, submarines and aircraft, and strengthen cyber and space capabilities. In a more turbulent world, that matters for national security and for our role as a reliable European and NATO partner.
Transport investment of £10 to £15 billion a year could fund new rail lines, signalling upgrades, station improvements, better local rail and bus networks, and the maintenance of roads and bridges that are currently crumbling. Faster, more reliable transport links raise productivity, reconnect left‑behind regions and make daily life easier and safer.
A further £8 to £12 billion a year for green energy and home insulation would speed the transition to a low‑carbon economy. It could help install millions of solar panels and heat pumps, retrofit homes so they are warmer and cheaper to heat, and upgrade the grid to cope with new patterns of demand and supply. Households would see lower energy bills, while emissions would fall much more quickly.
Turning numbers into a national story
The cumulative uplift of around £1.2 trillion over a decade is not a slogan. It is the tangible consequence of choosing a path based on growth, openness and investment instead of stagnation and managed decline. It means nurses you can see when you need them, doctors who have time to listen, teachers with manageable classes and pupils leaving school with real prospects. It means armed forces properly equipped for modern threats, trains and buses that actually work and homes that are warmer, cleaner and cheaper to run.
For Liberal Democrats, this is the second chapter of the story we need to tell. Rejoining the European Union is not just a constitutional argument; it is the economic engine that makes a healthier, fairer and more ambitious Britain possible. It is the foundation on which we can rebuild public services, restore trust in politics and give people back a sense that the future can be better than the past.
* Gareth McAleer is a Liberal Democrat member in Didcot and Wantage, and is active in the Liberal Democrat European Group.



23 Comments
“If the UK economy were permanently £180 billion larger every year, and that translated into around £54 billion of extra tax receipts annually, the real‑world impact would not be abstract. It would be measured in hospitals built, nurses hired, waiting lists cut, teachers recruited and classrooms made smaller”
All undoubtedly true, but unfortunately the overriding priority has to be defence spending.
This all sounds very nice – but is fatally flawed because Gareth is thinking only about money, not about practicalities. To take the first example, where he claims the funding could pay for 135,000 extra doctors. Who exactly would we recruit from? Are there 135,000 unemployed qualified doctors just sitting around waiting for the NHS recruiters to pick up the phone? Seems pretty unlikely. Most of his other examples fail for the same reason.
I don’t doubt that, hypothetically, rejoining the EU would somewhat boost per capita GDP, but any analysis needs much more careful thinking about what impact that would have. The boost would largely come from lower trade barriers, which would allow some goods to be produced more cheaply, putting more money in the pockets of people and investors. Given our massive housing shortage it’s very likely, that lot of that would quickly be swallowed up by house prices as people use their slightly better standards of living to compete for the few available houses. Any greater manufacturing efficiency arising from greater trade might free up some people to work in areas like social care, although you’d still probably need to increase social care wages to attract people – which in turn increases costs.
Putting that kind of analysis together, I very much doubt that the impact of rejoining on public services would be anything like as dramatic as Gareth is suggesting. (Although it would still be positive).
Here’s the cumulative real GDP growth for Europe’s four biggest economies since Q1 2020: 9%, 7.5%, 6.2%, 2.1%….
One of these left the EU.
Sad to say Gareth , but the further you delve into the figures you’ve come up with – they just don’t stack up to any meaningful scrutiny….
This is essentially a repeat of the article from a few days ago. Once again no source and consequently no evidence is given for the £180 billion figure claimed.
“If the UK economy were permanently £180 billion larger every year, and that translated into around £54 billion of extra tax receipts annually, the real‑world impact would not be abstract. It would be measured in hospitals built, nurses hired, waiting lists cut, teachers recruited and classrooms made smaller”
Firstly, as Andrew Tampion points out the £180 bn anually is just a made up number.
Secondly, even if it were true it wouldn’t have the benefits claimed. Up until 2008 the GFC crisis we did have steady economic growth. The UK’s GDP has increased by a factor of three since the early 70s.
But do we have a smaller pupil teacher ratio? To some extent, yes, but the improvement is all due to a falling birth rate. It’s fallen by 30% during this time.
But, are NHS waiting lists any shorter than they were in the early 70s?
Some of the criticisms of Gareth’s case seem rather oddly focused. Obviously, the economic damage caused by Brexit can never be assessed with complete accuracy, but not having a precise, unchallengeable figure doesn’t destroy the basic premise. It’s undeniable that trade with EU countries has been made more difficult, and the claim that Brexit was going to open up better trading relations with the rest of the world was always laughable. The winners in trade deals are those with more power – like the EU, not a small country like the UK.
The problem with waving around a precise (but therefore inevitably wrong) figure – good as it might look on the side of a bus – is that it raises expectations, as the article goes into more detail on, of some very specific improvements that would be made as a result of the change using that additional money.
In reality rejoining would be at least a decade of working through the accession process negotiations and realigning laws and regulations – slower, if an anti-EU or even ambivalent party ever got elected to government during that time – with many of the economic benefits coming gradually rather than instantly after that.
As a long-term policy to work towards, it makes for a good idea. “Work towards rejoining the EU” should be a policy. But waving around big numbers and big promises none of which will materialise in any form in the next decade is just a recipe for making people disillusioned – again! – with the whole concept, while not addressing the urgent question of what we do without that money for the next 10-20 years to make things work in the meantime.
“The winners in trade deals are those with more power – like the EU, not a small country like the UK.”
Of course this argument sounds superficially very plausible. But does it stack up with the reality.
The smaller countries in the EU don’t seem to do any better than smaller European countries which aren’t a part of it. Greece has well documented problems. Most are suffering the effects of population decline as their young people head off to greener pastures.
Singapore (population 6.1 million, of whom just over 4 million are citizens) seems to do very well economically. It resisted attempts to become part of a wider Malaysian Federation in the 60s.Those who opposed the Independence of Singapore would no doubt have use the the same argument. Singapore is too small to be anything other than a rule taker on its own.
The country of Iceland is even smaller. Pop 300K They also do OK without handing over a share of their sovereignty to others!
So maybe it is more a determination to succeed on their own terms rather than thinking they can rely of the security of being part of a larger political grouping which is the more important factor for the smaller countries.
@Peter Martin “The country of Iceland is even smaller. Pop 300K They also do OK without handing over a share of their sovereignty to others!”
Iceland, as you well know, is part of the EEA, so is required to implement the rules of the single market, including on free movement etc without being party to making them¹, as EU member state are, so while they do do “OK” they obviously have less sovereignty than EU members.
1. They are consulted, but it is non-binding.
Except of course neither Iceland nor the EU Member States have actually lost any sovereignty at all, because they’re members of their respective organisations completely voluntarily, and can leave if they wish.
Simon Robinson 14th Apr ’26 – 11:57pm:
The boost would largely come from lower trade barriers,..
No. The UK lowered its trade barriers by leaving the EU. They’ve been lowered further by new Free Trade Agreements and joining the rapidly expanding CPTPP. 86% (and rising) of world GDP is outside the EU. Joining the EU would raise UK trade barriers overall for a small reduction within the EU (mostly benefiting food exporters to the EU – just 1.5% of UK total exports).
International Trade Barriers Index:
https://www.tradebarrierindex.org/
@ Daniel,
Iceland hasn’t signed up to the Common Agricultural Policy or the Common Fisheries Policy.
The big advantage of staying out of the EU is there being no requirement to adopt the euro. Although it’s the set of fiscal rules that go with the euro rather than the euro itself which is the problem.
@Peter Martin
Peter, either Iceland still has all its sovereignty, and so do the EU states (because the rules of the organisations to which they belong are essentially voluntary because they have the unilateral option to leave), or neither do, because they are bound by some rules.
In the latter case, all countries that are members of the Universal Postal Union or the International Telecommunications Union are also not sovereign by that measure.
The existence of specific rules you don’t like (and are, of course, entitled to dislike) such as the SGP or the CAP have no bearing on the sovereignty of the countries that choose to adopt them; that is an exercise of sovereignty, not its absence.
And CAP or not, EEA countries demonstrably have less control over the rules of the single market to which they belong than EU member states do.
@ Daniel,
I understand your argument. You could equally say that membership of NATO, the IMF and the WTO, represents a loss of sovereignty. Even those who might oppose any of these wouldn’t frame their opposition in these terms though.
So what’s the difference between membership of NATO and membership of the EU?
NATO is a military alliance and Britain has always had those. Alliances with France and Russia led to our involvement in WW1. With France and Poland to WW2 etc. But there’s no requirement for anyone to elect members to a common Parliament, no requirement for everyone to align their laws with NATO law, no requirement to use a NATO common currency etc etc.
In other words, the difference is that EU has all the trappings of a nascent superstate whereas NATO, the WTO, the IMF etc do not.
There shouldn’t an issue, for example, in agreeing a customs union , a FTA or whatever with the EU. We’ve always had agreements of this kind with other countries. They aren’t a problem providing that we know what we are agreeing to in advance. The problem with the EU was that we signed up to what was originally termed a Common Market but then little by little it changed into something quite different. In the end many felt that enough was enough and we should leave.
@Peter Martin
All irrelevant to the argument I was making (and you have broadly accepted) that as long as EU membership remains voluntary there is no loss of sovereignty. So your argument about Iceland is invalid.
You are entitled to your reasons for disliking the EU, although I disagree, but the sovereignty argument, such as it is, is just nonsense. I don’t intend to engage on the particular rules of the EU that you don’t like—we’re not going to agree there—but please, please, stop suggesting member states have lost sovereignty. It is incorrect. (We have, in fact had this same argument before)
“the difference is that EU has all the trappings of a nascent superstate whereas NATO, the WTO, the IMF etc do not.”
I guess the underlying question is, in a world of three superpowers (China and the US as single state super powers and counting Russia and India as half a superpower each) what structure does the traditional democratic west (let’s call that quasi-Europe) need to adopt to retain its independence?
Does quasi Europe need to be a single superstate itself (and is this actually achievable given the shared history of more or less continual religious and/or ethnic conflict over 2000 odd years?)
Or is the better approach one of building coalitions that work as advocated by Mark Carney – many coalitions of the willing – if only because it is more likely to be achievable and sustainable – despite (probably) being less secure in the face of those other 3 superpowers.
In Britain n case there is the nascent supersate on our doorstep. Whether the EU would be open to becoming a military alliance as well as an economic one is an interesting question. Right now I probably favour a more flexible NATO . That structure should be kept alive, at least for the moment, in the hope that the US regains its sanity, but we must not repeat the error of believing an allied power can never change.
@ Daniel,
I’ve seen the argument on LDV that being in the EU meant that we shared sovereignty, or pooled it, which makes more sense.
You might want to ask Greek people if, and how, their sovereignty was affected when they voted for certain policies in 2015, in both an election and a referendum. However, a German government, which has no democratic legitimacy outside its own borders, overruled an elected Greek government. We should, in theory have had a general sharing of sovereignty with any dispute being settled by the European Parliament and the European courts. This, too, would have made sense according the arguments put forward by those who support the EU.
@ Daniel,
You’re right that there is a nascent superstate closeby. It’s fair enough for anyone to argue for the UK to become a member. I’d argue against it, of course, but if that’s what the majority want I’d go along with it providing it was made clear that we weren’t just rejoining a Common Market 2.0 The EU is a far more ambitious project than that. I wouldn’t want the UK to be a part of it, either if it succeeded or if it failed. I’m not sure which would be worse! From the EU’s POV they do have a better chance of success without us.
I’ve no problem with a military alliance with the EU. If the US pulls out of NATO we’ll end up with something close to this by default in any case.
.
Sorry the second part of my comment was meant for Tristan.
Craig Levene 15th Apr ’26 – 3:25am:
Here’s the cumulative real GDP growth for Europe’s four biggest economies since Q1 2020: 9%, 7.5%, 6.2%, 2.1%….
One of these left the EU.
The economy that grew by only 2.1% is, of course, Germany…
‘Germany in ‘historically deepest crisis’ with economy in ‘free fall,’ warns president of Federation of German Industries’ [December 2025]:
https://archive.is/0bBfU
Joining the EU would be like putting on a diver’s weight belt and joining a sinking ship.
Look at Austria, for example. Once one of the most stable economies in Europe with decades of near continuous growth. Today, after its longest recession since the Second World War the EU put it into Excessive Deficit Procedure. As elsewhere in the EU, it’s rapidly deindustrialising — for the usual reasons…
‘More and more companies are moving away from Austria’ [December 2024]:
https://www.krone.at/3291244
‘I was a Remainer — this is why I was wrong’ [April 2026]:
https://archive.is/Fkhfg
Andy Daer 16th Apr ’26 – 9:06am:
The winners in trade deals are those with more power – like the EU, not a small country like the UK.
The UK is not a “small country”. It is the world’s fifth largest market, fourth largest exporter, third largest online marketplace and second largest exporter of services. Market size is just one factor amongst many. Successful trade deals that are sustainable need both parties to be winners.
‘The EU is useless at negotiating Free Trade Agreements’:
https://archive.is/HDn2S
The EU typically takes a long time to negotiate relatively shallow trade deals, not least because they have to be negotiated down to the lowest common position amongst all EU members. Even then, some members are reluctant. For example, CETA was signed in 2016, but a decade later 10 EU members have still not ratified it.
With the US, it was the size of the EU’s trade surplus and its palisade of protectionism that put it in a weak position. The UK got a better deal.
‘This EU is finished’ [Translated from Die Welt]:
https://archive.is/LRIDd
@Craig. UK inflation adjusted GDP per head is almost exactly where it was in Q2 2019. You have chosen a starting point at the bottom of a trough caused by Covid but deeper than in other countries because of Brexit.
Andy Daer 16th Apr ’26 – 9:06am:
…the claim that Brexit was going to open up better trading relations with the rest of the world was always laughable.
EU trade deals were generally unsuitable for the UK as they mostly cover goods and agri-food rather than services (60% and rising of the UK’s non-EU exports, with two-thirds now delivered digitally). The UK can now negotiate better trading terms as it has more flexibility. For example, it can drop tariffs on a wider range of goods, in exchange for better access for services.
The UK rolled-over all but three of the EU’s trade deals on the same terms, has already upgraded several, added new agreements, and joined the rapidly growing Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP).
‘The real winners from Britain and South Korea’s new trade deal’ [December 2025]:
https://archive.is/RzLQP
‘UK And Switzerland Forge Unprecedented Financial Alliance’ [Berne Agreement]:
https://archive.is/CKGt9
CPTPP has far superior terms to the rolled-over deals negotiated by the EU. See the table: “Areas where CPTPP goes further than existing bilateral FTAs” on Page 6 of ‘UK Accession to CPTPP: The UK’s Strategic Approach’:
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/61728409e90e071977182a5d/dit-cptpp-uk-accession-strategic-approach.pdf
Costa Rica accedes shortly, then it’s Uruguay, UAE, Indonesia and the Philippines — the UK has no bilateral agreements with any of these countries. CPTPP has huge potential.
Andrew Tampion 15th Apr ’26 – 7:03am:
Once again no source and consequently no evidence is given for the £180 billion figure claimed.
It’s from the NBER paper (34459): The Economic Impact of Brexit. It’s another ‘doppelgänger’ study using a fantasyland computer model, heavily weighted to the US, to pretend the UK would have grown twice as fast as the eurozone and almost as fast as the US. This despite the UK closing down the North Sea, having the developed world’s most expensive energy (petrochemicals, ceramics, cement all down 30%, steel 50%), a record tax burden, more bureaucracy, etc..
See the green unicorn on economist Julian Jessop’s graph:
https://x.com/julianHjessop/status/1996638860630282471
For analysis read ’Rachel Reeves Wrong on Brexit’:
https://www.briefingsforbritain.co.uk/rachel-reeves-wrong-brexit-damage/