It is tempting for UK political figures unfamiliar with the wars in Afghanistan, to view recent events as a ‘surprise loss for the West’ that is ‘all the fault of President Biden’. Neither is true. I will attempt a summary.

The war was ‘lost’ many years ago. Talebs and other insurgents controlled a majority of the country after the first five years. By the end of 2009 ICOS (Western-funded) reported that the Talebs had a controlling presence in 97% of the country, and had de facto control of Districts representing almost two thirds of territory.

Certainly when I first arrived in 2008 the Talebs controlled the road from central Kabul and the Compound to the airport, requiring a dangerous circuitous route. Driving to Jalalabad or Kandahar, there were Taleb road blocks, some taking ‘fees’. The game was already over. Why?

The foundational reason is that after the tragedy of 9/11 US foreign policy became de-facto military-led.

Anti-terror wars became the ‘core material’ of the USA’s ever-expanding and competing military and security institutions, without budget constraints. The original stated aim of apprehending Al Qaeda leaders responsible for 9/11, thought to be hiding in the Southern Afghan deserts, unwisely morphed into a lucrative ‘tabula rasa’ occupation. In the US there was unbearable political pressure to show ‘muscle’ to a domestic audience after 9/11.

However, military institutions are not adept at ‘nation building’; such works require expert civilian oversight with military support, not military oversight. Another consequence was that the military and civilian efforts were absurdly fragmented, with stiff competition for being credited with ‘military successes’. In the US rush for ‘success’, the entire population became the enemy, and almost all civilian deaths became ‘successful anti-terror operations’, even the well-documented bombings of weddings & funerals.

There was the OEF/OFS campaign, and ISAF/RSM forces (also responsible for nation building and aid & development), plus UK, German and other forces. There were numerous semi-covert US groups, including via SOCOM and its dozens of independent units under JSOC, SOCJC, ASOC, and MFSOC. Each set of institutions had different military aims and engagement doctrines; which appeared to change regularly .. a fatal flaw. It was often reported that experienced UK forces would negotiate an ‘accommodation’ with a village chief, only for a US unit under OEF/OFS or elsewhere unknowingly to bomb the village shortly after.

Most ‘Western’ development efforts ran in parallel to Afghan governmental efforts, creating dependence and wasting resources. Development degenerated and included a vast cash hand out system for Districts (helpful for opium production). But locals reported that the Districts were useless and corrupt, and if they wanted mediation of disputes or help with irrigation they would go to the Taleb office.

The Provinces got relatively nothing, since centralisation suited the corrupt warlords and druglords that formally ran the state, and the foreigner kleptocracy. This was catastrophic, especially economically. In Afghanistan the major towns skirt the periphery and are more connected with populations across the border than with each other. After all, in winter many inter-city routes are impassable.

The role of Pakistan was key.

The US and UK backed mujahideen fighters in the 1980s against the Soviets, mostly via Pakistan. After the long withdrawal of the Soviets 1989-1992 there was fighting among different factions. The Talebs (‘students’) mostly Pashtuns, dominated.

But Afghanistan borders a part of Pakistan which is outwith the Pakistan constitution; literally lawless, and the border is open. Old mujahideen bases and mountain escape routes stayed open.

Further, Talebs and others had good practice from the Soviet occupation days, which came in useful after 2002, whereas foreign forces once again were in unfamiliar territory.

With such a military and political landscape, the prospects for success in the occupation were not favourable from the start. Building a house on weak foundations is always unwise.

* Paul Reynolds works with multilateral organisations as an independent adviser on international relations, economics, and senior governance.