As in many parts of the world, history is very much a political weapon in the Eastern Mediterranean. It is difficult to assess conflicts in Syria (and the British/Western interest) for this reason, especially for politicians unversed in the labyrinthine machinations of post-Sykes-Picot Syria and the Levant. Every phrase uttered is ‘controversial’.
There is much to be understood about the ancient past of the area, especially in relation to territorial claims and counter-claims made by different ethnic and religious factions today (..of widely-varying historical or archaeological solidity). These claims fog up the search for ‘academic’ historical understanding. The Eastern Med is identity politics on steroids.
However, relevant modern Syrian history begins not so much with the much-touted 1916 Sykes Picot agreement per se, but with a series of related international agreements established between 1915 and 1923, initiated primarily after the start of WW1 due to the anticipated fall of the Ottoman Empire. These involved the UK, France, Russia, Turkiye, Armenia … and Arab & Kurdish groups who had opposed the ruling Ottoman Empire.
Syria’s borders today do reflect these international negotiations. Local ethnically Arab, Kurd and other populations had limited influence. There was a reluctance in the major-power negotiations to establish countries or administrative regions based on ethnicity or religion, and a key result of that was the absence of a ‘Kurdish’ state, and the consolidation of several Arab states of mixed ethnic make up, and of varying denominations of the mostly Abrahamic religions.
These divisions were utilised after WW2 by the Soviets, with their anti-colonial narratives in the Cold War period. Recognising the history, they sought a ‘strong leader’ (in the colonial tradition) to hold all the Syrian groups together, by force or otherwise, who was not a member of one of the major dominant groups. In the early 1960s they cultivated a notable Alawite family, conveniently based in a Northern coastal area. By 1963 the brutal Ba’athist Hafez al-Assad, the future president, was already the primary power behind the scenes. He had received pilot training in the Soviet Union in the 1950s.
His older son, the heir apparent Bassel, died in 1994 and his softly-spoken ophthalmologist brother, Bashar, left his London home to take up the role; and became president in 2000. He proved inept at juggling the different factions in government, and keeping factions happy with largesse. He supported Western ideas about transparency and integrity in government (in which I was involved), and several groups began complaining more loudly they weren’t getting their fair share (the slice of the cake being more important than the size of the cake).
Bashar’s ineptitude in the end also resulted in a loss of Russian support, US occupation of the Eastern oil fields (oil goes mostly to Turkiye), Israeli bombing and stated territorial aims, haphazard Iranian influence, Kurdish militias controlling Rojava, occupation by Turkiye of parts of the North, and the growth of foreign-based militants with ‘anti-colonial’ Sunni Arab narratives (some Western backed),
In tipping the wobbly edifice over, the West backed their ‘best bet’; Al Nusra/HTS and political Sunni Islam, especially after the 2011 ‘Arab Spring’ uprising. This was a similar strategy in backing the 5 main Islamist groups against the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s. (And look what happened to that).
The government of Turkiye is unhappy. They seek opportunities for their 4m Syrian refugees to return home, and thus they promote stability and regional autonomy in Syria; but they know very well that the chances of an HTS-led government holding the country together and resolving all the conflicts, are slim. A weakened United Nations has little opportunity to promote peace. We live in hope.
* Paul Reynolds works with multilateral organisations as an independent adviser on international relations, economics, and senior governance.
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6 Comments
As Paul Reynolds says, “but with a series of related international agreements established between 1915 and 1923, initiated primarily after the start of WW1 due to the anticipated fall of the Ottoman Empire”.
Interesting to ponder on the various political changes initiated by British ‘Statesmen’ at the time and what benefit they may or may not have got from powerful vested interests at the time.
David Lloyd George’s fund raising arrangements always make for interesting reading.
In 1927, there was a small light on this when he sold his holding in United Newspapers for nearly £ 3 million (equivalent to £ 160 million today – according to the Bank of England inflation calculator)….. and a small bit of it. It wasn’t just about peerages and knighthoods.
Source, ‘Mr Lloyd George, a Study’, by Sir Charles Mallet (barrister and former Liberal MP), p 286, pub Ernest Benn, London 1930.
The UN Special Envoy, Norwegian diplomat Geir Pedersen has called for “urgent political talks” in Geneva to secure a peaceful future for Syria, and said that key players – including Iran, Russia, Türkiye and the US – have backed his appeal https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/12/1158021.
However, the neighbouring Arab states and Turkey do not seem to be waiting for a UN led transition to a new polotical settlement as proposed in resolution 2254.
There is still fighting going on in Syria and reportedly summary executions in Alawite areas of Assad regime supporters as well as the Israeli bombing and incursion.
I think the Italians are the only Europeans with a functioning embassy in Syria, so they may need to act as interlocutors with the interim government until some form of diplomatic missions can be established in Damascus by other counties in the region.
As Paul writes, a weakened United Nations has little opportunity to promote peace but can focus on organosing humanitarian aid,
HTS may want to tone down its Jihadist background, but it remains a dictatorial organisation in its governance of Idlib. If that strict form of governance is imposed across the country, the Syrian revoluition is far from over.
It was more than “Bashar’s ineptitude” that resulted in Russia, the US, Türkiye, Israel, etc. getting involved… There was the small matter of him killing around half a million Syrians, driving millions more into exile, fostering the growth is ISIS/Islamic State, etc.
The West didn’t back “their ‘best bet’; Al Nusra/HTS” after 2011, they backed a range of rebel groups, particularly in the south, that had nothing to do with them. After deciding against enforcing the red line over chemical weapon usage against civilians in 2013, western powers scaled back their support for rebels to such an extent that those in the south (the more secular groups) were in effect eventually handed over to Russia to manage via ‘Reconciliation’ agreements with the regime. The US retained forces in Syria around Tanf, but ended support for any armed opposition group apart from the SDF.
I understand there have been some indirect communications with HTS in recent years around combating IS, but that’s it.
“I understand there have been some indirect communications with HTS in recent years around combating IS, but that’s it.”
Considering that the leader currently has a $10 million bounty on his head, I suspect that contacts are rather limited.
https://rewardsforjustice.net/rewards/muhammad-al-jawlani/
@Adam – yes indeed. I referred to this in the comments section on my article posted on Sunday 8th: https://www.libdemvoice.org/syrians-are-free-at-last-76692.html
To the best of my knowledge contacts have been very limited and indirect only. But Jolani has been operating fairly openly in Idleb for several years now and the US has been using drones to target members of IS/ISIS in the region. They must have had the opportunity but evidently haven’t prioritised going after him.
I suspect that’s at least in part to HTS record of fighting Al Qaida and ISIS.
If they’d been desperate to kill him they could have done so on several occasions over the last few days.
The technocratic government set up by HTS to administer the northwest has become fairly widely accepted too. The UN has a permanent office in Idlib and external aid, education and health agencies have all been coordinating with it.
No one knows how things will pan out. But we ought to be making decisions informed by the complexities of recent history.
I’m always impressed by how many people “know” different truths about complex conflict situations like Syria. For example, that HTS are backed by the West, or, that HTS are proscribed terrorists to the West.
I am reminded that most of us “knew”, when Assad used chemical weapons, that as with Iraq, Western intervention would be a disastrous move. We should leave it to that nice Mr Putin to keep Assad under control, as he promised. So the Commons voted intervention down, and Obama followed the UK lead. An object lesson in how easy it is to get foreign affairs wrong.
Do we now “know” that HTS are evil, or do we “know” that they are nice? I would suggest we keep an open mind, and think rationally about what will work best. Jolani comes across as an authoritarian Islamist by nature, but one who wants to be pragmatic, and play nice if that will help him gain the support he needs to keep control. We should surely encourage that. If we don’t, Jolani might decide that playing nice has failed.