English football likes to think of itself as the most competitive, compelling league system in the world. And in many ways, the Premier League still delivers on that promise every weekend. But financially, the game is drifting into something far less credible: a system where losses are disguised, rules are gamed, and profit increasingly exists only on paper.
The rise of intragroup sales is not a clever innovation. It is a symptom of a broken model. When clubs such as Newcastle United or Chelsea can transform massive losses into tidy profits by selling assets to companies owned by the same people, we are no longer talking about football economics in any meaningful sense. We are talking about accounting choreography. The reported “sale” of St James’ Park to a related entity where ownership effectively remains unchanged, shows how easily accounting gains can be created without any real economic shift.
This is the logical end point of the current system. Profitability and Sustainability Rules (PSR) were designed to curb reckless spending and protect clubs from collapse. Instead, they have created incentives for financial engineering. Clubs are not being rewarded for building sustainable businesses, but for finding increasingly sophisticated ways to comply without changing behaviour.
But financial distortion is only part of a deeper structural problem. The competitive model that underpins English football with the promise of promotion to, and relegation from, the Premier League no longer functions as intended. In theory, the pyramid offers meritocracy. Perform well in the English Football League and you can rise; struggle at the top and you fall. In practice, the gap between divisions has become so vast that promotion increasingly resembles a temporary excursion rather than genuine arrival.
For clubs outside the top tier, reaching the Premier League is framed as a kind of utopia: transformative wealth, global exposure, long-term security. The reality is more precarious. The financial gulf forces promoted clubs into a binary choice: overspend in a bid to survive or remain cautious and risk immediate relegation. Either path carries significant risk. Relegation after overspending can be catastrophic; restraint often proves futile.
Meanwhile, established Premier League clubs’ benefit from entrenched advantages: higher revenues, deeper squads, and the cushioning effect of parachute payments if they do fall. The result is a system that is neither fully open nor fully closed, but increasingly stratified. This is where the model begins to break down: promotion and relegation still exist, but their ability to refresh competition and redistribute opportunity is weakening. Movement remains, but it is increasingly marginal with a narrow rotation rather than genuine renewal.
If financial rules are being gamed at the top and the competitive ladder is narrowing beneath it, reform cannot be limited to accounting tweaks. It requires a broader rethink of how the game is structured.
A more sustainable model would begin by aligning financial regulation with competitive balance. Limiting squad costs as a proportion of genuine revenue, closer to UEFA’s approach, would curb excess while being harder to manipulate than profit-based rules. Stricter controls on related-party transactions would help ensure that reported income reflects real market activity.
But beyond finances, the pyramid itself needs reinforcement. Greater revenue sharing between the Premier League and lower divisions could reduce the desperation that drives risky behaviour. Parachute payments, in their current form, entrench imbalance by giving relegated clubs advantages unavailable to their rivals; flattening or redistributing these funds could help narrow the divide.
More radically, however, the game may need to confront a far more uncomfortable conclusion: that promotion and relegation, as the organising principle of the pyramid, no longer works at all.
The premise is that clubs can move between divisions on sporting merit without being structurally outmatched. That premise has collapsed. The financial gulf between tiers is no longer a gap to be bridged; it is a structural divide that distorts behaviour at every level. Promotion demands immediate, often reckless spending just to compete, while relegation brings financial shock that even parachute payments only partially mitigate. The system no longer balances risk and reward. It amplifies both.
At the top, the effect is equally corrosive. The Premier League is not simply another division; it is a global commercial ecosystem with entrenched incumbents. Its clubs’ benefit from revenues and reach that those outside cannot realistically replicate. In that context, promotion does not integrate clubs into an equal competition, it exposes them to one they are structurally unequipped to survive. Relegation, meanwhile, rarely resets the balance; it often entrenches advantage through residual wealth.
The result is a system that preserves the symbolism of openness while functioning, in practice, as a controlled environment. Movement still exists, but it is increasingly performative. The pyramid remains in name, but its economic logic is closer to a closed league with limited churn.
If that diagnosis is correct, incremental reform will not be enough. Adjusting cost controls or redistributing revenue does not resolve the underlying contradiction between a global league and a fluid merit-based pyramid beneath it. At some point, the game must decide which model it is trying to sustain.
A more honest system would involve a more managed structure: one where entry to the top tier is governed not solely by short-term performance, but by financial resilience and long-term competitiveness. That could mean licensing systems, multi-year qualification criteria, or even a partial decoupling of the top division from automatic promotion and relegation.
This would represent a profound break with tradition. But clinging to the current model risks preserving a narrative rather than a reality. If the system no longer delivers genuine opportunity or sustainable competition, its symbolic value cannot justify its consequences.
English football does not lack money. It lacks financial honesty and structural balance. Until both are addressed, the gap between what the game claims to be and what it is will continue to widen.
And eventually, that gap becomes impossible to ignore.
* Jean-François Burford was Chair of the Kensington and Chelsea Liberal Democrats (2022–2025) and former Councillor for Kew Ward in Richmond upon Thames across two separate terms (2010–2014 and 2018–2022).
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12 Comments
“A more honest system would involve a more managed structure: one where entry to the top tier is governed not solely by short-term performance, but by financial resilience and long-term competitiveness. That could mean licensing systems, multi-year qualification criteria, or even a partial decoupling of the top division from automatic promotion and relegation.”
No, no, no…….. that makes the Premier League even more of a closed shop than it already is. Every dog deserves it’s day in the sun, even if it’s for just a couple of seasons, which my lot did between 2018-19.
‘In practice, the gap between divisions has become so vast that promotion increasingly resembles a temporary excursion rather than genuine arrival.’
Indeed. It also makes the English premiership only marginally less boring than the Scottish one (1985 was the last the time a side other than Rangers or Celtic won the title).
There is a more serious problem for football than the gap in class between the divisions. As the House of Commons Library report from last year (https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cdp-2025-0041/) showed, football clubs at all levels are becoming significantly more indebted. Just one of their bullet points is highly revealing:
“The increase in total revenues should not mask the fact that much of the football pyramid is financially overextended (i.e. operating with high levels of debt compared to the scale of the football club), at around 300%, a level that most other capital-intensive industries would consider unduly risky.”
“ In theory, the pyramid offers meritocracy. Perform well in the English Football League and you can rise; struggle at the top and you fall.”
With Tottenham Hotspur sitting 3rd bottom and in danger of relegation, after 48 consecutive seasons in the top flight, the idea that ‘struggle at the top and you fall’ is alive and well.
@Cassie, you may be interested to know that Hearts are currently leading the Scottish Premier League with 5 games to go and only 3 points covering the first three clubs.
When supporters, clubs, governing bodies, and institutions came together to resist the so-called European super league in 2021, one concept played a key role in the defence against it: the European Sport Model. When 12 clubs tried to launch a closed European super league, principles of open competitions were put under direct threat. The project would have scrapped open competition in favour of permanent membership, concentrated wealth and power even further at the top without representation or democracy, and hollowed out the connection between clubs and their communities.
Few football supporters will disagree with Jean-François Burford’s suggestion that the Profitability and Sustainability Rules (PSR) need to be updated to prevent the kinds of accounting abuses he describes, but they will disagree with any moves towards “decoupling of the top division from automatic promotion and relegation.”
As David Raw points out, less afluent clubs like Huddersfeld, Bolton, Burnley, Cardiff and Norwich, Sheffield Wednesday, Sheffield United and Blackburn have all enjoyed some success at the top level and we shouldn’t want to pull up the drawbridge to prevent their return.
However we do need to look at how these successes, albeit short lived, did come about. Often they depended on the largesse of individual owners. Owners don’t live forever. Owners can decide to walk away. Once they are gone the clubs they once supported can fall into virtual bankruptcy. Supporters end up being penalised for the decisions of others. The latest example of this are the penalties imposed on Sheffield Wednesday and their supporters.
There is a proven off-the-shelf solution to many of the problems faced by English football. The German model which is defined defined by the “50+1” rule, ensuring fan ownership and control, prioritising financial stability, and lower ticket prices. By mandating that club members hold a majority of voting rights, it prevents outside investors from taking total control.
@ Peter Martin Many thanks for the kind mention, Peter, coming as it does on the actual centenary date of H.T.A.F.C. becoming Champions of the Football League for the third successive year back in 1926. I know for fact those lads were paid £ 6 per week
@ David,
I thought you must have meant H.T.A.F.C. which is why I put your team first on the list. 🙂 My own team is second. We play each other on Saturday. I’ll be there. Supporters can be a fickle bunch and want immediate success. I’m always pleased to see that we still have a team to watch. We nearly went the way of Bury FC who went out of existence in 2019.
This shows that the problems in football aren’t confined to the Premier league or even to those who fail to establish themselves in the league. It’s a systemic problem. It’s very difficult to run a football club as a normal business. The German model is far better and for other football codes too. Rugby clubs suffer when wealthy owners pick them up only to drop them when they find their business plans aren’t working out.
I’m very pleased to see that the supporters of Bury FC do have their club up and running once again even if they are now in the 8th tier of the football pyramid.
@ Peter Martin Thought you might be a trotter, Peter. A great old club. We share Harold Hassall, Frankie W. and Big Sam.
H.T. special for family reasons. Most of the 1926 lads were from the Durham and Northumberland coalfields including Uncle Harry. Later on in 1926 they did what they could to help the relief funds in their respective villages – a bond which I’m sure was part of the team success. I know Harold Wilson carried a photo of the
Thanks David.
People who don’t follow football teams, of whatever code, perhaps don’t unerstand the emotional attachment that supporters have for their clubs. I often used to joke that girlfriends, and even wives, might come and go but not your chosen club. We’re stuck for life!
A favourite pub or cafe might close down and we find another. But it’s not the same with a football team. When Bury FC closed down it wasn’t an option for their supporters to simply switch to another nearby club.
Capitalism treats us all as workers or customers. We don’t have any say in how Tescos or Sainsbury operate. If we don’t like one we can switch to the other or one of their competitors. That’s the way it works legally, de jure if you like, with football, but not in a de facto way.
The law should recognise the reality of the situation and allow supporters to at least partially own the teams they support. Football Clubs should be Clubs, in reality, as they once used to be. Not limited companies owned by wealthy individuals.
Hi Peter, Yes, the bond is stronger than water, and I agree with your conclusions.
I think Darlo might have gone into a supporters Trust (a great notion for the bread and butter lower league clubs), but the Chelsea’s of this world seem to do what they like with foreign ownership. I fear for Newcastle.
You might be interested to know a pal of mine (and fellow HTFC supporter), and appropriately from the Colne Valley) has published on conscientious objectors in WW1 and the early Labour Party……. (Hudds was a stronghold).
@ Peter Martin I thought you might be interested in the following on the Darlo website
“Darlington FC has been fan owned since 2012. DFCSG owns a controlling stake in the Football Club and sets its strategic direction in line with the interests of the DFCSG membership. In other words, DFCSG members are the Owners of DFC.
Join over 1,440 other Darlo fans and the likes of Ben Hedley, Gary Smith, David Hodgson, Peter Kirkham, Gavin Worboys, Paul Ward and Kasabian’s Chris Edwards, all of whom have a say in how our football club is run for just £25 a year or £2.09 a month (£5 a year for under-16s)!
By joining us you too can become an Owner of DFC and help to shape its future direction. You’ll also gain access to a range of exclusive benefits.
Owner benefits
> The pride and passion that comes with owning YOUR club…
There is no better feeling for a football fan than to know that you and your fellow supporters genuinely own your club.
At time of writing, 1,430+ fans own just over 90% of Darlington Football Club, ensuring that those who love the club the most are responsible for its sustainability, direction and growth. And how many football fans of other clubs up and down the country can say that ?”