Russia’s dependence on Chinese markets, sanctions busting finance and political support is turning it into a vassal of Beijing.

The bromance between Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin was unbalanced to begin with. The Chinese economy and population are ten times that of Russia.

Russia is a primary commodity producing country which makes it more susceptible to the economic winds of change should its raw products – mainly grain, gold, oil and gas – drop. China, on the other hand has emerged as an advanced, complex economy which is far more dependent on good relations with its Western markets than on relations with Russia.

The only arena in which the Russians have been perceived to have the upper-hand in the Sino-Russian relationship is in the defense arena. But now that is on the wane. Putin’s litany of Ukrainian failures has severely damaged Russia’s reputation for military prowess.

Nuclear weaponry is the only arena in which Moscow retains an overwhelming advantage with the world’s largest nuclear arsenal. But rest assured that the Chinese are just as worried as everyone else about Putin’s threats to use nukes, and is applying the maximum political pressure to deter him. They will gain nothing and lose everything by allying themselves with a country that uses nuclear weapons to illegally annex another country’s territory.

The one thing holding the Xi and Vladimir together is their mutual suspicion/hatred of the West coupled with a firm belief that the days of Western liberal democracy are numbered and the rise of firm autocratic governments is inevitable. For that reason, China is unlikely to ditch Russia, but it will extract a hefty price for its support.

The question is: What is the price? For a start, Russian oil and gas. Since the 1980s most of Moscow’s energy exports have headed west to Europe. Russia is already redirecting 76 percent of its oil which formerly went to Western Europe. China has upped its annual Russian oil imports by 135,000 barrels daily. But the Chinese – like the Indians – are being offered discount prices to keep them on board. China will demand that they pay even less, and if Russia continues to lock itself out of Western markets than the law of supply and demand will support their case.

The next Chinese target is Siberia and the Russian Far East. The Chinese have never been happy with the Russian presence on their northern border or on the North Pacific coast, especially since the Russian presence there is largely the result of the 1858 “unequal” Treaty of Aigun.

At the height of the European imperial carve-up of China, Russia took advantage of Chinese preoccupation with the Second Opium War and the Taiping Rebellion to pressure the Qing Dynasty into handing over 231,660 square miles of Siberia. That is roughly the size of Ukraine. The terms of Moscow’s diplomatic coup still rankles in Beijing and the importance of the region has increased as climate change has opened access to Arctic natural resources and sea routes. It is perhaps significant that China has taken to describing itself as a “near Arctic” power.

Next is Central Asia – long considered by Russia as the vital stepping stone to a warm water port. Central Asia has been regarded as an integral part of the Russian Empire since the Tsar’s troops conquered the region in the 19^th century. There are large ethnic Russian populations in all of the now independent Islamic republics, major oil deposits and Russian military bases. China, however, wants to be dominant power in order to gain access to the region’s resources and re-establish the traditional Silk Road route.

The longer the war in Ukraine drags on the more Putin becomes dependent on China for survival, and the greater price that China will extract.

* Tom Arms is foreign editor of Liberal Democrat Voice and author of “The Encyclopaedia of the Cold War” and “America Made in Britain".