The Washington red carpet rolled out for Narendra Modi this week underscores India’s emergence as a cornerstone of America’s foreign policy.

Delhi is seen not only in military terms as a regional counterbalance to China, but increasingly as a major economic partner and a key to reducing Western dependence on Chinese factories.

But there are trip holes in the carpet of which all players need to be aware.

The biggest gaps are historical. India’s democratic institutions are the latest layer of centuries of political and cultural veneers that pre-date the Greco-Roman traditions that are the roots of American and European civilisation.

In many ways, India and China have more in common than the US and India. They are both Asian. They are both proud of their ancient histories, and they both endured the rigours and humiliation of colonialism. In fact, in the immediate aftermath of independence, this perceived commonality with China encouraged Jawaharlal Nehru to pursue a close relationship with Beijing. It foundered on the rocks of a disputed Himalayan border.

The two countries also have a common cause in that they both assert that the current legal structures that underpin the world order are disadvantageous to their interests and the interests of the wider developing world. They were written by Western countries for Western countries in the wake of World War Two. They need to be adapted to the 21st century. For a start, India wants a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.

Then there is Russia. Again, the relations between India and Moscow go back to the struggle against the British, when many members of the independence movement visited Russia and received training and support. When independence came, it was only natural that the links forged in the shadows emerged as public policy and Russia became India’s arsenal and a major aid supplier.

The US responded to the Russian presence by supporting India’s arch-enemy, Pakistan and then, from the 1970s until about 2010, China which also threw its weight behind Pakistan and launched a border war with India in the Himalayas.

The US is keen to wean India’s military off their Russian suppliers and is offering not only weaponry but defense technology to allow India to expand its own defense industry. This sits well with Modi’s “Make in India” policy. Moscow, however, still supplies 49 percent of India’s weaponry although it is down from 70 percent a few years ago. The US in 2022 supplied only 11 percent of India’s military needs.

India’s continuing attachment to Russia is evident in Modi’s refusal to condemn Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. His purchase of discounted Russia oil and gas has been a major factor in Moscow’s ability to finance its war machine. In fact, India has increased its purchases of Russian energy ten-fold.

India is unlikely to abandon Moscow for Washington and the Biden Administration appears to have reconciled itself to this political reality. China, it argues, is the bigger long term threat to American interests and is emphasising the anti-Chinese Quad Alliance of India, America, Australia and Japan.

The problem with the Quad is that India almost instinctively rebels against formal alliances. Delhi was one of the driving forces behind the 1961 creation of the Non-Aligned Movement (along with Yugoslavia, Egypt, Ghana and Indonesia). It is still a key member. Indian’s strong attachment to non-alignment is one of the reasons that the Quad is not a formal alliance like NATO, but rather a structure for security dialogue. In fact, its formal title is the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue.

India’s foreign policy is based more on relationships rather than formal alliances. It prefers a transactional form of mutual back scratching then strict commitments. As the world’s most populous country and the fifth largest – soon to be third – economy in the world, India is becoming increasingly aware of its diplomatic heft, and is acting accordingly.

It was during the Clinton Administration that the State Department first starting courting the emerging India. But the big breakthrough came during the George W. Bush years when in 2005 the two countries signed the US-India Civil Nuclear Agreement. India thus became the only nuclear weapons state that had not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty who was allowed to conduct nuclear commerce with other states.