The Falklands

The Falklands are back in the news. Argentine President Javier Milei has restated claims to “Las Islas Malvinas” and support from America and Chile—which was vital in 1982—is now doubtful.

But 2026 is not 1982. In 1982 there were about 100 Royal Marines at Port Stanley to protect the islands and the Royal Navy ice patrol ship HMS Endurance was facing withdrawal. After the Falklands War the government decided that deterrence was the best strategy.

There are now roughly 1,200–1,500 British military and supporting personnel in the South Atlantic, centred on the Mount Pleasant Complex, where the Royal Air Force bases four Typhoon FGR4 fighters, together with a Voyager tanker and an A400M Atlas transport aircraft. The islands also have radar, ground-based air defence and a rotating infantry company.

At sea, HMS Medway, a River-class offshore patrol vessel, replaced HMS Forth in January 2026 as the Royal Navy’s permanent South Atlantic patrol ship. An attack on the islands would therefore risk giving the attackers a very bloody nose.

Argentina, however, is increasing defence spending. Early control of the air would be key. Argentina has recently purchased 24 former Danish F-16s. The first six operational aircraft arrived in December 2025.

Milei would also need to beef up his navy. The initial 1982 invasion was by sea. Once the airfield at Port Stanley was secured, the Argentines flew in troops on transport aircraft. Defence planners would anticipate a similar requirement today, but this time Argentina would have to neutralise Mount Pleasant and overcome a much stronger British garrison and air-defence system.

The diplomatic position is as important as the military line-up. In 1982 Chile and Argentina were at loggerheads over the Beagle Channel. As a result, the government of Augusto Pinochet provided Britain with vital intelligence, reconnaissance and logistical support.

The Beagle dispute is over and recently President José Antonio Kast reaffirmed Chilean support for Argentina’s “legitimate sovereignty rights” over the Falklands, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands. He stressed, however, the need for a peaceful resolution to the dispute.

More important is the US position. In 1982 Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger led the way in pushing for strong American support for Britain. The result was the supply of Sidewinder missiles, satellite communications, intelligence, reconnaissance assistance, logistical support and other supplies. Weinberger was later rewarded with an honorary knighthood.

In 2026 the Pentagon has considered using the Falklands issue as leverage over Britain because of disagreements over the Iran War. On 31 August Trump said Washington was reviewing its position on the islands.

Javier Milei heard Trump. He responded with some sabre-rattling and this week announced tougher sanctions against companies involved in oil exploration around the islands.

Milei is highly sensitive to popularity and retaking the Falklands would be politically explosive. But even without American and Chilean support, a successful Argentine military operation would be extremely difficult. The islands are far better defended than in 1982 and Britain still possesses two aircraft carriers, modern destroyers and nuclear-powered attack submarines.

American help would be useful. But Trump’s help is not necessarily essential.

How is the new Hungarian government doing?

Enough time has passed for a quick look at how Hungary is doing without its right-wing populist prime minister Viktor Orbán.

Péter Magyar—Orbán’s replacement—won a two-thirds parliamentary majority and he is using it. He has dispensed with the old Fidesz president, improved relations with the European Union and Ukraine, distanced Hungary from Russia and introduced reforms affecting the media, health services, education and the courts. His government is also investigating alleged corruption and misuse of public funds under Fidesz.

His most controversial move was dispensing with the services of President Tamás Sulyok. The Hungarian president’s role is mostly ceremonial, but he does have limited powers to return legislation to parliament or refer it to the Constitutional Court. Sulyok, an Orbán-era appointee, refused Magyar’s calls to resign and strongly resisted moves to remove him.

Magyar used his two-thirds majority in the Hungarian parliament to change Hungary’s “Fundamental Law” and force Sulyok out of office before the end of his term. Critics, including Orbán and a number of constitutional lawyers, criticised Magyar for the move, saying that it was just the sort of constitutional engineering for which he had attacked Orbán.

So far, Magyar has had his biggest influence on foreign policy. Orbán was the darling of the global populist far right. He was deeply hostile to much of the EU agenda, friendly towards Russia and Putin, and opposed much European support for Ukraine. He repeatedly used Hungary’s veto in the European Council to block or delay EU aid to Ukraine and was a regular visitor to Moscow. Orbán’s battles with Brussels meant that billions of euros in EU funds were frozen.

Magyar and his foreign-policy team have moved quickly to reset Hungary’s foreign policy away from Orbán’s ceaseless antagonism towards Brussels and close relationship with Moscow.

The main thrust of this reset has been rebuilding ties with the European Union. Important to this effort was an early revision of policy towards Ukraine to bring Hungary closer to the EU mainstream and reduce the friction with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky that Orbán repeatedly stoked. Magyar has visited major European capitals to put relations with EU states of special importance to Hungary on a better footing. His government has also described Russia as a security challenge and this month expelled ten Russian diplomats.

The media was a special target of Orbán and he managed to place key allies in both public and private media companies. Magyar has cut government support to Fidesz-friendly media outlets and public television and radio were temporarily taken off air while their management and structures were reorganised.

Parliament has also approved amendments to the national media law aimed at removing structures that allowed Fidesz to dominate the media and replacing them with institutions designed to meet European democratic standards, including an independent public media board.

So what are Fidesz and Viktor Orbán doing in response? There is little they can do. Orbán remains leader of Fidesz and heads the parliamentary opposition, but Magyar’s Tisza Party has a two-thirds majority. Orbán himself has kept a relatively low profile and, because of new limits on the terms of prime ministers, he is barred from returning to the top job.

There are signs that the Hungarian public remains supportive of the change. Fidesz won about 39 percent of the vote in April. Recent polls have put it at around 24–25 percent among decided voters, although individual polls should be treated cautiously.

Péter Magyar and Hungary are providing an unusual European test case: whether an illiberal, far-right, pro-Russian, authoritarian, anti-EU political system built over 16 years can be dismantled through the ballot box and replaced by something closer to a traditional liberal Western democracy.

* Tom Arms is foreign editor of Liberal Democrat Voice. He also contributes to “The New World” magazine and lectures on world affairs. He is the author of “America Made in Britain,” two editions of “The Encyclopaedia of the Cold War” and “The Falklands Crisis.”