Oh, for the days of the British Empire. A protectorate in Egypt and Sudan. British troops at both ends of the Red Sea — Egypt and Suez in the west, Aden and Somaliland in the east. Trade flowed relatively freely between Europe and Asia.

Today’s picture is less simple.

The immediate problem is the conflict between the Iranian-backed Houthis on one side and the internationally recognised Yemeni government and its Saudi allies on the other.

But it is far more complicated than that. The Iran War has increased the importance of the Red Sea as an alternative outlet for Gulf oil, with the Saudis piping their product to the Red Sea port of Yanbu, from where it can be shipped north towards Suez and south through the vital Bab el-Mandeb Strait towards the Indian Ocean and Asia.

But the Saudis and the Houthis are not the only players in the Red Sea drama.
Bang opposite Bab el-Mandeb is the tiny former French colony of Djibouti, which hosts military facilities used by France, the United States, China, Japan and Italy. The two most significant are the American and Chinese installations.

The Americans have about 4,000 personnel at Camp Lemonnier, which covers nearly 600 acres. The Chinese have 1,000 personnel squeezed into 90 acres, although the facility is reported to include some 23,000 square metres of underground space. The Chinese base also has a substantial naval pier and is particularly well positioned for operations in the Gulf of Aden. It is China’s first overseas military support base.

To complicate matters further, more countries are sticking their oars into the turbulent waters of the Red Sea.

Israel has established diplomatic relations with Somaliland, while the United Arab Emirates has developed extensive commercial and security links with Somaliland and has invested heavily in the port of Berbera. The UAE previously maintained military facilities in the region as part of its operations in Yemen.

Britain does not maintain a major permanent military base in Djibouti, but British forces operate alongside American and other Western forces in the region. Turkey and Qatar have also developed growing political, economic and security interests around the Red Sea and Horn of Africa.

Then there is Ethiopia, which must contend with renewed tensions with Eritrea and continuing instability in the Tigray region. Ethiopia is landlocked and has long sought greater access to the Red Sea, making its relationship with Eritrea particularly sensitive.

Ethiopia also has to contend with an estimated 76,000 Sudanese refugees who have fled the civil war next door. That struggle between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) is believed to have killed at least 150,000 people and displaced more than 14 million. Sudan is itself a Red Sea country and, before the war, around 180,000 barrels of oil a day passed through the Red Sea terminal at Port Sudan.

Because of Sudan’s strategic location, the civil war has drawn in a wide variety of competing foreign players, including Egypt, Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, the UAE, Chad, Libya and Russia. Ukraine has also become involved, with Ukrainian special forces assisting the Sudanese army against Russian-linked forces and the RSF.

Fighting on both sides of the Red Sea has had a direct impact on shipping.

Before the latest escalation, war-risk insurance for ships transiting the Red Sea was around 0.3 percent of the vessel’s value. After the Houthis announced a naval blockade, it rose to about 0.75 percent. This week, depending on the ship, destination and proximity to Yemen, premiums are reported to be between 3 and 7 percent of the vessel’s value.

The closure of the Strait of Hormuz has also increased the importance of Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea oil terminal at Yanbu. Before the latest disruption, 5 percent of the world’s oil supply was passing through the Bab el-Mandeb. At one point this year the figure rose to about 8 percent. Following attacks and disruption to Saudi oil infrastructure, Red Sea oil flows have subsequently fallen sharply.

Oil is not the only commodity passing through the Red Sea. Around 22 percent of the world’s containerised trade normally passes through the Suez Canal.

Higher insurance costs are not the only additional factor. Crews sailing through war zones quite rightly expect higher pay. Add that to insurance costs, increased fuel consumption and the possibility that a ship might be attacked, and an increasing number of shipowners are sending their vessels around South Africa’s Cape of Good Hope.

That detour can add two to three weeks to a voyage. The result is predictable: higher freight costs, higher insurance premiums, more expensive goods and, ultimately, higher prices for consumers.

The Red Sea is therefore no longer simply a shipping route between Europe and Asia. It has become one of the world’s most heavily contested strategic corridors — and one in which the ghosts of the British Empire are still very much alive.

* Tom Arms is foreign editor of Liberal Democrat Voice. He also contributes to “The New World” magazine and lectures on world affairs. He is the author of “America Made in Britain,” two editions of “The Encyclopaedia of the Cold War” and “The Falklands Crisis.”