Over at The Independent, former Lib Dem leader Lord (Paddy) Ashdown assesses the situation in Afghanistan in the light of President Karzai’s belated acceptance of the need for new, legitimate elections. Here’s an excerpt:
… no one should be in any doubt what the new vote will cost, not just in treasure but in blood. A new election may do something for President Karzai’s legitimacy, but it won’t alter the problem he poses if, as Mrs Clinton at least seems to expect, he is re-elected. What then?
Some say that Karzai II must be very different from Karzai I and the international community (and especially Washington) must make sure it is so.
He must be persuaded – whether before or after the run-off – to have a government of national unity (GNU), which would include his main rival in the election, Abdullah Abdullah, and also the representatives of all ethnicities in multi-ethnic Afghanistan. He must then reach out and run an administration for the whole country, rather than one whose primary driver is the Pashtun interest.
Then, Karzai II must at last begin a serious programme to tackle the endemic corruption that is eating away at his support. This all makes perfect sense and we should certainly try it. But we should be aware that it is far from certain to work.
Instead Paddy suggests an alternative approach to tackle head-on Afghanistan’s deeply centralised tribal structures,
by shifting our emphasis from building up Kabul structures, to building up local ones, running with, rather than against, the grain of Afghanistan’s tribal system? Next year there are local elections in Afghanistan and these could offer a perfect moment to make this shift of emphasis, by switching much of the aid we are currently pouring in to help President Karzai build up his government, towards increasing the capacity of local and regional government.
This switch could have three fairly immediate beneficial effects. First, it would mean that we were, at last, working with Afghanistan’s decentralised and tribal nature. Second, it would deal with the problem of President Karzai, not by rejecting his election but by the simple expedient of making him matter less. I don’t suppose we could get to the position of Switzerland – where everyone knows there is a president, but no one knows who it is – but we could at least travel several large steps in that direction.
And lastly, shifting the government towards the local and tribal level would create a much better context for an energetic pursuit of the new policy of “Taliban reconciliation” that everyone, from President Obama down, now seems to recognise has to be a key part of the future mix if we are to begin to turn things round in the country.
When it comes to contemplating a second Karzai presidency in Afghanistan, we have a real chance to turn a problem into an opportunity. We should grasp it.
A fascinating article, well worth reading in full here.



One Comment
I always feel I have to preface my remarks by saying that generally I admire Paddy Ashdown, but I really think his article on this is seriously flawed.
It is all very well advocating decentralisation, but what Paddy is also complaining about is that President Kazai does not follow orders. I really get the impression that he feels like the political leadership in Afghanistan is so useless he would rather go in and do it himself. It is understandable that we would not want president Kazai to be corrupt, but the idea that he should do what he is told does not sit well with the idea that we believe in local control.
Corruption is not something we can do much about, but at least we can blame someone else for that. What is being ignored is that Afghanistan has become much harder to govern since president Obama sent a much larger contingent of troops to Afghanistan. The old story that the problems in Afghanistan were caused our troops being diverted to Iraq has been turned on it’s head. Corruption is conveniently someone else’s fault, but if the problem is the presence of our troops then what do we do?
The answer of course is to withdraw them. There is a case for saying that in some parts of the country they can do a useful job. The Taliban never succeeded in running the whole country when they were last in power. The Tajiks in the north and the Shia’s in the west may appreciate our presence in order to keep out the Taliban. But in places like Helmond it is a complete waste of time.