Last Friday, journalists and civil liberties organisations waited outside London’s High Court while inside a secret court hearing took place. Despite efforts to petition the court, they were denied access even though the outcome impacts people in the UK and around the world.

Leaks to the press suggest that Apple may have been appealing a Technical Capability Notice (TCN) issued under the Investigatory Powers Act — often dubbed the Snoopers’ Charter. The TCN is believed to have instructed Apple to introduce a capability that would allow the company to access encrypted data stored in the cloud. We say believed because Apple are not permitted to disclose the detail of the TCN.

These secretive actions by the Home Office have already had real-world consequences. Apple has disabled its Advanced Data Protection service in the UK — a move that undermines the security of users’ iCloud backups and their overall digital privacy.

Liberal Democrat MPs have rightly written to the Home Secretary, warning that any government-mandated “backdoor” to end-to-end encryption (E2EE) introduces vulnerabilities that bad actors — including criminals and hostile states — could exploit. They also raised concerns about the lack of scrutiny surrounding such notices.

Discussing issues such as E2EE can often seem technical. I like to use a really simple analogy of locks to explain things. Most of us use locks every day — on our homes, cars, or devices. Criminals, of course, use locks, too, for example, to secure stolen goods. But we don’t respond to that by banning locks. That would be foolish as we understand the benefits to the law-abiding majority outweigh the benefits to criminals. 

Introducing backdoors to encryption is like creating a master key that opens every lock. What happens if that key falls into the wrong hands? Such a tool would be a prize for hackers, scammers, and foreign intelligence agencies alike. 

Unfortunately, law enforcement agencies have made it clear that they want this skeleton key and are not giving sufficient weight to the broader impacts on society. 

The TCN under the Investigatory Powers Act is just one example of growing attacks on encryption. The Online Safety Act now gives Ofcom powers under Section 121 — the so-called “spy clause” — which could compel companies to scan private messages for harmful content. If Ofcom uses this authority, it risks pushing services like WhatsApp or Signal to withdraw their services from the UK, as Apple has already done with ADP.

Globally, activists, journalists, LGBTQ+ individuals, and even the Ukrainian military rely on E2EE to stay safe. E2EE ensures that only the intended recipient of a message can read it — not the platform provider, not the Government, and not criminals.

Using encryption is, in essence, ‘practising safe text’. Privacy enables us to think, speak, and explore ideas freely without fear of surveillance or judgment. This is especially vital for vulnerable communities facing higher risks of persecution. There is a reason, for example, why services like WhatsApp are banned by the most oppressive regimes. 

It’s also important to bust the myth that encryption blocks all forms of law enforcement. Encrypted messages can still be used as evidence if the recipient shares them. In fact, improving user tools to report harmful messages could enhance safety without compromising encryption. Police already have the power to investigate digital crimes. Under Section 49 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA), individuals can be compelled to hand over decryption keys or face imprisonment. The tools exist — what we don’t need are new ones that quietly break the backbone of secure communications.

The Government wants these powers in secret. That is deeply troubling in a democracy. Without transparency, civil liberties groups and elected representatives cannot scrutinise whether these powers align with human rights. The Liberal Democrats have a proud history of defending civil liberties. Standing up for end-to-end encryption should be a fight the party takes up to protect individuals’ right to privacy and freedom of expression in the digital age. We hope you can support our ‘Practice Safe Text’ Campaign. 

‘The Independent View‘ is a slot on Lib Dem Voice which allows those from beyond the party to contribute to debates we believe are of interest to LDV’s readers. Please email [email protected] if you are interested in contributing.

* James Baker is a Lib Dem member writing on behalf of the Open Rights Group.