New Chinese spy case and our Defending Democracy policy draft

Wednesday’s disturbing news on UK democracy interference is the Met’s arrest and a new Chinese espionage case. Among the suspects is the spouse of an MP.

Nigel Farage — the leader of a party with a senior member convicted for aiding Russia — has rushed to attack Labour and Keir Starmer. To rebut this hypocrisy, we must press ahead with our efforts to get the Government to place China in the Enhanced Tier of the Foreign Influence Registration Scheme (‘FIRS’) in the planned Democracy Bill.

We must not only defend our democracy from foreign interference; we must also keep our community informed about the scale of Chinese interference activities in the UK. Reform seeks to undermine trust in our institutions through mocking statements. By contrast, our push for China’s placement on the Enhanced Tier under FIRS will strengthen democratic participation by improving safeguards and raising public awareness.

It should also require Ministers and relevant officials to brief elected representatives on the extent of China’s foreign interference in the UK. That could mean stronger scrutiny of the China Audit (see my previous article), or transparency about which overseas Chinese “community aid” groups are facilitated by the United Front Work Department.

Placing China in the Enhanced Tier of FIRS does not intrude on individual liberties. On the contrary, it protects civil liberties by increasing transparency around institutions, software, and social media platforms that serve the Chinese party-state. With an Enhanced Tier mechanism, we can better understand the breadth and depth of the Russia–China—and, to an extent, Iran—bloc that spreads disinformation, fuels populist far-right sentiment, and channels political donations.

We must also show that the Liberal Democrats are the true safeguard of Britain’s resilience—by building a stronger Europe—rather than Reform’s pandering to a unilateral Trump-style America.

A few months ago at ALDE Congress, I noticed a significant knowledge gap among members of sister parties in Western Europe about China’s “carrot-and-stick” approach and its economic coercion. With some political interns taking additional placements in China, outdated lobbying and political donation rules, and weak safeguards, our democratic institutions are failing to mitigate foreign interference risks. China is actively working to undermine Europe’s industrial strategy and to lock in supply chains dependent on China. From solar inverters to electric vehicles, our dependence on Chinese production is increasing Beijing’s leverage.

To put it sarcastically, at this rate, Volkswagen’s Chinese name may end up resembling 人民汽車 rather than 大眾汽車 if it is effectively absorbed by SAIC Motor. Ironically, both names still convey the idea of a “people’s car”.

Meanwhile our solar energy infrastructure will not truly cut global carbon emissions if the supply chain relies on coal-fired manufacturing and unchecked pollution during raw material extraction.

It is understandable that EU politicians worry that UK–China trade could become a backdoor into Europe after Brexit. That is why we need renewed customs integration with Europe—to rebuild trust and form a coherent industrial strategy. With that foundation, Europe and the UK can collaborate with other free and open states on industrial research and resilient supplies of critical raw materials.

Finally, when we talk about “intelligence capacity”, we must remember that the Chinese Communist Party deploys a whole-of-society approach to political and economic interference. Our cooperation with Europe should not be limited to traditional intelligence sharing; it must also include collaboration on industrial policy, research security, and resilience. What is clearly lacking is a Resilience Minister who can coordinate this work across government, officials, and experts.

Therefore, taking the new Chinese spy case we must focus on three pillars:
a) Strengthen the Foreign Influence Registration Scheme by placing China in the Enhanced Tier, alongside Russia and Iran,
b) Provide active education on the methods of operation used by individuals and institutions covered by the Enhanced Tier; and
c) Call on the Government to appoint a Resilience tsar—whom we would shadow in opposition—to show the public how we counter foreign interference by building resilience networks with our European partners.

I encourage active participation in the party’s latest working paper on Defending Democracy: Saturday 14 March, 18:15–19:45, Lendal Room, Barbican Centre, York. And I’m delighted our chair – Larry Ngan is driving democracy resilience for the UK in this working group.

* Nicholas Chan is a Liberal Democrat member training in Criminal Law. He is Vice-Chair of Liberal Democrat Friends of Hong Kong.

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