CIA
Why did CIA Director John Ratcliffe fly to Moscow? It definitely was not the “semi-routine” visit that Donald Trump claims.
The last time the head of the Central Intelligence Agency visited the Russian capital was in November 2021 – and that was hardly routine.
A study of the available reporting and surrounding circumstances point to a similar reason—with a few additional twists. The first reason is that American and British intelligence are reported to have picked up indications that Putin is considering testing NATO’s Article 5 commitment by taking some sort of action against a NATO country. The most likely target is one of the Baltic states.
America’s stock of Patriot interceptors in Europe has reportedly fallen to critically low levels because of their enormous consumption in the Iran war. If Moscow believes Washington is militarily distracted and European air defences depleted, Putin could conceivably think this is an unusually favourable moment to test NATO.
Another complementary reason for the visit is likely to be Ukraine. Ratcliffe is reported to have given his Russian counterpart—Sergei Naryshkin–a distinctly pessimistic assessment of Russia’s position and urged Moscow to enter serious negotiations before its military and economic circumstances deteriorate further.
Iran would also have been discussed. Russia is closely aligned with Tehran, and Washington is trying to increase pressure on Iran while pushing shipping through the Strait of Hormuz back towards normal. CBS reports that Ratcliffe warned Moscow about further sanctions connected with the Strait. Reuters says Russian support for Iran was among the subjects discussed.
In November 2021 President Joe Biden sent CIA director to Moscow to warn Putin not to invade Ukraine. In August 2026 President Donald Trump sent John Ratcliffe on a similar mission. Putin ignored the first CIA director. Why should Washington believe he will listen to the second?
Mid term elections
Time for some detailed analysis of US mid-term election data. Using Cook Political Report, one of America’s best established non-partisan election analysis organisations, the figures show the Democrats in pole position to win the House and with a 50/50 chance to gain control of the Senate.
But let’s take a closer look. Republicans currently have a five-seat majority in the House of Representatives. This means that the Democrats need to win only three seats to gain control. Analysts reckon that they have a chance of gaining 2-10 seats. This means that at the bottom end of the range the Republican retain control with the narrow majority of one and at the top the Democrats have a solid 15-seat majority.
As of 25 August, Cook reckons that there are 21 congressional election races that could be considered toss-ups worth closely watching. They are: two Republican-held seats in Arizona; one Republican-held seat in California; one Republican-held seat in Colorado; two Democrat-held seats in Florida; one Democrat-held seat in Washington state; two Republican-held seats in Iowa; two Republican-held seats in Michigan; one Republican-held seat in New Jersey; one Republican-held seat in New York; one Republican-held seat in Wisconsin; one Democratic-held seat in Ohio; three Republican-held seats in Pennsylvania; one Democratic-held seat in Texas and one Republican-held seat in Virginia.
A quick count of the above reveals that of the 21 toss-ups 16 are currently held by worried Republicans. This means that the Republicans are defending more than three times as many toss-up seats as the Democrats.
Now for the Senate where the Republicans currently have a healthier 53 seats and the Democrats 47. Therefore, the Democrats need a net gain of four to win control. There are seven Senate seats which Cook regards as marginal. They are: Alaska (Republican), Iowa (Republican), Maine (Republican), Michigan (Democrat), Ohio (Republican), Texas (Republican) and North Carolina (Republican).
Cook reckons that North Carolina has moved from marginal Republican to what they call “lean Democrat.” Texas is heading that way with Attorney General Ken Paxton trailing the Democrat James Talarico candidate. The campaigns of the Democrat candidates in Maine, Michigan, Ohio and Alaska have all been given a boost by Trump’s trade war with Canada as the tariffs both sides have imposed will have a big impact on the economies of all those states.
Then there is Trump himself. The president is said to be planning a TV ad campaign focusing heavily on his achievements. He believes that he personally is a vote winner. This may be delusionary because his latest approval ratings have sunk to 33 percent.
The president should be seriously worried. Loss of the House of Representatives alone would mean Democratic control of committees and the legislative agenda, together with the power to launch investigations, create special committees and issue subpoenas into the activities of the administration—and potentially Trump and his family.
Germany and France
Ukraine’s next battle may be fought at the ballot box in Germany and France.
There are three German state parliamentary elections in September, starting with a potentially extraordinary one in Saxony-Anhalt. The far-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) is polling at 41 per cent. Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s Christian Democratic Union (CDU) is well behind in second place at 24 per cent.
The AfD has a realistic prospect of becoming by far the largest party—and perhaps even approaching an outright majority. The other September elections are in Berlin and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania. In the latter, the AfD has also been polling very strongly.
The important thing is not simply whether the AfD gets a state premier. It is what happens to Germany’s Brandmauer—the “firewall” under which the mainstream parties refuse to cooperate with the AfD. Repeated AfD victories make that position increasingly difficult to maintain.
And Ukraine is right in the middle of this. The AfD is much more sympathetic towards Moscow than the present German government and opposes Germany’s present level of military support for Kyiv. Germany is now one of Ukraine’s indispensable suppliers. So, a major AfD breakthrough would put increasing pressure on Merz and the CDU to accommodate AfD voters and policies—even if the formal firewall remains intact.
Then comes the really big one: France in 2027.
France holds its presidential election in April–May 2027. Emmanuel Macron cannot stand again.
The National Rally (Rassemblement National) is in an exceptionally strong position. Marine Le Pen is currently again a candidate, while Jordan Bardella remains another potential standard-bearer for the populist right. The centre is fragmented between figures including Édouard Philippe and Gabriel Attal, while the French left is also badly divided.
That matters enormously for Ukraine because the French presidency has considerably greater control over foreign and defence policy than most European heads of government. A National Rally president would therefore have much more immediate capacity to alter French policy than an AfD victory in a German state election.
There is a potentially dangerous sequence. September 2026: the AfD makes spectacular gains in Germany. During 2026–27 pressure increases on the German political establishment and the firewall. Then, in April and May 2027, National Rally has a serious chance of capturing the French presidency.
Meanwhile, the United States is withdrawing much of its direct financial support for Ukraine. That leaves Europe carrying more of the burden just as two of its most important countries face powerful political movements which are considerably less enthusiastic about supporting Kyiv.
Putin has failed to break Western support for Ukraine on the battlefield. The question now is whether European voters will do it for him at the ballot box.
* Tom Arms is foreign editor of Liberal Democrat Voice. He also contributes to “The New World” magazine and lectures on world affairs. He is the author of “America Made in Britain,” two editions of “The Encyclopaedia of the Cold War” and “The Falklands Crisis.”


