Ukraine is in deep trouble. Its soldiers are holding the frontline but behind the lines there are serious problems.

Russian missiles are hitting the country’s energy infrastructure. Millions of Ukrainians are facing a bitter East European winter without heating or electricity. And American support—already shaky—is wavering even more.

Donald Trump, facing a Democratic landslide in the November mid-term elections, is ignoring the economic impact of his Iran War to blame Ukraine—and its president Volodymyr Zelensky—for the unsustainable rise in American fuel prices.

This has in turn led to lifting of sanctions on Russian oil, more attacks on  Zelensky and the temporary cuts in the vital US-provided Starshield which provides protection against Russian missile attacks.

Problems started in January 2024 when the Ukrainians first demonstrated the capability to hit Russian oil refineries with their drones. Russia is a major exporter of refined oil products and the money earned from those exports is financing Russia’s war effort. The US initially supported the attacks and they were coordinated with intelligence from the CIA. But then in  March 2024, the US position shifted and Washington  urged Kyiv to stop striking Russian oil infrastructure, citing concerns about global oil prices and possible Russian retaliation.

Then on 28 Feb 2026, the US and Israel attack Iran and 20 percent of the world’s oil supply ceases overnight as the Iranians close the Strait off Hormuz and bomb Saudi pipelines to the Red Sea. Meanwhile Ukrainian attacks on Russian refineries have increased. Between 30-50 percent of the Kremlin’s refining capacity is closed. Ukrainian attacks are affecting the ability of Russia’s industrial and agricultural wheels to keep  moving as well as its export earnings. But between them, 45  percent of the world’s seaborne energy, is carried by Russia and the Gulf countries.

Congress (including 18 Republicans) , however, is on the side of Ukraine. In early June it passes Lindsey Graham’s toughening sanctions by a comfortable majority of 226 to 159 The sanctions include additional American assistance to Ukraine. In the Senate, the bill had 60 co-sponsors. Trump  signed the Graham Act into law on 18 September.

In the interim, Trump’s top Ukraine envoys—golfing partner  Steve Witkoff and son-in-law Jared Kushner—met for several hours with Putin in Moscow. Among the topics discussed were potential business deals between the US and Russia. These have been in the background since the start of the transactional Trump Administration, but US law meant that they were contingent on the war’s end.

Then on 3 October, Reuters reported that Putin had proposed a potential $22 billion dollar deal involving the sale of the international assets of the Russian oil company Lukoil. The reported buyers included Todd Boehly—a Trump donor–  Middle Eastern groups with business ties to Kushner or Witkoff’s families, and an arm of the US government. Putin presented the deal to demonstrate that US and Russian businesses could work together again—before the end of the Ukraine war.

At a 9 October Miami meeting between European, Ukrainian and Witkoff and Kushner, the two Americans suggested that lifting sanctions on Russian oil would help negotiations. They also proposed that about $300  billion in Russian assets held outside the US be transferred to American control to aid negotiations. The Europeans opposed the lifting of sanctions and refused to transfer the assets. They were clearly suspicious of American intentions.

The following day  Trump announced that Russia would supply more than 300,000 metric tonnes of diesel to US and global markets and 500,000 tonnes per month thereafter. The move was presented as a way to ease high energy prices. In practice it has had a negligible effect on prices, but it is significantly raising Russian oil revenues and its ability to wage war.

Lifting sanctions was immediately attacked as a flagrant breach of the Graham Act. But more importantly, it also breached the even tougher 2022 “Ending Importation of Russian Oil Act” which specifies that no Russian oil can be imported until there is peace in Ukraine.

To try and head off Congressional opposition, Trump announces an energy ceasefire. He claimed that Moscow has agreed to stop targeting Ukraine’s energy infrastructure and Kyiv would stop attacking Russian oil refineries. Both sides, however, denied knowledge of any such arrangement. Trump  responded  by blaming lack of agreement and  the diesel shortage entirely on Zelensky —  no mention of the Iran War that he started—and announced: “I think it is time for Ukraine to get a new president.

Republicans in the House and Senate immediately started to attack the lifting of sanctions. On 13 October, a group of 12 senators, including six Republicans, urged Trump to rescind the deal.

Then on 14-15 October came the news that Starshield, Elon Musk’s military satellite service had stopped functioning normally on fast-moving platforms. The result was that Ukrainian drones could not target Russian missiles and they destroyed energy plants providing power and heat to 600,000 homes.

It quickly emerged that the order to slow down Starshield came from inside the White House. The defence shield was quickly restored, but Kyiv and its supporters interpreted the move as yet another attempt to force Zelensky to  concede Russian control over  a third of Ukraine. Without Starshield, Ukraine is almost entirely defenceless.

It seems clear that Ukraine is more than ever dependent on the EU and UK for its survival. They have repeatedly confirmed their unstinted support. But Europe does not have a replacement for Starshield and although its defence industries and intelligence operations are quickly growing, they are still a long way from a replacement for America.

The European dimension is further complicated by the rise of the populist right. In France, Marine Le Pen well ahead in the polls for next spring’s presidential elections. She has said she would cut off aid to Ukraine. Germany’s Alternative for Deutschland (AfD) is growing daily in voters and influence. It also backs Russia. In the UK, Reform leader Nigel Farage, has not come out publicly behind Russia, but he has denounced Ukraine as  corrupt.

Ukraine is approaching another winter under severe military, economic and humanitarian pressure. Russian infrastructure tanks have been doubled over the previous year. The United States is easing some restrictions on Russian fuel exports while pressing Kyiv to restrain its own attacks; and European governments face the prospect of having to compensate for any reduction in American support.

The cumulative effect is unmistakable: Kyiv faces greater uncertainty about the military assistance, economic pressure and diplomatic backing on which its survival depends.

* Tom Arms is foreign editor of Liberal Democrat Voice. He also contributes to “The New World” magazine and lectures on world affairs. He is the author of “America Made in Britain,” two editions of “The Encyclopaedia of the Cold War” and “The Falklands Crisis.”