All rational people must be sincerely and passionately committed to ridding the world of nuclear weapons, so destructive is their potential. The age-old debate is about how best to do this. The FPC motion for Harrogate is a combination of the best traditions of unilateralism and multilateralism.
For the first time in a decade the Party is proposing a radical reduction in the size of the British nuclear deterrent. By unilaterally cutting Britain’s nuclear weapons by 50% yet keeping our seat at the table, we have the best chance of driving forward a multilateral disarmament agenda.
Cutting our nuclear stockpile in half now would send a positive message to non-nuclear or aspirant-nuclear states that Britain will live up to its obligations under the NPT. It puts nuclear disarmament back on the international agenda, and commits Britain to leading preparations for the 2010 NPT review conference – as Robin Cook did running up to the productive 2000 conference. Labour failed to capitalise on that momentum – not least by supporting Bush in Iraq and tarnishing our reputation as an honest broker.
Something must be done to regain the initiative and kick-start new talks. Conceding 50% of our force now, making it clear that we are sincerely prepared to relinquish the other 50% if enough progress can be made, is the best way to persuade Iran, North Korea and their neighbours to sit around the table and discuss a non-nuclear future for all of us.
Deciding now to replace Trident, so making Britain a nuclear state until 2060, would remove all our credibility in such talks. But equally deciding now not to replace Trident would play all our cards and leave us no leverage in talks.
The current international outlook on potential proliferation of nuclear weapons, especially in the Middle East, is more unstable today than for many years. Now would be a perverse moment to dismantle a system we have paid for, and which has another 20 years of life.
But we no longer need a cold war size deterrent. Cutting it to approximately half the current size would be sufficient to provide for Britain’s ultimate security until we have more certainty about proliferation. And if the looming proliferation can be halted, we genuinely could create the circumstances where a successor to Trident is strategically unnecessary.
Many experts agree that Tony Blair has jumped the gun on making a final decision on Trident replacement. He wants Parliament to write a blank cheque before a new submarine has even been designed or costed. He has bowed to the arms manufacturers, fiddled the figures and brought forward the procurement schedule to justify making a decision while he is Prime Minister. This is all about Blair’s legacy, ‘New Labour’ and political positioning. Liberal Democrats should not fall into his trap.
Colin Ross begins his opinion piece saying: “No to Trident, No to son of Trident.” But that is not what the amendment he is promoting says. It does say “No to son of Trident” but bizarrely proposes keeping Trident itself for the rest of its lifespan. This is potty! If we’re going to follow Blair in making a premature decision but say “No,” then let’s dismantle Trident straight away. Having signalled that we’re getting out of the business it will cease to have any deterrent value, so why waste another £1½ billion a year for 20 years? We could at least garner whatever moral credit might be gained from getting out if we did it right away.
As for the Eurobomb* amendment, I sympathise with its objectives but the NPT renders most of it impossible. There is also the minor matter that America would terminate our 1958 agreement the day we decided to go in with the French, and without US missiles we would have no deterrent for 20 years while the Anglo-French system was (expensively) created.
The FPC Motion was the subject of negotiation and concession between many shades of strongly held opinion. It is much more progressive than our traditional stance and represents the best option around which we can unite. Our opponents would love to see us tear ourselves apart or come to a position the public won’t understand and is not prepared for. This is the trap Blair has laid for us – don’t let’s fall into it. Unpicking this compromise would put us in serious difficulties.
Trident is not Iraq. This is not an issue that has millions marching across the country. Polls show most people are fairly ambivalent. Don’t be fooled into thinking that if we call for scrapping our nuclear weapons that British voters would rally to our flag – it hasn’t worked for the nationalists or greens. This issue has always been a shield issue for us – don’t turn it into a sword issue for our opponents.
It makes sense to keep our options open on replacing Trident. We can revisit the issue any time as circumstances become clearer. Britain could choose at any time to scrap its nuclear deterrent completely. Passing the motion leaves that option very firmly on the table.
* Editor’s note: More on the Liberal Democrat European Group amendment will be published tomorrow.
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11 Comments
I agree completely with Nick Harvey that something needs to be done about the stagnation of anti-proliferation measures, and that the UK has a vital responsibility in this matter.
As presented however I feel that there are considerable omissions in his argument.
He is right to highlight the smoke and mirrors deployed by Blair on this matter and right that (in terms of an assumption of continuing UK Nuclear deployment) there is no necessity for a decision now. We are therefore not making current decisions under an extreme ‘take it or leave it’ time limit.
However his litany of ‘blank cheques , accurate as far as it goes, has the disadvantage of concentrating on the Trident/ Vanguard issue. This is not the most important part of the current ‘Nuclear weapons decision’ process in the UK, even though it is the occasion for the current debate and upcoming parliamentary vote. In a sense ‘Trident’ is a complete red herring.
In a separate post below I repeat the long comment I made on the ‘Avoiding Impalement on Trident’ thread on LibDem Voice on the wider issues.
If we are to go into NPT negotiations in good faith and with the intention of actually getting results, we need to be able to show the world:
1 What the UK nuclear weapons system actually means in terms of financial costs and defence opportunity costs.
2 Give an awful warning to other states – ‘if you go down the nuclear road this is the kind of burden you will take up’.
3 Show other states that we know that disarmament measures would mean for us, have thought them through, and are politically capable of taking on the vested interests in the status quo (industrial and military and Freudian) should international agreements require us to do so.
This party has rightly taken a strong line on Civil Nuclear Power issues, and in particular on the disgraceful attempts of the current Government to ‘fake’ consultation processes. We need to take an equally strong line on the current attempt to ‘fake’ a debate on the nuclear future of the UK.
In my view the best strategy in any Parliamentary vote on the Governments proposals is to refuse outright to back any renewals of the Trident/Vanguard sub-system at this time and demand that before any future consideration of such a renewal the UK must carry out a complete audit of the ‘Nuclear Weapons support and development decision system’. I suggest in my second post below some of the matters that such an audit could cover.
Such an audit should include a statement of what it would actually take to withdraw from Nuclear Weapons development and deployment.
It is simply not good enough to go into upcoming NPT negotiations with generalised statements about ‘putting cards on the table’ when we in the UK have patently not faced up to what our cards actually are.
For convenience, a repeat here of a post on a previous LibDem voice thread which outlines some of the matters in the UK Nuclear Weapons complex that we need to audit before we can go into any NPT talks with credibility and with a chance of actually influencing others..
1. The Nuclear Weapons complex keeps getting renewed mostly silently and without public debate bit by bit over the years. For example the most important decisions made recently have been to install new development facilities into AWRE Aldermaston. No discussion, of course.
The way the discussions on the ‘Nuclear Matter’ is managed is to have periodic selective consultations on bits and bobs and then take this as endorsement for the whole. Thus the so-called Trident debate now, which isn’t really even about the Trident Missile.
If we were having a proper national debate over the possibility of 50 years more of UK Nuclear Arms a proper White paper would be presented listing amongst other things:
1 The complex of nuclear installations and the rolling investments that are taking place and that would be needed to maintain and develop nuclear weapons systems.
2 The parallel developments in non-nuclear weapons systems some of which could supplant ‘nuclear’ devices.
3 The Industrial interests that are served by developing and deploying these systems and the economic pressures these place on the government to make decisions based on industrial rather than security criteria.
4 How the industrial sectors of the UK Nuclear Weapons system relate to the patterns of possible corruption in the general arms trade. (The current Saudi-BEa matter is an interesting litmus paper in all this).
4 The opportunity costs imposed on the military by having to pay for such systems as against other weaponry and equipment.
5 The political constraints including constraints on independent judgement of UK National Interest placed on the British Government through dependence on US co-operation at multiple complex points in the overall system.
6 In particular, the lessons we have learnt from the ongoing Iraq war about the pressures that can be put on the UK by the USA contrary to UK interests and the extent this is possible because of hidden pressure points in the Nuclear complexites.
7 A proper audit of the financial costs.
8 A comparison on what strategic and security issues would persuade Britain to become a nuclear arms power if it was not one already, and an examination of how these schenarios compare to projected real-world security developments.
No such comprehensive debate is possible because no such proper outline of the system is ever presented to Parliament or the people. Instead we are diverted (as in the current White Paper) into contemplating one widget.
Parliament should now refuse to give penny-package approval for the so-called Trident renewal, and insist on a proper presentation of the entire issue.
This presentation should include a thorough analysis of the costs and opportunities of the UK withdrawing from nuclear weapons deployment.
After all, if the political position is that the UK is willing to negotiate away its nuclear arms, what happens if the world says “OK lets cut and abolish?”. It would be embarrassing, let us say, to find we didn’t know how to do this nor what it would cost.
In the absence of such a comprehensive analysis and in particular in the absence of a strategic review to facilitate any degree of future disarmament from Unilateral Action to negotiated tranches, the proposal to approve new Vanguard class submarines at this time should be turned down.
We do not need to put forwards proposals for alternative patterns of widgets like 50% cuts in warheads.
Nick has set up a web forum which outlines the motion and allows you to post up questions. Tonight he will be answering the questions live from 7pm-9pm.
http://z6.invisionfree.com/LDNuclearDeterrent/
“Now would be a perverse moment to dismantle a system we have paid for, and which has another 20 years of life.”
“[the amendment says] “No to son of Trident” but bizarrely proposes keeping Trident itself for the rest of its lifespan. This is potty!”
There seems to be a logic failure here – it would be perverse to dismantle Trident now but potty to keep it for the rest of its lifespan?
(also have we paid for Trident? Are their no ongoing costs?)
Hi will.
You are selectively quoting.
“This is potty” clearly refers to the position that Colin Ross has found himself in promoting the amendment.
Let’s quote Nick in full shall we:
“Colin Ross begins his opinion piece saying: “No to Trident, No to son of Trident.” But that is not what the amendment he is promoting says. It does say “No to son of Trident” but bizarrely proposes keeping Trident itself for the rest of its lifespan. This is potty!”
Hi Pete
I don’t think I am – Nick says the amendment is potty for proposing keeping Trident for its lifespan but not replacing it – but says it would be perverse to dismantle it now. I don’t understand how the two are consistent.
I also see on last nights forum that Nick has revealed that there is no rationale behind the conveniently media-friendly 50% cut.
http://z6.invisionfree.com/LDNuclearDeterrent/index.php?showtopic=12
What we seem to have is a soundbite dressed up as a reasoned policy.
Hi will,
Is Nick not pointing out that Colin says “No to Trident” but the amendment does no such thing? Unlike the FPC motion, the result of the amendment would be to maintain Trident for the next quarter century.
He also argues previously that now would be the wrong time to scrap Trident altogether given the precarious nature of proliferation.
I see no contradiction.
expriest, a debate on when to scrap Trident is a red herring. The key issue of concern is the replacement of Trident.
Nick Harvey says he sympathises with the objectives of the LDEG amendments. Given his well known views on Europe, this might come as a surprise to some, but is obviously very good news. However the rest of his analysis is less so.
He thinks that the NPT renders most of what we are suggesting, impossible. This is simply not the case. Both Britain and France are nuclear powers under the NPT. There is no bar to our continuing to be nuclear powers. Nor would there be any bar to our exchanging or sharing nuclear material. Furthermore, Germany and Italy have specifically indicated that their adherence to the NPT is subject to there not being some European format to nuclear defence, in which case they would feel free, also, to participate in such arrangements. But in fact there is no need for them to do so to achieve an effective European nuclear deterrent.
All that would be necessary would be for Britain and France to declare that their nuclear weapons were for the defence of the EU, not just themselves – a nuclear guarantee similar to, though more explicit than, that provided by the United States to NATO members during the Cold War. To give this greater credibility, non nuclear member states could contribute to the non nuclear element of any new Anglo French system, whether it be the submarines, aircraft or missiles. This would not be a breach of the NPT and could dramatically reduce the cost of any European option. We would be prohibited from entering into any such arrangement if we remain with the Americans because of the 1958 Nuclear Weapons Treaty.
That remains in force until 2014. Between now and then, we could negotiate the basis of a new system with the French and the manner in which both the British and French nuclear deterrents could be put at the disposal of the EU. The termination of the 1958 Treaty would not permit the Americans to stop the present arrangement for the maintenance of the Trident missiles. They might chose to do so, as an act of political blackmail, but that would be a dramatic breach of policy, with consequences, it is difficult to imagine, that they would desire. In fact, a far more credible European deterrent, and by implication a more credible European defence role as a whole would actually be in America’s interest. It is only the neo-Cons who wish relations of dependency, rather than genuine partnership with America’s allies. The reasons for our engaging in a French / European option, rather than an American one, is that it allows Britain to maximise her influence in Europe, not just to escape our dependency upon the United States, though that is the other side of the same coin. In the long run the only security for the West must be in a partnership of equals, between America and Britain and France / Europe. Anything less will not be robust enough to resist the challenge posed, in particular, by China.
What Nick Harvey seems to be saying is that the only way he believes we can have any replacement of Trident is with the Americans. If he frames his case in those terms, he is greatly, and wholly unnecessarily, strengthening the unilateralist case. I am sure he does not mean to do this, but in the light of what he has already said, he should take this opportunity now of clarifying his position.
Hi Gareth,
You say “expriest, a debate on when to scrap Trident is a red herring. The key issue of concern is the replacement of Trident”
I think the key issue of concern is seeking to bring down the number of nuclear weapons in existance across the world.
The FPC motion gives Britain the best chance to achieve this in the medium term. The amendment doesn’t.
expriest “I see no contradiction.”
Well lets just agree to disagree. I’m more bothered about the lack of any rationale underpinning the 50% cut in warheads.
Saying we will maintain a minimum nuclear deterrent is a perfectly sustainable position. But the level of that minimum needs to be set using some criteria. Below that minimum and we have a deterrent which won’t work – which is utterly pointless!
Nick’s reply when pressed on this point is to say “we decided” – the we being the policy working group who don’t seem to have much expertise to decide something of this significance. (I’d be surprised if Tim Garden could share what knowledge he has without running into serious Official Secrets Act trouble :-))
Saying the government don’t publish their criteria isn’t much of a justification.
We’ve settled on maintaining Trident at a particular level for nothing less than getting a handy soundbite to use in the media. That might be one way of deciding a policy but you can hardly call it principled.