The Washington red carpet rolled out for Narendra Modi this week underscores India’s emergence as a cornerstone of America’s foreign policy.

Delhi is seen not only in military terms as a regional counterbalance to China, but increasingly as a major economic partner and a key to reducing Western dependence on Chinese factories.

But there are trip holes in the carpet of which all players need to be aware.

The biggest gaps are historical. India’s democratic institutions are the latest layer of centuries of political and cultural veneers that pre-date the Greco-Roman traditions that are the roots of American and European civilisation.

In many ways, India and China have more in common than the US and India. They are both Asian. They are both proud of their ancient histories, and they both endured the rigours and humiliation of colonialism. In fact, in the immediate aftermath of independence, this perceived commonality with China encouraged Jawaharlal Nehru to pursue a close relationship with Beijing. It foundered on the rocks of a disputed Himalayan border.

The two countries also have a common cause in that they both assert that the current legal structures that underpin the world order are disadvantageous to their interests and the interests of the wider developing world. They were written by Western countries for Western countries in the wake of World War Two. They need to be adapted to the 21st century. For a start, India wants a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.

Then there is Russia. Again, the relations between India and Moscow go back to the struggle against the British, when many members of the independence movement visited Russia and received training and support. When independence came, it was only natural that the links forged in the shadows emerged as public policy and Russia became India’s arsenal and a major aid supplier.

The US responded to the Russian presence by supporting India’s arch-enemy, Pakistan and then, from the 1970s until about 2010, China which also threw its weight behind Pakistan and launched a border war with India in the Himalayas.

The US is keen to wean India’s military off their Russian suppliers and is offering not only weaponry but defense technology to allow India to expand its own defense industry. This sits well with Modi’s “Make in India” policy. Moscow, however, still supplies 49 percent of India’s weaponry although it is down from 70 percent a few years ago. The US in 2022 supplied only 11 percent of India’s military needs.

India’s continuing attachment to Russia is evident in Modi’s refusal to condemn Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. His purchase of discounted Russia oil and gas has been a major factor in Moscow’s ability to finance its war machine. In fact, India has increased its purchases of Russian energy ten-fold.

India is unlikely to abandon Moscow for Washington and the Biden Administration appears to have reconciled itself to this political reality. China, it argues, is the bigger long term threat to American interests and is emphasising the anti-Chinese Quad Alliance of India, America, Australia and Japan.

The problem with the Quad is that India almost instinctively rebels against formal alliances. Delhi was one of the driving forces behind the 1961 creation of the Non-Aligned Movement (along with Yugoslavia, Egypt, Ghana and Indonesia). It is still a key member. Indian’s strong attachment to non-alignment is one of the reasons that the Quad is not a formal alliance like NATO, but rather a structure for security dialogue. In fact, its formal title is the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue.

India’s foreign policy is based more on relationships rather than formal alliances. It prefers a transactional form of mutual back scratching then strict commitments. As the world’s most populous country and the fifth largest – soon to be third – economy in the world, India is becoming increasingly aware of its diplomatic heft, and is acting accordingly.

It was during the Clinton Administration that the State Department first starting courting the emerging India. But the big breakthrough came during the George W. Bush years when in 2005 the two countries signed the US-India Civil Nuclear Agreement. India thus became the only nuclear weapons state that had not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty who was allowed to conduct nuclear commerce with other states.

The nuclear deal became a foundation stone on which diplomats on both sides could build economic, political and cultural links. It was further aided by the gradual cooling of relations between Pakistan and the US. By 2022 The United States was India’s biggest trading partner– $191 billion. US investment in India totalled $54 billion and Indian investment in the US had reached $40 billion. The Indian diaspora in the US had reached 200,000.

The Biden Administration wants to build on two decades of intensive diplomacy to cement India’s role as a counterbalance to China in economic arena as well as the military realm. They are concerned that globalisation has resulted on Western over-dependence on Chinese manufactures and they want India to pick up some slack of the as the US reduces trade with China.

This coincides nicely with Modi’s own economic plans. The current Indian economic miracle is mainly due to growth in high-end pharmaceutical and technology products and services. He wants to expand the manufacturing base to lift the millions of working class Indians out of poverty.

There is plenty of scope for growth in relations on the basis of India’s transactional approach. But basic foundational conflicts remain. The approach to democracy is one of them. America’s democracy grew out of Europe’s Age of Enlightenment and has a strong attachment to human rights. India’s was a British import, and from its inception has been hamstrung by the conflict between Hindu and Muslims.

The creation of Pakistan and the long-standing enmity between Islamabad and Delhi are the result of this conflict. Mahatma Gandhi tried to prevent it and was assassinated by Hindu extremists for his troubles. Nehru did his best to pursue a secular state, but his Congress (I) Party has been overtaken by Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party. The BJP is a right-wing Hindu nationalist party which promotes the rights of Hindus over the Muslim minority.

To do this it has intimidated journalists, academics and lawyers, using many of the same techniques found in countries such as Hungary and Turkey. Hindu rights, as opposed to human rights, are the main policy of the Modi government.

Seventy-five US Congressmen urged President Biden to raise the treatment of the Muslim minority in his talks with Prime Minister Modi. For the moment, geopolitical concerns outweigh human rights.

* Tom Arms is foreign editor of Liberal Democrat Voice. He also contributes to “The New World” magazine and lectures on world affairs. He is the author of “America Made in Britain,” two editions of “The Encyclopaedia of the Cold War” and “The Falklands Crisis.”