Soon after the Second World War ended, a German Jewish survivor, a brilliant philosophy student, sat down to explain to herself and the world how Hitler and Stalin had turned organised madness into an engine of government and destruction. Hannah Arendt’s The Origins of Totalitarianism came out in 1951.

Much of her analysis is dated or specific to the German or Russian peoples. But some is chillingly relevant.

How relevant is this to Trump’s MAGA movement, to Farage and Reform?

• “Denial of the very possibility of a common mankind…total denial of the whole concept of human rights – stigmatised as weak, feeble-minded and hypocritical.”
• Particular appeal to people who had not taken part in political life – non-voters etc – and such people could be kept loyal without much argument or influence of reason. “Politically indifferent masses could easily be a majority in a democratically ruled country…a democracy could function according to rules which are actively recognised by only a minority.”

Reform’s success has been to combine the intolerant hard right, which always existed, with voters who previously had not voted in local elections, and maybe not in any elections – people who neither understood not trusted the system.

Why is such a large pool of such voters available? The internet, the right-wing media and immigration are obvious and real reasons – but there are others.

There were always many people beyond social or work organisation, beyond strong and stable communities. In 18th century Europe they were numerous in cities, fuelling the Porteous Riots in Edinburgh and the Gordon Riots in London. In the 19th century, they declined despite urbanisation, because of the rise of an urbanised working class – possessing regular jobs, working en masse and unionised. Moreover, Methodists, Baptists and Catholics recruited and organised among urban workers. The Nonconformist churches and the unions had a participative ethos, promoting active mutual support. Both unions and chapels were strongly linked to the Liberals while the Conservative Party relied on traditional ties: rural land-based hierarchy, Church of England, military.

From late that century, small businesses and self-employed craftspeople declined, but industrialised and bureaucratised employment predominated. The Nonconformist churches began a shallow, steady decline from around 1910, but unions grew stronger. The experience of two world wars underlined for many the importance of mutual support, and for officers and NCOs, duty and caring responsibility.

In this environment, income and wealth differentials gradually declined. The poor got less poor. But in the 1970s this faltered and in Britain, under Margaret Thatcher, it went into reverse. She did not succeed in cutting government expenditure – unemployment is expensive, as are the military – but she made the rich richer. She systematically assaulted not only unions, but also local councils and any bodies that got in the way. U.S. President Reagan pursued a similar agenda.

Thatcher’s ideal was a country where responsible, prosperous families and individuals took care of themselves. She saw no need for co-operative bodies between family and government – or between consumer and market. In the event, she speeded up the decline of institutions that bound people together and encouraged co-operation. Traditional parties of the Left saw their base in the industrial towns and organised working-class declining and understandably sought new support. But this led to taking the traditional base for granted and to many people, even in prosperous areas, feeling ignored.

Sensible calculation by all parties about winnable, safe or unwinnable constituencies and wards led to many voters being virtually ignored. In the Liberal Democrats, repeated advice was to use the marked register and for door-knocking, to ignore people who had not voted. The advice was followed. Electorally, it worked – but it meant the only effort made to engage the disengaged was common leaflets which they binned.

The British disease of centralisation meant local government was starved of funds and loaded with statutory duties, till councils had little capability to spend on locally popular projects. Why bother to vote in local elections, then? Were the devolutionist Lib Dems innocent on this count? Then how, in coalition, did we allow local government spend to be cut more sharply than national?

Political establishments were shocked by the Brexit result. Places that had been overlooked voted Leave. Boris Johnson exploited the new constituency – but then spectacularly misbehaved. Into the breach stepped Farage.

So what to do?

Responses – I have no space to discuss them – must include properly listening to and serving ignored communities; the hardest, engaging some of the disengaged voters (some will always remain disengaged); and radical devolution.

* Simon Banks is an activist in Tendring, North-east Essex, and former council group leader, Waltham Forest.