The United Kingdom is undergoing a quiet constitutional breakdown. Not in the dramatic sense of institutional collapse, but in a slower and more corrosive way: voters increasingly feel unrepresented, power remains concentrated in Westminster to a degree unusual among modern democracies, and the link between democratic choice and real-world decision-making has weakened.
These are not separate problems. They form a single constitutional question: how can a modern, diverse, multi-national state remain democratic, fair, and stable when many of its institutions were designed for a different era?
The answer lies in three connected pillars: fair representation, decentralised power, and fiscal accountability. Each alone is insufficient. Together, they form a democratic redesign of the United Kingdom. The first pillar is electoral reform.
A functioning democracy depends on a simple principle: votes should translate into representation. In the United Kingdom, that principle is routinely broken by First Past the Post.
The 2024 General Election once again demonstrated the scale of the distortion. Parties receiving millions of votes secured only minimal representation, while others translated relatively modest vote shares into overwhelming parliamentary majorities. This is not merely a technical flaw. It is a structural weakness that undermines confidence in democratic legitimacy.
The solution is the Single Transferable Vote (STV), a proportional electoral system that preserves local accountability while ensuring representation more closely reflects voter preference.
Under STV, voters rank candidates in order of preference within multi-member constituencies. Several MPs are elected in each area rather than a single winner taking all. Representation is therefore earned through votes, not shaped by electoral geography.
The benefits extend across the political spectrum.
For Labour supporters, STV ensures electoral victories and defeats are determined by genuine support rather than the efficient distribution of votes. For Conservatives, it reduces the dramatic seat swings that can occur when small national shifts produce huge parliamentary changes, encouraging stability and broader coalition-building. For Green voters, it ends decades of under-representation relative to vote share. For Reform UK supporters, regardless of political agreement, it ensures substantial public support translates into a meaningful parliamentary presence.
Perhaps most importantly, STV reduces the incentive for tactical voting. Citizens can support their preferred candidate without fearing they are helping elect their least preferred option. The system adapts to voters, rather than requiring voters to adapt to the system.
Electoral reform also changes political behaviour. Parties must appeal beyond narrow geographic strongholds and seek support from a broader range of voters. Candidates must engage with more diverse electorates. Politics becomes less about concentrating support in the right places and more about winning support across society.
The result is a Parliament that better reflects Britain as it actually is: politically plural, regionally varied, and increasingly diverse in opinion.
Yet fair votes alone cannot solve the wider constitutional problem. Even a perfectly proportional Parliament would still govern through one of the most centralised states in the democratic world. Fair representation is therefore the first pillar of reform, not the final destination.
The wider goal is a United Kingdom where votes count, where power is exercised closer to the people affected by decisions, and where funding follows democratic responsibility. Electoral reform provides the democratic legitimacy upon which the other two pillars—federalism and fiscal federalism—must rest.
A modern democracy should not require voters to navigate distortions and tactical calculations simply to be heard. It should ensure that votes translate into representation and that representation translates into meaningful influence.
If trust in politics is to be restored, every vote must count. That is the foundation of a more representative, responsive, and genuinely democratic Britain.
* Iain Donaldson is the treasurer of the Rochdale Liberal Democrats.
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12 Comments
I like the sound of STV elections. Why not start the process by convincing the EU to use that system instead of the white/black smoke system used to choose Pope von der Leyen?
@Tom Bailey “instead of the white/black smoke system used to choose Pope von der Leyen”
The President of the European Commission is nominated by the European Council (viz. the heads of state/government of the member states) and approved (or not) by the EU Parliament. It is neither complex nor concealed how this is done.
Daniel Walker, I’m fully aware of how the EU elective system works, and the point is that European voters are not allowed any direct access to that process. [ probably because the EU elite think voters would get the *wrong answer*] How many voters of Holborn and St Pancras, Lisbon, or Seville voted for Ursula von der Leyen? Answer : None, because 250 million Europeans, never got a ballot paper Lets have STV in the EU first and then we can discuss UK options on re-joining?
@ Tom Bailey Given that Ms Ursula von der Leyen is a Lutheran not a Catholic you seem to have a vivid imagination.
@Tom Bailey “How many voters of Holborn and St Pancras, Lisbon, or Seville voted for Ursula von der Leyen? Answer : None, because 250 million Europeans, never got a ballot paper”
Tom, the EU Parliament is directly elected, by citizens of the EU. It controls (along with the Council, who are elected Heads of Government) the appointment of the Commission, including the President. The main difference from Westminster-style parliamentary systems is that the President is not selected from the members of the body as the UK Prime Minister is¹ No-one has actually voted for Keir Starmer to be UK PM; he is the Leader of the largest party in the House, and thus commands its confidence, but there’s not been a formal vote in the house for him to be PM; Ms von der Layen has be so confirmed by a democratic body, and can be removed by it if sufficient MEPs so desire, exactly the same situation as a PM picked by a Parliament from its own members.
(Incidentally, MEPs are elected by STV for in both Ireland and Malta.
The electoral systems used to elect MEPs must be broadly proportional, but are otherwise up to the member states (Belgium in fact has one FPTP seat for its German-speaking area, as an exception). So your request to use STV for MEP elections should perhaps be better directed at the member state governments)
1. although this is convention and not actually a matter of law
As often happens on LDV any discussion quickly, in this case from the first comment, gets on to the EU even though the OP isn’t about the EU.
I still think its a pity that we didn’t vote for a change to AV in 2011. This works well in Australia and I don’t see the problem with it. I wouldn’t mind STV but I suspect we’ll end up with is a system of party lists, no doubt using , to most voters, some highly unintelligible method (D’Hondt or Sainte-Laguë).
@Peter Martin
It’s not really about the EU. It’s about Tom making a statement (implying that the process for electing the President of the European Commission is obscure or undemocratic in some way) when it is neither.
If he’d said “I would prefer it if the EU selected its executive from the Parliament as the UK does, and uniformly used STV for MEP elections” I wouldn’t have said anything; it’s a fair comment, whether you agree with it or not.
The rest of your comment I broadly agree with, which makes a pleasant change! I don’t like party lists either, but it is more likely in the UK, especially if Labour are in charge of the design.
(while I agree most voters don’t understand the various methods for allocating seats, I don’t think either of the two you mention are particularly complicated.)
Always, debate settles on the assumption that “… most voters don’t understand …” and it infuriates and entrenches the anger of voters who want less government in their lives, not more. All we need to know is that 17.4 million UK voters rejected your Panglossian view of the EU as dishonest, and at that point democracy prevailed.
My point in the first comment is on topic, in that STV, is a valid attempt to create closer representative democracy until it matters most, when governance gets *appointed* , *confirmed*, and *given royal ascent*, and any other method of *elite nominated structure* which doesn’t involve pesky voters.
As we are neither a member of the EU, nor likely to be in the near future, I won’t comment further on Tom’s observations other than to say that with the exception of directly elected local authority mayors, Combines Authrority Mayors, and Greater London Assembly members, the electors in Britain elect neither their council leader, nor their Combined Authority Members. This is something that UK politicians can do something about, whereas we have no say in how the EU runs its affairs.
Turning to Alternative Vote (AV) versus Single Transferrable Vote (STV), since the AV retains single-member constituencies, it is generally considered inferior to the STV in terms of proportional representation because it can still produce significant disparities between vote share and seat share; it leaves many voters effectively unrepresented; it makes it difficult for smaller parties to win seats despite substantial support; it preserves safe seats; it offers voters less influence over which individual candidates are elected; and, it and can generate distorted regional outcomes. Conversely, STV’s multi-member constituencies allow representation to be distributed more proportionally, reduce wasted votes, improve opportunities for smaller parties and minorities, and provide voters with a wider range of meaningful choices.
AV also has the disadvantage that it was famously rejected by the people of Britain. Many peoiple who voted against sited the need for a more proportional system.
As far as voting complexity goes, there’s two separate bits to that.
1) How difficult it is to understand how to vote? Closed List is exactly equal to FPTP, Open List is much the same. STV isn’t a lot more difficult, though the value of giving preferences to candidates you dislike (but still prefer to the ones you hate) is often misunderstood.
2) How difficult it is to understand what happens to the votes afterwards? FPTP is easy, List isn’t too bad, AV is also quite simple … but STV has some very complex rules around transfer of surpluses which – as someone who has personally run and participated in multiple STV counts – I wouldn’t be wholly confident I could describe with perfect accuracy without preparation.
Thanks Mim,
That’s fair as a description of the counting process, but I think it’s worth separating the voter experience from the administrator experience.
For voters, STV is very simple: you rank candidates in order of preference (1, 2, 3, 4, etc.). You can rank as many or as few as you want.
The count works like this:
First preferences are counted.
Any candidate who reaches the election quota is elected.
If an elected candidate has more votes than they need, their surplus votes are transferred to the next preference shown on those ballot papers.
If there are still seats to fill, the candidate with the fewest votes is eliminated and their votes are transferred to the next available preference.
Steps 2–4 repeat until all seats are filled.
The precise method used to transfer surpluses can be technically detailed, but the basic principle is straightforward: votes are not wasted. If your first-choice candidate has already been elected or has been eliminated, your vote moves to your next preferred candidate.
Most voters don’t need to understand every accounting detail of the count any more than FPTP voters need to engage with the process by which, or even understand exactly how, constituency boundaries are drawn. They just need to know that their preferences continue to count.
While a fan of local devolution it does not necessarily result in treating minorities any better than a more centralised one. Accountability is key and not just fiscal. One of the major leavers against siefdoms is a vigorous, independent and financially resilient local media. Without this the temptation to pander to your own predjudices can become irresistible.