We can all welcome Nick Harvey’s work with Phillip Hammond in producing what appears to be the first balanced MoD budget since at least the 1997 Defence Review: time will tell if their projections hold water. However, Mr. Harvey’s article is redolent of MoD Press Office spin, and has several important elements that need debating. Moving back to the vertical take off and landing variant of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) – known as the F-35B – is hardly the panacea the Minister pretends: there were several reasons that the military warmly welcomed the switch to a conventional cats ‘n’ traps carrier and aircraft (F-35C) in the 2010 Defence Review.
Second, performance: the F-35C carries a larger payload further than the F-35B. Radius of action is critical to projecting carrier airpower, so buying the shorter range jet significantly constrains your military options, as was demonstrated in the Falklands 30 years ago this month, as the Harriers were limited to short periods over the islands as the carriers had to be kept at a safe distance from the Argentine air bases. Not only will this choice constrain UK military options now, it will do so for the next 30 years.
Third, the Joint Strike Fighter carries much of its weaponry internally to ensure that it can evade radar through its stealth technologies. The F-35C has larger internal bomb bays so that all of the UK’s existing bombs and missiles can be carried inside the stealthy bays. However, the F-35B has smaller bays and cannot carry the larger bombs in the UK inventory, nor, reportedly, can it carry the RAF’s current long-range AMRAAM missile or the new air to air missile (METEOR) without modification.
Fourth, the F-35B is the most complex and most expensive JSF variant. It was also placed on technical probation by the US Dept of Defense in 2011, and it remains a work in progress. Moreover, with the US Marine Corps already reducing their orders in favour of the more capable F-35C, not only will the unit cost increase, but at a time when the US government is looking for large defence cuts, the F-35B is also the most likely to be cancelled after the 2012 Presidential election. If it is cancelled, then the UK will have no other fixed-wing aircraft to purchase, rendering the carriers impotent. Were this to happen, the Government would then have to convert the carriers to cat ‘n’ trap configuration if thy wanted any fixed wing aircraft to fly from their decks – a strange case of a U-turn on a U-turn on a U-turn.
Fifth, carrier airpower is about much more than just the fast jets; the support aircraft – tankers, radar aircraft, transport aircraft as well as helicopters – are critical. Unfortunately, scrapping cats ‘n’ traps means that all of the off-the-shelf options for tanking, airborne early warning and carrier on-board supply delivery are unworkable, and the UK will be reliant on helicopter based options instead, which are much less capable, as well as being unique to the UK, and thus comparatively expensive. In doing so, the entire capability of the UK carrier programme has been significantly and permanently downgraded – as well as losing interoperability with our French and US Navy allies.
Sixth, the suggestion that this decision makes the carriers operational sooner is at once both misleading and a red herring. It is apparently the case that if the Royal Navy stuck with the F-35C, the converted carrier would not be operational with its airwing until 2023; if the F-35B is ready on time, this could be 2021. However, if the UK were to order a different aircraft with cats ‘n’ traps, the carrier could enter service as soon as the carrier was converted – well before 2023, and probably by 2019. Two aircraft could fulfil this requirement – France’s Rafale or the US F-18 E/F Super Hornet.
With a probable price of at least £100m each, (around twice as expensive as the Eurofighter Typhoon) the F-35 is both enormously capable and enormously expensive, meaning that even in the US forces there is pressure for cheaper options. This is at least one of the reasons that the US Navy continues to order F-18E/F Super Hornet at a third of the cost of the F-35C, let alone the more expensive F-35B. With a 25 year life, the US Navy clearly assesses that these aircraft will remain viable beyond 2030.
Given that the carrier programme’s probable cost of the ships and aircraft is above £15bn, and it represents a 30 year investment, it is critical to get the choice of aircraft right. Therefore, if the F-35C was technically better for the UK’s needs – as it was in 2010 – it would seem reasonable to wait 18 months to ensure that the UK secured the best possible value for money. However, if the cost was so high that the F-18E/F Super Hornet was good enough for the UK – as it is for at least part of the US Navy – then we could have the carriers in service well before the F-35B, even allowing for the time to convert it to cats ‘n’ traps.
Therefore, the suggestion that the change back to the F-35B is get the carrier into service quicker is unlikely to be the key driver; indeed, if it was, it smacks of poor stewardship of defence value for money.
So, far from the sunny language used by Mr Harvey about “changed facts”, what appears to have happened was a straight cost driven decision because of a budget crunch. Strategic considerations clearly lay second to cost, not least given the fanfare with which the Government (correctly) castigated the previous Government for opting for the F-35B instead of cats ‘n’ traps in the 2010 Defence Review.
It would be refreshing if Mr Harvey could at least admit this. But to do so would admit that there were other savings options in the MoD budget to make the money available for the cats ‘n’ traps conversions, which he and Phillip Hammond declined to make, resulting in this expensive fiasco. At CentreForum, we published a paper in March advocating the scrapping of Trident and transferring the funding to recapitalise the armed forces. Item one? A fully equipped pair of carriers with their aircraft and supporting equipment. Sadly, a major opportunity missed.
* Toby Fenwick is a Research Associate of the British American Security Information Council (BASIC), has written extensively on the UK Trident programme, and served on the party’s last Trident Working Group. This article is written in a personal capacity.
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20 Comments
It’s a real pity they didn’t cancel the carriers. Is it really too late? They are half the size of a Nimitz class carrier, and oil powered which gives them a 3 day endurance without refuelling, I believe. With proper carriers, all this to and fro about the F35s would be moot. Or convert them to fly drones; what we’re doing with manned combat aircraft at this point I find difficult to understand.
A really good post! The government’s decision is a whole new pasty tax; and equally foolish! Making the carriers incapable of handling the fixed-wing aircraft of the USN and France limits us to compatibility with the US Marine Corp and it’s natural theatre of operation in the Pacific.
I’m not so sure how much this decision is based upon a very narrow (extremely narrow) cost assessment, and how much it is driven by BAe lobbying.
It’s also a shame that the carriers were not originally procured on a multinational NATO-wide basis similar to the (continental) AWACS E-3 Component program.
I concur, an excellent article, well done.
Any naval aviator worth their rations would always go for the ‘extra fuel’ option rather than carry a large amount of machinery that is only used at launch and recovery and is just extra weight the rest of the time, so the 35B variant is the least preferred options. By far the biggest problem is the limitations on the use of other aircraft the ski ramp deck shape imposes; a carrier strike force needs AWACS (and a Sea King dangling something that sees 90 miles doesn’t count!), a COD (carrier onboard delivery), EW etc., and all these need cats and traps.
MOD may have balanced the budget but this is not a well thought out solution.
I’m afraid I must disagree witht the article for the following reasons.
1) Individual STOVL aircraft like the F-35B may cost more than a conventional Carrier aircraft (F-35C) but with the purchase and maintenance of the catapults and arrestor wires, the landing systems, plus the extra crew (including pay, training, and benefits such as pensions) it is quite possible for the “Cats and Traps” option to cost more money.
2) The range of the F-35B is significantly more than the Sea-Harrier and the major benefit of STOVL aircraft is their flexibility in basing and landing options, meaning they can operate closer to the area of action or land to refuel after the mission. The Forward Operating Base at San Carlos greatly increased air cover and Close Air Support for the troops in the Falklands. Also it will be a lot easier for RAF STOVL aircraft to join the Carrier for “Surge” operations.
3) Weapons are increasingly smaller and more precise to avoid unnecessary collateral damage. Total bomb load is not as important as it used to be but I believe the F-35B’s is more than the Sea Harrier’s.
4) The STOVL version of the F-35, the “B”, had problems but is back on track. The F-35C now has a major problem with the tail hook needed to catch the arresting wires and may retire a major redesign.
5) We were very unlikely to have these support aircraft; the US is struggling to have a balanced air wing on their carriers. One advantage of STOVL over CATOBAR aircraft is the ability to land quickly and vertically – CATOBAR aircraft require a refuelling aircraft present when landing in case they run out of fuel due to missing the wires and having to try again. It has often been said “it’s better to stop and land than to land and try to stop”.
6) Both the Hornet (even the Super variant) and the Rafale will be obsolete quicker than both F-35 variants and will require a new aircraft purchase sooner and will cost more money in the long run. It is also very difficult to compare aircraft prices as national deals tend to involve other factors such as support, maintenance, certain discounts, etc, and with part of the F-35B being built in the UK (lift-fan) then the Government can get some money back in tax, etc.
The biggest advantage of the STOVL version will be the possibility of using both carriers as aircraft carriers, the Cats and traps only being confirmed for one of the planned carriers. A STOVL aircraft can operate from the deks of conventional carriers, STOVL carriers such as operated by Italy and Spain, as well as assault ships, so the range for interoperable options is much better.
Thank-you to all commenters for your interest. Some responses:
@Gareth Jones.
1. If the through life costs of STOVL are lower, then Nick Harvey will be able to demonstrate this by releasing the cost modelling. The number of extra crew for cats’n’traps (e.g. LSOs) is unlikely to be significant – the driver is going to be the cost of operating the aircraft, and the larger number of F-35Bs required to achieve the same military effect as the F-35Cs given the smaller warload and shorter range. The point is that we don’t know, as MoD haven’t released the information.
2. Several points here. First, everyone accepts that there is a quantum improvement in any version of JSF vs Harrier / Sea Harrier – after all, JSF is a 2000s design as opposed to an early 1960s one. JSF is also F-4 Phantom sized – the F-35A has a maximum takeoff weight of 70,000lb versus around 26,000lb for the Sea Harrier – so it should go further, do more things. Second, the forward deployment argument of a STOVL force is nice but not really relevant in scenarios except Falklands – the whole point of carrier air power is that you don’t need land basing…! Third, yes, it will probably be easier to surge crews (and not RAF ones, the plan is to have a joint set of units) to the carriers. However, there are two issues (a) F-35C will be the easiest conventional carrier aircraft to land ever built and (b) the issue is not just ability to land on the deck – but to fight from the sea, which is all about practice and mindset – both of aircrew and ship’s company. The RAF’s sorties “to the boat” with Harrier GR9s in later years were not a happy precedent for the “STOVL makes it easy” argument.
3. On the difference in size with Harrier, see above. And yes, where possible, you’ll always want to use the smallest warhead possible to achieve the required effect. However, this doesn’t mean that the larger bombs are now redundant – they have been retained for specific reasons.
4. Both F-35B and F-35C are at the beginning of their development lives. The –B is still affected by weight issues, and whilst not trivial, the –Cs tail hook issue will be resolved because the US Navy needs it to be. The operational case for the –B is much weaker.
5. Several points here. The support aircraft are affordable – by retiring Trident – as I detailed on pages 52-53 of the CentreForum study. STOVL cycle times vs cats ‘n’ traps (CATOBAR) is less clear – you certainly don’t have lots of F-35Bs coming down at once. Moreover, the UK requires rolling vertical landings for bring back requirements, which requires a deceptively large slug of deckspace.
6.Several issues here, too. Both F-18E/F and Rafale will indeed be obsolete against a specific set of threats before F-35 will be – but the US Navy is still buying “legacy” jets for the reason that outside of these specific threats that need stealth, the legacy aircraft is perfectly good (and a third of the price). However, the point I was making was whether they would be “good enough” for the UK, given the price differential, and as Nick Harvey suggested that the earlier service entry for HMS Prince of Wales was driving the STOVL decision, it is only fair to point out that if he were so concerned about having no carrier airpower, he could have it soon still if he were prepared to change his aircraft choice – he can’t have it both ways.
The UK content of the F-35B is no reason to select it – nor did Nick Harvey make this case. Given the differential purchase prices, it’s a pretty poor way to aid Rolls-Royce.
And the RN certainly hoped that the 2015 Defence Review would get HM Queen Elizabeth converted in the early 2020s, so that there would be two cat ‘n’ trap carriers.
On interoperability, I can’t think of a case in which STOVL jet have operated off a conventional carrier – you lose the ski jump, seriously denting performance, and you’d need to clear the deck of other aircraft to take off. Italy and Spain? Not the most obvious partners, and their carriers are tiny (Invincible-class size), so the chances of meaningful interoperability with them is small.
@ Ron – thank you. We can only keep fighting our corner for sensible decisions.
@ John – the French were of course going to buy / build a CVF for themselves as the PA2 (Porte Avion Deux) project before they scrapped it as being unaffordable. I struggle to think who else would be up for this sort of project, especially as command and control is difficult in a way that the E-3 force doesn’t face. But increased integration and specialization would be a good idea.
@ Jenny – the fuelling cycle is likely to be a constraint, but a nuclear powered option was dropped early in the design face on cost grounds, I understood. The F-35 may well be the last manned generation of aircraft, but drones are not ready to take on the full range of roles – and I’d be surprised if they were by 2025.
I can’t help feeling the JSF programme is driven by the needs of the defence industry rather than by UK defence needs. Cats ‘n’ traps, may be more expensive , but it gives us flexibility in the aircraft we can use. By going down the STOVL route we have no choices but to pay up for F35b what ever the cost and the JSF is not without critics both on cost and performance. It looks like the JSF has been sold not as being fit for purpose, but on industry lobbing and design of the carriers seems to fit this pattern, so only JSF can be used. Surely for STOVL to makes sense, we would build smaller carriers like Invisible, what was the point of Labour ordering such large carriers without cats ‘n’ traps.
IF “The F-35 may well be the last manned generation of aircraft”, then I would of thought that would increases the argument for the Rafale or F-18 E/F Super Hornet, as the F35 could be obsolete before the end of its life cycle. Drones are so much cheaper, that in time they could be deployed in much larger numbers, swamping complex defence systems like the F35 by weight of numbers.
a highly partial article, that as gareth jones has pointed out above, can be made in equally convincing terms for the opposite case.
i am particularly dubious about the f18 costing one third of the f35b argument, using flyaway costs versus lirp costs.
i want two fully equipped catobar carriers operating full complements of f35c.
however, the defence budget does not support this alongside other ambitions.
i am relatively sanguine about the idea of giving trident budget to conventional forces.
however, this is not on offer.
treating the two as an existing political package does not help make good decisions that really are in front of us now.
@ Jedibeeftrix
I’m sorry that you think that it is partial, but welcome to the debate. Yes, LRIP costs versus flyaway is not apples to apples, but first, they’re the only costs we’ve got, and second, the F-35 cost estimating has been dreadful, so it is safe only to assume that the LRIP costs will be the basis of the future costs.
The issue of Trident versus the conventional forces is live – and now is exactly the time to be starting the debate ahead of the 2015 manifestos and the election.
If you can get me two catobar carriers and 100 f35c I am all ears.
@ Jedibeeftrix – yes – plus additional Astute, T-26 and E-2Ds – all costed on p,. 52-53 of the CentreForrum “Dropping the Bomb” (www.centreforum.org/assets/pubs/dropping-the-bomb.pdf). You even get four converted SSGNs to cover the conventional strike gap until the airwings are worked up!
Consider me sold……. Provided the budget does remain within the mod.
Colour me cynical, but I have watched the defence budget drop from 2.7% of gdp to 2.0% since 97 alone, and I have no doubt that some righteous sandal wearing types will find some worthy social problem desperately in need of just a few billion more.
The only thing holding the budget where we it is right now is over commitment combined with the desire to show the US that somebody in Europe will tow the treaty bottom line!
@Jedibeeftirx – one of the most enduing myths in MoD budgeting is that there is a pile of cash marked “nuclear” that will otherwise be swiped by HMT. Not true! The level of budget is a political decision and these recommendations are there in a group precisely because they need to be taken as a package. I look forward to debating this with your further!
@ Toby – I must apologise; I was in the process of submitting my last comment and ran out of time, so the introduction was rushed. what I meant to say was that you were not wrong period but that there was an alternative argument and the STOVL F-35B did have some advantages. As you can probably tell I like the STOVL concept…
I have read the “Dropping the bomb” report and I very much like it. However, like Jedibeeftrix I have some doubt about the assumed costs of the replacement projects (prices usually increase, as you know) and whether the money saved by scrapping trident would remain within the MOD. Now even half the replacement projects would significantly boost our conventional cabailities, so as long as the savings remain within the military budget, I’d be happy with two CATOBAR carriers (and significant aircraft to fly off them), and the other benefits.
Nice paper, Toby. I’m not sure I would spend the entire saving on conventional forces, but it certainly gives the defence hawks a tastier option than a never to be used nuclear deterrent.
See above.
Write a legal commitment to maintaining the core defence budget at 2.0% of gdp, as a minimum and not including operational costs, and I will think about it.
@ Jenny – thank-you for your kind words. It’d be great to debate these things in the round, but my judgement was that based on the UK’s needs and the past, current and likely future Government’s appetite for international military engagements, the conventional force shortfalls need to be made up – and the Trident savings along with the increase in the equipment budget already announced begin to do this. This was why the recommendations in the paper are a package – and for the counter-factual on Trident’s opportunity costs.
@Jedibeeftrix – I’m instinctively suspicious about legislation (as I am with legislating aid, levels, too) because it seems to provide a false level of comfort – a future govt could simply ignore or repeal it. Based on the UK’s needs and expectations, I can’t see how we can get away with spending less than c.GBP 40bn on core defence – a figure coincidentally about 2% of GDP. For me, it’s about making the case based on policy needs, and then the numbers, rather than the other way around. Still, there’s going to be a fight to get to 2%, I suspect.
@Gareth – ah, many thanks – and nice SHar gravatar, BTW. The numbers in the paper for the replacement kit are either NAO numbers or US current prices +10%. Of course, the capability costs (training, spares and personnel) are higher, but we put the tables together to provide a counterfactual against the Trident brigade. The MoD budget point is ultimately a political choice – HM Treasury is there to work for the Government, not the other way around.However, it will be a tough sell, which is why the recommendations are there as a package – it’s all too easy to pick and choose, at which point it all falls apart.
@ toby – “Still, there’s going to be a fight to get to 2%, I suspect.”
High toby, could you elaborate on that please?
We are down to about 2.0% already, we cannot go lower without holing nato below the waterline.
Our commitment keeps the US committed, if we shirk our responsibilities the alliance is dead.
@ Jedi – I think that there will be a debate to be had within the LibDems for 2%, let alone across Govt if there’s a Spending Review to save c. £20bn p.a. this autumn.
Speaking personally; on the subject of Defence spending in the face of requests for further total spending cuts.
Seeing as defence of the realm is the first duty of the sovereign nation state, I have zero problem with defence occupying an increased proportion of government spending. Rather tied in with ones perception on the purpose of the eu.
Seeing as future force 2020, and the funding it requires, represents the very minimum of a credible capability for sovereign and strategic power projection, I want the nato 2.0% as an absolute floor. Chatham house study shows public still want Britain to act as a great power.
It would be extremely ‘courageous’ (and personally disappointing), for the lib-dens to campaign against either of the above positions!