Britain needs Europe. Europe needs Britain. But not as they currently are.
This thought began by watching the current US administration’s repeated disdain for European allies—the transactional contempt, the treaty ambiguity, the suggestion that decades of partnership count for nothing. Liberal internationalism is under threat. The transatlantic order that underwrote European security for seven decades is fracturing visibly. That creates a vacuum—and a question the Liberal Democrats are uniquely positioned to answer: what should Europe become, and where does Britain fit?
No other party will ask this. Labour has calculated that silence on Europe costs less than clarity. The Conservatives remain captured by their Brexit coalition. The Liberal Democrats—consistently internationalist, consistently proved right—have both the standing and the freedom to lead.
What follows is a proposal. A confederated Europe—sovereign democracies choosing deeper partnership without dissolving into a superstate. Britain rejoining not the arrangement we left, but something reformed and stronger.
* * *
The European Union’s current structure has real limitations. Unanimity requirements mean a single state can paralyse collective action—Hungary vetoing Ukraine support, for instance. The single market for services remains incomplete, disadvantaging Britain’s core economic strength. Defence cooperation exists but lacks the integration that genuine strategic autonomy requires. Democratic accountability is diffuse; citizens struggle to know who decides what.
A confederation would address these. Not federation—no European government overriding national parliaments. Confederation means sovereign nations pooling specific functions while retaining authority over everything else. The EU already operates closer to this model than most people realise; the question is whether to make it work properly.
Three reforms matter most. First, replace unanimity with qualified majority voting, so decisions actually get made and member countries’ voices carry weight proportional to their populations. Second, complete the services single market—genuinely opening European economies to British expertise in finance, law, technology, and professional services. Third, integrate defence properly: pooled procurement to reduce duplication, coordinated command structures, and Franco-British nuclear cooperation providing a genuine European deterrent independent of Washington’s whims.
What remains national stays national: taxation, welfare, public services, constitutional arrangements. Trade negotiation, climate commitments, and security coordination operate confederally. The division is clear.
The economic case is arithmetic, not idealism. The EU plus Britain represents roughly €21 trillion—the second-largest economic bloc on earth. Britain outside follows EU regulations to access European markets regardless; we simply no longer help write them. Rejoining means a seat at the table, not subordination to Brussels.
* * *
The fear that deeper partnership means absorption is real. But confederation explicitly preserves what matters. National parliaments remain supreme on domestic matters. No requirement to adopt the Euro or join Schengen; tiered membership accommodates different levels of integration. Constitutional arrangements—common law, parliamentary tradition, the Constitutional Monarchy system—are unthreatened by trade coordination.
Paddy Ashdown understood this. A Royal Marines and Special Boat Service officer before entering politics, he learned from military service that security requires collective action—and from Bosnia, where he rebuilt the country as High Representative, that European fragmentation has human costs. He advocated throughout his career for a common European defence policy independent of the United States. Not starry-eyed about Brussels; clear-eyed about threats.
Fifty-six percent of Britons now believe Brexit was a mistake. Among younger voters—who lost freedom of movement, study abroad access, and the assumption that borders would stay open—the figure is higher still. That sentiment will remain politically inert unless someone articulates what rejoining should actually mean.
* * *
Labour will not provide that articulation. Starmer’s government treats Europe as a problem to be managed, not an opportunity to be seized. The Conservatives cannot move without splitting their coalition. That leaves the Liberal Democrats—the party that warned, held the line, and was vindicated.
Being right creates responsibility. Not to relitigate 2016, but to define what comes next. Confederation, not federation. Partnership that strengthens both sides. A Britain that brings capability to Europe and gains strategic depth in return.
This should be in the next manifesto. Not as distant aspiration—as concrete policy development starting now. The party has a policy process; this proposal should enter it.
Europe would be stronger with Britain. Britain would be stronger in Europe.
* Dominic Rider is a Liberal Democrat activist in Shinfield, Wokingham. He has previously stood for local council. He used Claude AI as a drafting and research tool.
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9 Comments
Confederation is much easier in a peaceful world than where we are now. Trade relations can drag on through endless committee negotiations without too much damage. But security and defence require common funding, and rapid decisions. That’s one of the central challenges facing the EU now. US leadership substituted for European agreement, with a US ‘Supreme Commander’ solving the question of which European general should lead. In a hostile global environment, facing China, Russia and an unfriendly USA, some stronger institutions, and a larger common budget, may be unavoidable id European states want to protect our own interests..
This is not an entirely new problem. In the War of the Spanish succession the Dutch Parliament sent a committee to keep an eye on how careful Marlborough was being in husbanding the resources of their allied army. Marlborough got so fed up with constant hesitations that he marched the British forces from what is now Belgium to link up with the Austrians in southern Germany to have a go at the French – at Blenheim.
The UK would gain the right to talk about reforming The EU after we Rejoin, not before.
You’re right that security decisions require decision-makers who can act. The article deliberately proposed confederation rather than federation precisely because full EU integration lacks the shared demos that makes federal decisions legitimate. But defence is the exception that proves the rule—it would need a mutual defence commitment comparable to NATO Article 5, a European defence grouping with genuine rapid response capacity, and command structures that can act without waiting for 27 unanimous votes.
Franco-British nuclear cooperation—Lancaster House, Teutates—demonstrates this is achievable: bilateral coordination without supranational command. A follow-up piece on the nuclear dimension (to be posted) makes the case that bilateral coordination can achieve this—without Brussels machinery. The architecture already exists. The political will doesn’t appear to.
The European Political Community—which Britain hosted at Blenheim Palace in 2024—explicitly includes non-EU members in discussions about Europe’s future. Forty-seven countries participate; the whole point is that European security architecture concerns more than just EU members. Writing an op-ed in a UK party publication isn’t dictating terms to Brussels; it’s aiming to contribute to domestic debate about what kind of Europe we should seek to rejoin—and the Liberal Democrats, as the party most committed to that destination, should be shaping that vision rather than leaving it to others.
Excellent piece @DominicRider
“where does Britain fit?”
It doesn’t is the short answer. Non-members don’t fit in and don’t get to tell members what reforms they should or should not do.
“ No requirement to adopt the Euro or join Schengen; tiered membership accommodates different levels of integration”
This is just yet another demand for cake-ism for the U.K. The other member states made it absolutely clear when we were leaving that there is absolutely no way they are going to rewrite the EU Treaties to accommodate a U.K. that left the EU.
And it isn’t a Confederation that Europe needs, it is a Federation. Both Putin and Trump would be a lot more cautious about and respectful of Europe if the EU (including the UK) had actually set up the (mythical) “EU Army” a few decades ago.
Confederation or Federation? As I understand the terms, a confederation does not have an overall federal government whereas a federation does. So, what the EU has at the moment can accurately be described as the former.
Dominic Rider is therefore arguing to maintain the status quo, albeit with some improvements which constitute steps towards the latter.
So why not go the whole way and have even more improvements? Probably the most compelling argument for having a federation is to administer the common currency. A unit of fiat currency is an IOU of the issuing government. The problem with the euro is that it doesn’t actually have one. The ECB does its best to fulfill that role but it is far from an ideal setup .
So I agree with Paul R, the EU, or at least all the countries in the Eurozone, should be a Federation. I don’t want the UK to be a part of it though. Whether the non euro using EU countries and ourselves can form a confederation with the new EU Federal govt is another question.
Tiered membership isn’t British exceptionalism—it’s existing EU architecture. Not all members use the Euro; not all are in Schengen; Denmark has permanent opt-outs secured in 1992. The EU concluded a major agreement with Switzerland in December 2024 (initialled May 2025) establishing dynamic alignment and single market participation outside the EEA—the Centre for European Reform describes it as “a new model for partial integration” with “important lessons for the UK.”
On federation: I’d welcome it if achievable. My concern is feasibility, not principle. The EU has had seventy years to federalise and hasn’t—Constitutional Treaty failed, Lisbon was salvage, the eurozone crisis produced emergency mechanisms rather than fiscal union. Peter Martin is right about the Euro’s design flaw; that’s why the article doesn’t propose UK membership. Confederation isn’t a comfort zone—I believe it’s the maximum integration achievable while preserving democratic consent. If federation proves possible, wonderful. But building confederal structures now beats holding out for a settlement that may never arrive.