In the wake of his Beijing sojourn, Donald Trump is embarking on a dangerous and complex game of diplomatic chess with Taiwan as the piece most likely to be sacrificed for the greater American good.

While in China, Trump became convinced what the rest of the world has known for some time. China cannot be bullied. Threats of escalating tariffs and civilisational extinction just roll off the Chinese political back. They have been around a long time and have seen it all.

Next, China is as much of a superpower as the United States. And, if he is going to avoid an Armageddon-like nuclear war, he has to learn to live on the same planet with Beijing instead of baiting and containing it.

Finally, the American president is almost certainly convinced that Xi Jinping is sincere when he says that China wants Taiwan and any American attempt to block a Chinese takeover could easily lead to a Sino-American “clashes and even conflict.”

The three-way dilemma of China-US-Taiwan dates back to before President Nixon’s historic visit to China. It has been resolved with the famous “strategic ambiguity” which was designed to deter war by making the Chinese uncertain about US intervention.

Trump doesn’t do ambiguity. He does transactions. The Taiwan issue presents him with an opportunity to use his much-hyped negotiating skills to pull off one of the great transactions of all time. A tempting prospect which ego would find difficult to resist.

But with whom and how?

Sitting on Trump’s Resolute desk is a $14 billion arms deal with Taiwan. Also still in play is a deal dating back to December for a further $11 billion. If Trump blocked—or scaled back—the deal then Xi would probably respond with a big purchase—possibly the additional 300 Boeing jets that Trump expected to sell on his visit.

Alternatively, he could threaten Taiwan. Trump could tell Taipei that he will reduce arms sales unless Taipei invests more in the US. In particular, he wants the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) to move a big chunk of its production to the US. TSMC produces nearly 70 percent of the world’s advanced computer chips and represents 20 percent of Taiwan’s GNP. At Trump’s insistence, Taiwan has already invested $162billion in an Arizona production plant.

Trump wants more. He has publicly said so. But if Taiwan moves more of its facilities to America it loses a big chunk of its GNP. In addition, one of main arguments for defending the island is to protect the vital global supply of advanced computer chips. No chip production equals no need to protect Taiwan.

Trump has said that he intends to have a telephone chat with Taiwan’s William Lai in the near future. Beijing has declared its public opposition to the talk because any contact between the American and Taiwanese president implies US recognition of Taiwan.

Privately, however, Beijing must be delighted. If Trump, as expected, pressures Taiwan to move more of TSMC to America then it will make the Taiwanese start to question the value of their relationship with the US. The Chinese will simultaneously continue with a gentle wooing of the Taiwanese in the hopes that more of them will start to see their future as part of China.

But there are two potential flies in this diplomatic ointment—Japan and, to a lesser extent, Australia. Japan’s southernmost islands are close to Taiwan and Japan’s right-wing prime minister, Sanae Takaichi, has declared the Chinese threat to Taiwan as “survival-threatening” to Japan. Australia is not as dramatic in its support for Taipei, but—under increased US pressure—it is increasing its defense budget to three percent of GNP by 2033.

It is clear that Trump would like to see both countries—and possibly South Korea as well– play a bigger role in the defense of Taiwan as it is the region’s key flashpoint. Whether or not they have the capacity to do so is questionable.

The danger is that Trump may believe Taiwan is merely another negotiable asset in a larger geopolitical bargain with Beijing. But Taiwan is not a real estate deal or a tariff dispute. It sits at the intersection of nationalism, military prestige, technological supremacy and the credibility of American power in Asia. Any perception that Washington is quietly edging away from Taipei would reverberate far beyond the Taiwan Strait—from Tokyo and Seoul to Manila and Canberra—and would inevitably raise doubts about the reliability of every American security guarantee in the Pacific.

For more than fifty years, successive American presidents maintained peace through uncertainty. China was never sure America would fight; Taiwan was never sure America would not. Trump’s instinct is to replace ambiguity with deal-making and personal diplomacy. But in the case of Taiwan, clarity may prove more dangerous than confusion. If all sides begin to believe the old balance is collapsing, then the diplomatic chess game could quickly become something far more volatile—and far more difficult to control.

* Tom Arms is foreign editor of Liberal Democrat Voice. He also contributes to “The New World” magazine and lectures on world affairs. He is the author of “America Made in Britain,” two editions of “The Encyclopaedia of the Cold War” and “The Falklands Crisis.”