The Foreign Office has an unspoken strategy: whenever possible, it frames conflict as a humanitarian disaster, not a political problem requiring a political solution. Supporting UN aid efforts is laudable, but it is also easier than devoting diplomatic time and capital confronting deep-seated issues like systemic corruption, the persecution of minorities or the marginalisation of ethnic groups. No wonder so many civil wars defy our efforts to secure a genuine sustainable peace.  

The current violence in Sudan is an example of how officials respond to conflict as if it were an earthquake rather than a man-made disaster. Twenty years ago, officials treated the ethnic cleansing in Darfur like a disease rather than a racist expression of the Sudanese regime’s policy to eliminate its Black African civilians. The ideology behind the slaughter in Darfur was never acknowledged, just as Milosevic’s plans for Greater Serbia and the Interahamwe’s genocidal ambitions to erase Rwanda’s Tutsi minority were ignored by diplomats at the time. 

Another Foreign Office strategy is to cling to the old, discredited elites when searching for a negotiated settlement. In Sudan, the architects of the violence were seen as the international community’s partners in the search for peace. Over the last two decades, the voices of civilians were largely ignored, while the elite – and the men with guns – made promises they were never asked to keep. No benchmarks were set, and there was no mechanism to deliver consequences for failure to fulfil commitments made to negotiators. It was Bosnia all over again.

A popular uprising in 2019 ended three decades of Sudan’s Islamist junta, but civilian voices were side-lined during talks to transfer power to a civilian administration. The Quad and Troika negotiators (the UK is on both) put the old elite centre stage. They accepted the promises of the Rapid Support Forces (formerly the Janjaweed) of General Hemedti and the Sudanese armed forces under General Burhan. Together the generals staged a coup in 2021, arresting the civilian authorities. Despite this, the negotiators continued to take the generals at their word until the moment they began fighting each other on April 15th.

A Liberal Democrat perspective?

Rooted in our values is empowering local people to advocate for themselves. Implicit is a belief that citizens are best placed to determine their future and can be trusted to hold those in power accountable. We should remind the UK Government that Sudan’s problems spring from its elite political disfunction. The voices of civil society groups, not the generals or the discredited political parties, should be central to negotiations. 

No one suggests the de-Baathification strategy that was so disastrous in Iraq: the vast majority of soldiers have no ideological loyalty to either warring general: they mostly just want a regular pay check. However, the leading officers in both battling armies must be removed from Sudanese politics. This may be obvious to Liberal Democrats, but UK Government intends to continue where they left off when the fighting began. 

Liberal Democrats in Parliament must urge the UK Government to be careful before they resume talks with the generals. We do have leverage: by working with Gulf governments, we can freeze and seize the bank accounts, assets and businesses of Sudan’s deep state, including the generals and Islamist old guard, which are mostly registered in Saudi and the UAE.

Moreover, Liberal Democrats in Parliament must not follow UK ministers into the “humanitarian” cul-de-sac. There are plenty of NGOs advocating for urgent humanitarian aid. Our role is to make sure the voices of the brave civilians who for years have faced down the men with guns are central to any future political settlement. It is a model suitable for conflicts closer to home, too.

* Rebecca Tinsley is founder of the human rights group, www.WagingPeace.info, and on the Liberal International British Group Executive