In Nick Clegg’s party conference speech last week the Deputy Prime Minister made it clear that he wants the Liberal Democrats to remain a ‘party of government’ beyond 2015. This requires the party both to make a success of the next 18 months, and to plan effectively for the period beyond the next election.
Based on research into coalitions in other countries – and the specific question of how smaller parties have fared – the Institute for Government recently published a paper setting out five lessons for the Liberal Democrats as they move towards the final phase of the coalition:
- Smaller parties can only distance themselves from larger coalition partners to a limited extent. Coalitions are often rewarded or punished as a whole for their performance in office. Ensuring that the government is seen as effective and competent is crucial, and particularly so for the smaller party, which will often have less credibility at the outset as a party of administration. This will often require smaller parties to show discipline in supporting major policy initiatives of their larger partners, as when the German Greens backed Chancellor Schroeder’s Agenda 2010 welfare reforms in Germany.
- However, smaller parties also need to be able to demonstrate their distinct contribution to government, and therefore need to have some distinct flagship policy successes to point to at the next election (as the Scottish Liberal Democrats with free care for the elderly, and the German Greens with the abolition of nuclear power were able to do). But parties should pick their battles wisely – securing a concession that is seen as self-serving or irrelevant by voters can undermine the wider strategy. For instance, early in the current German coalition, the liberal FDP prioritised a VAT tax cut for hoteliers, helping a small FDP-supporting sector but alienating other voters.
- Small parties’ success rests greatly upon the performance and profile of the party leader. Successful junior coalition partners have leaders with a strong public profile and a clear personal record of achievement in government (as did the German Greens, for instance, in Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, who took bold action to support German intervention in Kosovo, and in opposing the US war in Iraq). Parties with weak or unstable leadership have fared poorly (like the FDP and the Dutch Democrats 66, who both changed leaders in mid-term). What Nick Clegg has personally achieved or delivered is a key question for the Liberal Democrats in 2015. This week’s free school meals for all announcement may form a central part of the party’s answer to that question.
- Parties associated with the premature coalition breakdowns are rarely rewarded by voters. Smaller parties in coalition elsewhere such as New Zealand First (in 1998) and the Irish Greens (in 2011) have pulled out of coalition early facing unpopularity and tensions with the coalition partner, and were hammered at the following election. On the other hand, the German experience from 2005 – when SPD Chancellor Schoeder forced an early dissolution of the Bundestag – is a reminder that coalitions can be brought to an end due to splits within the larger (and apparently dominant) party too, even when there is a strong fixed term parliament law.
- Smaller parties in any case have a limited influence over whether they remain in government or not. A party may remain in coalition even after a poor election result (as did Democrats 66 in 2003) or may end up in opposition even after performing relatively well (as for the German Greens in 2005 or the Scottish Liberal Democrats in 2007). The lesson here for the Liberal Democrats is to therefore make the most of the rest of this Parliament, and seek to achieve as much as possible before 2015.
A final point is that the party should prepare for the days and months after the election more thoroughly than last time. In 2010, too little planning had been made for government itself – in part because Cameron’s openness to coalition was so unexpected. This contributed to mistakes being made. Foolish pledges were, of course, made in opposition and then dropped. Little thought went into the party’s position on major issues like NHS Reform – until it was too late. And while the party negotiated hard on key policy priorities, other crucial issues – like the ministerial portfolios it would take, and the support and resources Nick Clegg would need as Deputy PM – were almost an afterthought. This has undermined the party’s effectiveness in government.
The decline of two-party dominance (the Conservatives and Labour took 97% of the vote in 1951, but just 65% in 2010) means the Liberal Democrats are indeed likely to have further bites at the coalition cherry. The question is what the party will make of the opportunity when it next arises. International experience and events at Westminster since 2010 should help inform the party’s answer to that question.
For more information on the Institute’s work on coalition government contact [email protected].
* Akash Paun is a Fellow of the Institute for Government in London, which is an independent and non-partisan thinktank that works to improve the effectiveness of government in the UK. He has led the Institute’s work on coalition and minority government since 2009, publishing a number of reports and articles in this area. He is currently conducting research into challenges faced by the civil service in supporting the two coalition parties in the final period of coalition.
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8 Comments
The Liberal Democrats have socially liberal attitudes, wish to make electoral systems ând other areas of public life processes more democratic and are pro Europe and internationalist.
These are the party’s distinctive features. Each aspect needs to be emphasised and robustly defended between now and the next election. Each aspect needs to be well to the fore in Lib Dem policy pronouncements and manifestoes.
The AV referendum and the Lord’s reform bill have been bitter set backs, yet we must continue to put forward the argument for democracy and explore other avenues such as local government where these principles can be put into action.
The author is doubtlessly correct to warn of the dangers for smaller parties and the need to retain a clear identity.
Fighting the 2015 elections from inside the government is totally unworkable. I don’t really know what Nick Clegg thinks he’s going to say if he stands up at a Leaders’ debate (next to Nigel Farage, no doubt) as Deputy Prime Minister. “I agree with Dave”? You cannot run against government while in government, and you cannot run as part of government without throwing votes to the dominant voice in the coalition.
Clem Attlee took Labour out of government in 1945 so that he could run against Churchill with no strings attached, and that worked very well for him. But every time the Liberals ran as part of a coalition, the result was a disaster — not necessarily for the coalition, as in 1918, but always for the Liberals. Of course Cameron was “open to coalition” — he knows Tory history well enough to know that the Conservatives have always benefited from such arrangements, and their partners have always lost by them.
I am constantly amazed about how many people think the Conservative offer of coalition was unexpected. After 13 years in opposition and with some strong points of agreement with the Lib Dems, it seemed entirely predictable. It is the typical pattern in local Government, than two opposition smaller parties combine to oust an long-term administration. Not least where was the memory of Blairs big-tent approach that Cameron was blatently copying.
The cabinet posts seemed to be handed out on the basis of jobs for the negotiators – when clearly making a Lib Dem Chancellor would have maximised the Lib Dems chances of being associated with any recovery – although I doubt it could have survived the David Laws expenses scandal.
I think all analysis of the coalition agreement has to remember two key facts: The Lib Dems had fewer MPs than previously despite more votes and the fear in the Party leadership of the prospect of another swift General election in which they would be massively out spent by the Conservatives. Indeed it is the assumption that Cameron would do a Wilson circa Feb 1974 which seems to have led to the lack of preparation for coalition.
I found all the rush to a deal because ‘markets need a stable government’ argument illadvised, unconvincing and off putting.
Indeed if the Lib Dems had held their nerve and their been another hung-Parliament their hand might have been noticeably strengthened.
As a consequence of the Clegg decision to make talking to the ‘winning’ party first, most sensible consideration of the Lib Dems own interest was destroyed. One only has to read reports of Damien McBride to see how a Labour/Lib Dem coalition would have struggled but ironically, from a selfish party view point, that might have served the Lib Dems better.
There was an absurd demand that Brown stand down as Labour Leader, supposedly because he would scupper the referendum on electoral reform.
But, from a Lib Dem point a view, keeping an unpopular Labour Leader in place would have been helpful.
And who can doubt that if there had been another election that left the Lib Dems in opposition, then Clegg would not have reneged on tuition fees, that the Lib Dems would be leading a Cameron Government in the polls, hammering on them on the bedroom tax, storming to victory in by-elections and Labour would be trying to dump Ed Miliband in the search for someone more electable ? The idea that the voters would punish the Lib Dems for flunking coalition is about as far fetched as the voters rewarding them for coalition.
OK the Lib Dems wouldn’t be in Government 2010-2015 – but then that is a judgement call as to which have been better in the long-term.
“Smaller parties in any case have a limited influence over whether they remain in government or not. A party may remain in coalition even after a poor election result (as did Democrats 66 in 2003) or may end up in opposition even after performing relatively well (as for the German Greens in 2005 or the Scottish Liberal Democrats in 2007). ”
This is factually wrong. The Scottish Liberal Democrats were invited to coalition talks in 2007 by Alex Salmond and refused the invitation to even open negotiations. The decision to follow a defeated Labour party into opposition was entirely in the hands of the then Lib Dem leadership. The lesson to draw is here is that the Scottish Lib Dem leadership had become too closely attached (and arguably still are!) to their old coalition partners and lacked the pluralism needed to even attempt to negotiate a coalition with another party that had won the most seats in the 2007-2011 parliament. Had they been part of such a progressive coalition government in Scotland in 2011, being seen to protect Scotland from the worst policies of the UK government, they might have avoided the meltdown they suffered in that year’s Scottish elections.
Al Macintosh – thanks for your response. Yes you’re right that the Scottish Liberal Democrats under Nicol Stephen rejected the possibility of a deal with the SNP. Part of the reason was perhaps lack of openness to alternative partners, as you suggest. But another big factor was that such a coalition would have lacked a majority and was seen as unlikely to survive. Of course Salmond then showed how a minority government could work rather well, but that wasn’t the conventional wisdom at that point in time.
Caracatus – On your point that “I am constantly amazed about how many people think the Conservative offer of coalition was unexpected.”
It’s true that local government and international experience ought to have led people to expect this outcome, or at least see it as a possibility. But virtually noone did. The senior LibDems involved in planning for post-election negotiations concluded that the most they could expect from this electoral scenario was a confidence and supply deal – and prepared accordingly. David Laws writes about this in his book. Similarly, the civil service ran scenario exercises and concluded that a coalition deal wouldn’t be done. There was also a CentreForum pamphlet from Julian Astle (now a special adviser) in March 2010 that concluded that a full formal coalition between Cons and LDs was unlikely. I wrote something similar at the time too!
I do think this all led to a lack of serious preparation for what government with the Conservatives might mean, what were the risks as well as potential benefits, and what the party should therefore ask for/demand before signing the deal.
David-1 – you say “Fighting the 2015 elections from inside the government is totally unworkable.”
It will undoubtedly be difficult, but I strongly doubt that early withdrawal from coalition will help. The party would still be held responsible for unpopular policies it has backed while in government – and quite right too. But it would also lose credibility as a responsible of government. Worst of all worlds no?
David-1 – Further to that. Yes it may have worked for Attlee, but there was quite an obvious rationale for the party withdrawing from government when it did. Namely the end of the war in Europe! Had Labour said in December 1944 – “we have to worry about our party identity now so we’re moving into opposition” – I wonder if they’d have done quite as well in the 1945 election.