Ukraine has introduced a new strategic weapon in its war with Russia. How it uses this weapon could determine the course of the conflict.
There is a heavily-defended 600 mile frontline between the Russian army in Eastern Ukraine and the Ukrainian military, grouped mainly on the western bank of the Dnieper River. Movement along this frontline has been incremental, much like the western front of World War I.
Defended by poorly-trained Russian conscripts is the 650-mile border between northeast Ukraine and the Russian oblasts of Kursk, Bryansk and Belgorod.
Ukraine’s military commander Oleksandr Syrsky has crossed a 10-mile stretch of that border to become the first military leader since World War Two to invade Russia. As of Friday, Ukrainians have established their dominance in 800-square miles of the Kursk oblast; set up a military administration in the Russian town of Sudzha and gained control of 81 other towns and villages.
General Syrsky declared: “We are here to stay. A spokesperson for the Ukrainian foreign ministry, said: “We have no intention of staying. We will leave.”
The Syrsky stay strategy is likely to lead to failure and defeat. The diplomats’ approach contains the seeds of victory.
To occupy the Kursk salient requires soldiers – lots of them. Those soldiers have been taken off the frontline where they were holding back incremental advances. In fact, while the Ukrainians are celebrating their successful invasion of Russian territory, the Russians have moved to take the strategic Ukrainian town of Pokrovsk.
The Ukrainians have home ground advantage but this is seriously blunted by statistics. The Russians 1.3 million active military personnel and two million reservists. Ukraine has 900,000 active soldiers and 1.2 million reservists. Russia’s total manpower pool is 69.4 million compared to Ukraine’s 22.8 million. The Russians have 4,255 military aircraft. Ukraine has 321. The stats continue, and they are all in Russia’s favour. In a toe to toe slugging match across a static frontline, Putin’s troops have a distinct advantage. In a more fluid war, the odds shift towards Zelensky’s men.
A possible solution therefore lies in a series of well-executed in-out Ukrainian raids by a relatively small but well-trained Ukrainian force across the conscript-defended Russian border. Today the Kursk region. A month from now 50 miles north of Kursk. Two months hit and run 50 miles south. Each time the Russians will be forced to draw troops away from the front line in eastern Ukraine, thus giving the Ukrainian troops the opportunity to advance.
The cross-border raids will also raise Ukrainian morale and dent the Russian’s. So far your typical Russian citizen has been largely isolated from what Putin continues to call the special military operation. Russian officials admit to the evacuation of 200,000 civilians as a result of the Ukrainian attack. Vladimir Putin can’t hide the facts which represent a serious threat to his reputation as “Mr Security.” A reputation he has carefully nurtured for 24 years.
* Tom Arms is foreign editor of Liberal Democrat Voice and author of “The Encyclopaedia of the Cold War” and “America Made in Britain". To subscribe to his email alerts on world affairs click here.
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9 Comments
I guess the hope is that these cross-border incursions will focus the minds of the Russian governing elite on a negotiated settlement of some sort, but it hard to see how that can come about while Putin remains in power and Ukrainians are treated as an inferior race to Russians.
This is a catastrophic conflict for the United Nations. The Russian invasion of Crimea in 2014 was a precursor to the wider conflict in much the same way as Saddam hussein’s invasion of Kuwait was the precursor to the disastrous Iraq war.
Woodrow Wilson’s league of nations was the great hope for world peace after the Great war, but when the American congress rejected membership that body was fatally undermined. The Council began with four permanent members (The United Kingdom, France, Italy and Japan). Japan’s 1931 incursion into Manchuria was challenged and Japan simply withdrew even though they were a permanent member. Italy’s 1935 invasion of Abyssinia (Ethiopia) was perhaps the coup de grâce for the League and was soon followed by German expansionism.
Haile Selassi’s Iconic 1963 speech to the United Nations remains as relevant today as it was then Haile Selassi speech
As you say, it’s good for morale in Ukraine. And makes Putin look weak.
I think it also helps Ukraine against western appeasers/defeatists – the people who think that we should stop supplying them with arms and should instead push them into accepting some ‘peace deal’ (ie roll over and surrender territory).
It’s also a boost for western supporters, who can feel they are getting something positive for all the weapons they’ve supplied. And will therefore be encouraged to keep on doing so.
The Times, citing defense sources, reports: The US is preventing Britain from allowing Ukraine to use Storm Shadow missiles in Russia, as The UK’s month-old request to ease restrictions remains unanswered UK awaits US approval for Ukraine to use Storm Shadow missiles in Russia
The US and UK are both signatories to the 1994 Budapest Memorandum that provided security assurances to Ukraine in exchange for transferring their nuclear arsenal to Russia. This restriction on the use of US/UK supplied weapons against airfields and other military bases bombarding Ukrainian cities appears somewhat disingenous in the circunstaces.
According to today’s Washington Post, Ukraine’s offensive derails secret efforts for partial cease-fire with Russia, officials say.
The warring countries were set to hold indirect talks in Qatar on an agreement to halt strikes on energy and power infrastructure, according to officials.
@John Waller. I think it’s more correct to say that Russia’s attitude has derailed the talks. There’s absolutely no reason in principle why the talks on halting strikes on power infrastructure could not happen, and Ukraine is still willing to have those negotiations, but Russia has nevertheless unilaterally decided that they don’t wish to continue the talks while the Ukrainian offensive is underway. That’s arguably completely hypocritical on Russia’s part since Russia has been running a much bigger offensive on Ukrainian lands for 2 years and is even now continuing to attack Ukrainian land – but Russia apparently doesn’t see that as a barrier to the talks.
I don’t think we should be blaming Ukraine for something that it is solely Russia’s decision.
Hello Simon, some posters find it troublingly difficult to blame Russia.
To some extent Putin’s invasion of Ukraine was attempting to follow Stalin’s post-1945 defence strategy. Stalin incorporated territory from most of his neighbours into the Soviet Union, as a buffer for Russia. He got territory from Finland, the whole of the Baltic States, Poland (to Bielorus and Ukraine), Czechoslovakia (to Ukraine), Romania (Moldova) and Japan. I’m sure this Ukrainian incursion is intended to show Russians that this strategy (taking land from a neighbour), far from making Russia safer, reduces Russia’s security.
Angela Merkel once described Vladimir Putin as a leader using 19th-century methods in the 21st century. What the former German chancellor meant was that Russia’s leader is a man of war and nationalism in an era supposedly defined by laws and globalisation.
In the Crimean War, the Russian forieign minister complained of British and French hypocrisy (wiith good cause) in denying them conquests in the balkan states while France was colonising Algeria and Britain was adding another African state to its empire almost weekly. Otto von Bismarck fought three wars to unify Germany.
The percentages agreement was a secret informal agreement between Winston Churchill and Joseph Stalin during the Fourth Moscow Conference in October 1944. It gave the percentage division of control over Eastern European countries, dividing them into spheres of influence. Churchill seemed to think Stalin could be trusted but was soon proven wrong when Stalin installed communist regimes in Roumania and Bulgaria Churchill’s Strategic and Diplomatic Assumptions at Yalta
The cold war that ensued did little for Russia’s security. The development of long-range bombers and inter-continental missiles obviated the perceived security of a 19th century Cordon Sanitaire. Today, it is only the relinqushment of aggressive war as a means of settling disputes and International diplomacy that can provide security for the Great Powers.
It will be interesting to see how this develops. Along with more strikes inside Russia, Ukraine seems to be causing a redressing of the previous situation on the ground. With territorial gains there will be a greater impetus for some sort of negotiated settlement to get started.